Law and the Poor in Rural India: The Prospects for Legal Aid by Gordon, Richard K., Jr. & Lindsay, Jonathan M.
American University International Law Review
Volume 5 | Issue 3 Article 1
1990
Law and the Poor in Rural India: The Prospects for
Legal Aid
Richard K. Gordon Jr.
Jonathan M. Lindsay
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University International Law Review by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact
fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gordon, Jr., Richard K. and Jonathan M. Lindsay. "Law and the Poor in Rural India: The Prospects for Legal Aid." American University
International Law Review 5, no. 3 (1990): 655-772.
ARTICLES
LAW AND THE POOR IN RURAL INDIA: THE
PROSPECTS FOR LEGAL AID
Richard K. Gordon, Jr.* and Jonathan M. Lindsay**
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ............................... 656
A. Critiques of Legal Aid and Law and Development 658
B. An Approach to Evaluating the Prospects for Legal
Aid: An Introduction to the Indian Case ........ 661
II. THE STRUCTURES OF DOMINANCE IN RURAL
IN D IA ......................................... 664
A. Caste and the Religious, Social and Economic Or-
dering of Village Life ........................ 665
1. Introduction to varna and jati .............. 665
2. Varna and jati as religious law ............ 668
3. Varna and jati as social referents .......... 673
4. Jati and economic relations ................ 678
a. Jati and access to land ............... 678
* B.A. 1978 Yale College; J.D. 1984 Harvard Law School. Consultant, Interna-
tional Tax Program, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
** B.A. 1979 Yale College; J.D. 1984 Boalt Hall. Associate, Goulston & Storrs,
Boston, Massachusetts.
Support for fieldwork came from the Committee on General Scholarships and the
Sheldon Fund of Harvard University, and from the Harvard Law School. The authors
wish to thank the American Institute of Indian Studies, the Indian Law Institute, for-
mer Chief Justice P.N. Bhagwati and the Supreme Court of India, and the School of
Oriental and African Studies for their institutional support. We also wish to thank
Professors V.S. Rekhi, Marc Galanter, John Mansfield, David Smith, Lance Liebman,
Gary Bellow, Kenneth Phillips, Mr. Zubair Khan, Mr. Michael Macy, Ms. Betsy
Burns, and Jane L. Taylor for their invaluable assistance and comments on earlier
versions. We especially thank those villagers in western Uttar Pradesh, India who so
kindly tolerated our presence and our questions, and who made us feel so welcome.
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
b. Jati and labor ....................... 681
B. Shifts and Stability in the Hierarchy: Sources of
Change and Sources of Reinforcement in the Struc-
tures of Rural Dominance .................... 684
1. Jati and religion: continuity and change ..... 684
a. Reform and perpetuation from below ... 685
b. Reform and perpetuation from above ... 690
c. Jati and religion: society and change .... 693
2. Westernization and secularization: continuity
and change .............................. 695
a. New rights and politics ............... 695
i) Democracy, rights and benefits .... 695
ii) Village politics and factionalism . 697
b. Courts, police and the new rights ....... 709
i) The modern formal judicial struc-
ture ........................... 709
ii) The Indian legal system in village
life ............................ 7 17
c. Economic change ..................... 732
i) Changes within the village ........ 732
ii) Sources of government assistance.. 740
III. LAW AND CHANGE ........................... 746
A. Status Quo, Sanskritization and Westernization.. 746
B. The Legal System and the Have-Nots in Rural In-
d ia .. ....... ...... .... ..... ... ..... ..... ... 7 50
1. The current state of public interest litigation. 756
2. The current state of legal aid .............. 766
3. A proposal for rural legal aid ............. 769
I. INTRODUCTION
Movements come and go, in society at large no less than in the acad-
emy. Theories are refined; they inspire action, engender criticism, and
secure successes and failures. Modern programs for social intervention
in the contemporary United States, particularly those designed to alle-
viate poverty or to secure equal treatment for unpopular minorities (the
"have-nots"), have lately fallen on harder times. An obvious sign of
this trend is the federal government's curtailment of financial support. 1
Recent signs from the Supreme Court also indicate a major withdrawal
1. See PERSPECTIVES ON THE REAGAN YEARS (J. Palmer ed. 1987) (providing an
overview of the reduction in government spending).
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from past judicial activism in favor of the have-nots.' Criticism of pro-
grams of social intervention, however, has come not only from con-
servative politicians, but also from both the left and right of the schol-
arly community. A crisis of confidence has evolved in the government's
ability to help engineer a better society. 3
The subject of this article involves two such movements: free legal
aid (and related public interest litigation)4 and law and development
(particularly the application of Western legal experience to the study of
developing countries). Both movements have suffered intense criticism.
Nevertheless, a new field has emerged-free legal aid in developing
countries-which somewhat surprisingly has attracted support from
scholars, governments, lawyers, and international institutions.'
As with other movements, legal aid in developing countries has un-
dergone theoretical refinement. It has engendered action, criticism,
some successes, and many failures. This is not to say that criticisms of
2. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. Croson, 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (noting the govern-
ment's strict standards of demonstrated necessity when government uses race to dis-
tribute burdens and benefits); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115
(1989) (shifting the burden of proof in setting out discrimination claims to the plain-
tiffs); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989) (holding that racial
harassment is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Martin v. Wilks, 108 S. Ct.
2843 (1988) (allowing white workers to challenge previous affirmative action
settlements).
3. For conservative critiques, see, e.g., C. MURRAY, LOSING GROUND (1984) (argu-
ing in part that welfare is empirically ineffective because it creates disincentives to self-
improvement); M. NOVAK, THE NEW CONSENSUS ON FAMILY AND WELFARE: A CO.t-
MUNITY OF SELF-RELIANCE (1987) (arguing that culture is the primary determinant of
success). For an example of criticism from the left, see Simon, Rights and Redistribu-
tion in the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1431 (1986) (offering an example of
criticism from the left). Simon argues that welfare creates an illusion of redistribution
without actual improvement in the life of the poor, thereby defusing the impulse for
real change. Id.
4. These two forms of legal involvement representing special vulnerables are distin-
guishable. Public interest litigation is more often political and ideological than is legal
aid for the indigent and can serve as an adjunct to other forms of political mobilization.
Legal aid is primarily associated with the vindication of individual rights and supported
by state aid. Some public interest litigation, however, particularily regarding the envi-
ronment and land use, is of interest to the middle class more than others. Both, how-
ever, seek to empower special vulnerables. Moreover, public interest litigation and legal
aid depend on one another. Test cases need to extend and clarify rights, and individual
cases ensure enforcement.
5. Professors Marc Galanter and David Trubek have criticized both legal aid in the
United States and the law and development movement. Both, however, have argued for
the creation of free legal aid programs in developing countries. Galanter, The Duty Not
to Deliver Legal Services, 30 MIANI L. REV. 1 (1976); Trubek & Galanter, Scholars
in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Stud-
ies in the United States, 1974 U. Wis. L. REV. 1062; M. Galanter, New Patterns of
Legal Services in India (1982) (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors);
Trubek, Unequal Protection: Thoughts on Legal Services, Social Welfare. and Income
Distribution in Latin America, 13 TEX. INT'L L.J. 243 (1978).
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both left and right have been so devastating as to invalidate these pro-
grams for social intervention. Instead, many argue for program im-
provement and not for elimination. There exists, however, some
profound criticisms of public interest litigation, legal aid, and law and
development.
A. CRITIQUES OF LEGAL AID AND LAW AND DEVELOPMENT
Criticisms of the modern legal aid movement range from those of
specific aspects of program implementation to those of the theoretical
basis of the Western legal model. Similar issues are raised in the evalu-
ation of the law and development movement.
Political conservatives criticize legal aid on many levels and propose
the curtailment or elimination of public funding of legal aid activities.
They argue that the legal aid is too expensive, that the private bar can
meet the genuine need for individual legal representation among the
poor, and that legal aid (as public interest litigation) tends to confound
the political decisions of democratic government.' Political conserva-
tives contend that court enforced rules, such as affirmative action for
racial minorities, are anti-democratic and instill a greater antagonism
in the haves.
7
Liberal critics have also raised questions about the nature of govern-
ment funded legal aid. They suggest that legal aid can create an inap-
propriate dynamic of state supported lawyers litigating against state
interests or against those individuals or institutions with an interest in
preserving the status quo (the "haves"). This situation can result in
unreliable financing8 or restrictive rules placed on the use of these
funds; both scenarios have occurred in the United States.9
6. Phillips, Legal Services and the Public Interest, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
355, 357 (1985); Rabxin, Public Interest Law; Is It in the Public Interest?, 8 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 341, 343 (1985); Breger, Legal Aid for the Poor: A Conceptual
Analysis, 60 N.C.L. REV. 281 (1982).
7. T. SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY 90 (1984); see also Cren-
shaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidis-
crimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1336-46 (1988) (discussing Sowell's views
and the conservative assault on antidiscrimination law).
8. Government-supported legal aid lawyers in the United States are paid far less
than the average wage for the legal profession. It is argued that the government has an
ambivalent attitude toward financing its own opposition. Abel, Lawyers and the Power
to Change, 7 LAW & POL'Y 1, 5-9 (1985); Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid
Under Advanced Capitalism, 32 UCLA L. REV. 474, 524-33 (1985) [hereinafter Abel,
Law Without Politics].
9. Until the 1988 fiscal year budget, the Reagan Administration unsuccessfully at-
tempted to end funding for the Legal Services Corporation. Congress restored the
funds. Federally funded legal aid centers are prohibited from engaging in political ac-
tivities, strikes, or labor organizing, and from bringing suits on behalf of abortion rights
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Liberals have also raised questions concerning the efficacy and valid-
ity of the judicial model of resolving social and economic inequality.
First, lawyers that litigate issues concerning social or economic inequal-
ity often have their own profound ideological beliefs that may super-
sede the needs or best interests of the client.10 This problem becomes
far more pronounced as the number and diversity of clients increases
and the social, racial, cultural or other differences between lawyers and
clients become greater." Second, liberals argue that courts are institu-
tionally incapable of both understanding complex social and economic
relationships and of overseeing the process of social intervention. For
example, when judges attempt to fashion rights-based remedies for mi-
nority children in public schools, or inmates in prisons, or patients in
mental hospitals, the process can present complexities well beyond the
capacity of the court system to address. 2 Third, those interested in
protecting the status quo normally have better access to legal resources
and, therefore, a continuing advantage over the have-nots in the legal
arena.
13
The fourth and perhaps most profound criticism is that government
funding of legal services creates an illusion of justice and an image that
the state does not truly wish to rectify inequality through more sub-
stantive means.14 This can be done in two ways. First, encouraging re-
course to the court system may result in the neglect of more meaning-
ful political activity, which may create more substantive benefits for
the have-nots.1 5 Second, the use of the legal system may legitimate ex-
isting inequalities inherent in society, inequalities entrenched in ex-
or school integration. 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b) (1982).
10. See Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests In
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976); Cahn & Cahn, Power to
the People or to the Profession? The Public Interest in Public Interest Law, 79 YALE
L.J. 1005, 1014, 1040 (1970).
11. See Abel, Law Without Politics, supra note 8, at 521-22; Rhode, Class Con-
flicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1183 (1982).
12. See Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585 (1983). Note, Im-
plementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 HARv. L. REv. 428,
448-55 (1977).
13. Galanter, Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REV. 95 (1974); see Bachman & Wetchek, Acorn Law
Practice 7 LAW & POL'Y 29, 41 (1985) (arguing that a specialized private bar is more
effective at marshalling information and managing the legal system).
14. This argument is associated with the Conference on Critical Legal Studies. M.
KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); THE POUTICS OF LAW: A
PROGESSIVE CRITIQUE (D. Kairys ed. 1982) [hereinafterPouLTcs oF LAw].
15. Bachman, Lawyers, Law and Social Change, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 1 (1985); Dhavan, Managing Legal Activism: Reflections on India's Legal
Aid Programme, 15 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 281, 283-95 (1986) (arguing that litigation
prevents the development of effective political activity in India).
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isting Western legal systems."6 Abstract legal categories such as "land-
lord" and "tenant" are stripped of factors indicating the true nature of
inequality and, when enforced through judicial proceedings, that ine-
quality is reinforced.
17
Many of the questions raised in the field of law and development
mirror the criticisms of legal aid in the United States. Legal system
advocates may be unaware of the intricacies of the social and economic
systems of specific developing countries and their interactions with the
legal system. As a result, these advocates may place too much emphasis
on legal doctrine and action without an awareness of consequences or
alternatives. 8
The Western comparativists, through their ignorance of a particular
foreign culture, may suggest inappropriate plans of action. Conse-
quently these plans are unlikely to work or may result in pernicious
action.' The distance between the advocate of a "Western" legal strat-
egy and the intended beneficiaries is probably greater than that be-
tween a lawyer and plaintiffs in the United States.2" The legal systems
of developing countries may slant more against the interests of the
have-nots, in terms of procedure and substantive law, than in the West.
Because the Western legal model may not even work well in the West,
its applicability to developing countries is doubtful.2
16. See Kennedy, Antonio Gramsci and the Legal System, 6 AM. LEGIS. STUD.
A.F. 32 (1980); Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983
Wis. L. REV. 379; Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in PoLITIcs oF LAW,
supra note 14, at 284-86; Greer, Antonio Gramsci and "Legal Hegemony," in PoLITIcs
oF LAW, supra note 14, at 305; see Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination
Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62
MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978) (noting American race relations); Crenshaw, supra note 7,
at 1349-69 (discussing generally the critique from the left).
17. See Gabel, Reification in Legal Reasoning, 3 REs. L. & Soc. 25, 26-28, 32
(1980); Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1363-64 (1984); Gordon, supra
note 16, at 286.
18. See Trubek and Galanter, supra note 5, at 1076-78.
19. Merriman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins, Style, De-
cline and Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. J. Comp. L. 457,
481 (1977) (summarizing some of these issues and noting that foreign scholars have
"unfamiliarity with the target culture and society (including the legal system), inno-
cence of theory, artifical access to power, and relative immunity to consequences").
20. Trubek & Galanter, Scholars in the Fun House: A Reply to Professor Seid-
man, I REs. L. & Soc. 31, 38 (1978).
21. Trubek & Galanter, supra note 5, at 1081-85; see Seidman, The Lessons of
Self Estrangement: On the Methodology of Law and Development,'l RES. L. & Soc.
1, 5-6 (1978); Greenburg, Law and Development in the Light of Dependency Theory, 3
REs. L. & Soc. 129 (1978).
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B. AN APPROACH TO EVALUATING THE PROSPECTS FOR LEGAL
AID: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INDIAN CASE
We believe that the resolution of the debate outlined above is in no
way self-evident. While it raises appropriate issues for a Westerner
studying legal aid in a developing country, only a detailed empirical
examination can successfully answer these questions underlying it.
There is a tendency in critical writing to assume that a particular thesis
can be answered merely by posing the question. We, however, believe
otherwise. 2 Using these critical theses as guides, this article examines
the nature of dominance in one particular developing country and how
law and a legal aid program may work within the existing context to
benefit the dominated.
We chose India as our area of study for a number of reasons. First,
lawyers trained in the common law tradition can readily understand
the formal structure of the Indian judicial system. The structure and
powers of the courts, the roles of judges and lawyers, the adversary
system of trial, the reliance on judicial precedent, the doctrine of stare
decisis, and the shared fund of concepts and techniques locate Indian
law in the mainstream of the Anglo-American legal tradition.
Second, judges, lawyers, activists, and scholars in India have ex-
pressed a growing interest over the last two decades in establishing a
system of legal assistance for the poor and have actively debated the
form such a system should take. This debate has been the focus of
considerable interest on the part of international agencies such as the
Ford Foundation, which has funded a number of important free legal
aid activities in India, including international scholarly conferences, le-
gal aid camps, and public interest groups. 23 Moreover, in the past fif-
teen years, the Indian government impaneled two government commit-
tees on legal assistance and created a Federal Committee on
Implementation of Legal Aid Schemes. In addition, virtually every
state has enacted legislation creating state and district level legal aid
bureaucracies.24 The Indian Parliament has promulgated a .constitu-
22. See generally Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social
Field as an Appropriate Subject Study, 7 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 719 (1973); McCauley,
Law and the Behavioral Sciences: Is There Any There There?, 6 LAw & PoL'v 149
(1984) (noting that social science research may answer questions which are posed by
broad social theories and the law); Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies
and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REV. 575 (1984) (noting that empirical research may
answer some of the larger questions posed by critical legal theory, including legitima-
tion, reification, and other issues).
23. See generally THE FORD FOUNDATION, 1986 ANNUAL REPORT (1987).
24. See GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF LAW, JUSTICE AND COMPANY AF-
FAIRS, PROCESSUAL JUSTICE TO THE PEOPLE: REPORT OF THE EXPERT COMMITTEE ON
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tional article that was adopted (albeit imbedded in the nonjusticiable
Directive Principles of the Indian Constitution), calling for the creation
of free legal aid. 5 Most recently, the Indian Parliament has adopted
the Legal Services Authority Act, which aims to extend legal services
to the poor.26 The Indian Supreme Court has also played an important
and vigorous role in promoting both free legal aid and public interest
litigation.
2 7
To a great extent, the current debate over legal aid in India parallels
the past debate in the United States. While its proponents begin with
the assumption that easier access to the legal system by the poor is, by
its very nature, a desirable goal, skeptics dispute the assumption. Some
activists for the poor instinctively distrust legal aid as the creation of
the state. They maintain that pursuit of rights in a state-run legal sys-
tem would merely dilute their efforts and divert their energies away
from more direct action.
To such critics, legal aid has the effect (if not the intent) of coopting
the disadvantaged into a system that presents a veneer of impartiality
and justice, but which in reality is slow, complex, and inherently
stacked against them. 28 In addition, critics point out that unlike West-
ern courts, Indian courts are particularly slow and proceedings are
often bogged down in extraordinary procedural complexities.2" Indian
courts have difficulty implementing their decrees even more than courts
in the United States. The Indian legal profession has no tradition of
providing the wide range of counseling and monitoring services that
Western legal services lawyers typically provide.30
Although Indian courts from the village to the national level are both
slower and less efficient than those in the West, Western-style legal
institutions have long been firmly entrenched features of Indian life.
Indians have flocked to the courts with enthusiasm since the establish-
ment of the first English court over two and one-half centuries ago.
This behavior promoted the evolution of a legal profession of immense
LEGAL AID (1974); GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF LAW, JUSTICE AND COM-
PANY AFFAIRS, REPORT ON NATIONAL JURIDICARE: EQUAL JUSTICE-SOCIAL JUSTICE
(1977).
25. INDIA CONST. art. 39A.
26. LOK SABHA ACTS, ACT 39 OF 1987.
27. See Bhagwati, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation, 23 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 561 (1985).
28. Dhavan, supra note 15; see also LEGAL AID IMPLEMENTAION COMMITTEE, PUB-
LIC INTEREST LITIGATION IN INDIA: AN INVESTIGATIVE REPORT (Dhavan ed. 1982)
(providing a critical overview of legal aid proposals in India).
29. See infra notes 205-221 and accompanying text.
30. See discussion infra notes 95-96 (noting that legal services are not available
outside of the large cities).
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size and an elaborate system of courts and administrative tribunals. In
spite of arguments that a Western legal system is inappropriate and
alien to Indian culture, efforts to replace that system with "indigenous"
methods of dispute resolution have met with virtually no success. 31
Although much is known about the formal structure of the Indian
legal system, as well as many of its successes and failures, little is
known about the interaction of the poor and that system. How do the
poor, the have-nots, view the legal system? What types of problems do
the poor face and can legal aid address them? What form should legal
aid take? "The problem," according to former Chief Justice Bhagwati,
"is that no one knows what the legal needs of the poor really are. Yet
we go out and try to provide for them."
Our purpose is to approach the prospects for legal aid in India from
this angle, guided by the proposition that both skepticism and optimism
about legal aid are not currently informed by sufficient empirical exam-
ination. Although legal aid is the topic of this essay, the article does not
begin with a discussion of legal aid in India or of the Indian legal sys-
tem. We have instead elected to examine the possibilities for legal aid
within the existing Indian social, political, and economic setting. As a
result, our inquiry follows the path of such settings and tracks the pos-
sibilities for change within the existing milieu. This approach aims to
avoid the pratfalls of laying too much importance on legalism or on
formal legal structures. Though this process may be somewhat daunt-
ing for the those who are not Indian specialists (and, inevitably, over-
simplified to the specialists), it is the only effective way of understand-
ing how recourse to a legal system in a developing country may affect
social change.
What follows, therefore, is an examination of a rural Indian commu-
nity, the structures of dominance within that community, and how
those structures interact with the formal legal system and other state
institutions. The analysis is based primarily upon observations and in-
terviews conducted in three North Indian villages, principally the vil-
lage of Kisanpur in District Krishnapur, in the state of Uttar
Pradesh.32
31. See Galanter, The Aborted Restoration of 'Indigenous' Law in India, 14
CoNIP. STUD. IN Soc.& HisT. 53 (1972). This is not to suggest that traditional meth-
ods of settling disputes do not also continue to operate in some fashion in Indian
communities.
32. Krishnapur is a fictional name of an actual distrift and Kisanpur is a fictional
name for an actual village. Field work was carried out during 1982-83, and 1985. The
authors conducted all interviews in Hindi (with the not infrequent assistance of Mr.
Zubair Khan, then a graduate student in the Law Faculty of the Aligarh Muslim Uni-
versity) and transcribed each interview upon its completion.
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The analysis starts with the proposed beneficiaries of the services,
rather than with the providers, and poses in a specific setting the ques-
tions suggested above: What is the status quo of the have-nots in a
particular Indian community?; What are the religious, social, and eco-
nomic forces that reinforce dominance and hierarchy?; What, if any,
are the existing dynamics of change, particularly those that benefit the
have-nots?; Could the legal system advance the interests of the have-
nots without diverting or weakening other forces for change?; In specu-
lating on a form of legal aid, can the interests of the have-nots override
those of the providers of services or of the state?; How can the system
be designed to provide the have-nots with the best chance to prevail
over the haves?; And, finally, is it possible to minimize the preference
for radical change along western cultural lines (without sacrificing the
benefits of a comparative perspective), and achieve the possibility for
change within the existing religious and cultural system of rural India?
II. THE STRUCTURES OF DOMINANCE IN RURAL INDIA
India is a large, spectacularly diverse country, with approximately
820 million people living in an area only one-third the size of the
United States.3 3 Of those, approximately 75%, or 615 million, live in
rural areas. Although there are a substantial number of religious mi-
norities,3 over 80% of all Indians classify themselves as Hindus.3
Since the partition of British India into Muslim Pakistan, Hindu soci-
ety has dominated nonsectarian India.
The definition of "Hindu" is not entirely clear. Although Hinduism
is very old-the earliest scriptural authorities date back perhaps three
and one-half millennia-there is no centrally organized church or
clergy. There are, however, temples and priests. Despite the hundreds
of different sects of Hindus existing in India, a number of common
threads unify most adherents. With regard to self-identification within
society (if not with regard to philosophy or ethics), the most obvious
and perhaps most important aspect of Hinduism is caste.
33. Dhavan, supra note 15, at 281-82 (reviewing scholars complaints that too much
emphasis is placed on caste and not enough on economic considerations, particularly
with regard to social legislation). Courts have also noted the over-emphasis on the caste
system. Id.
34. THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 108-09
(1988). India is eleven percent Muslim (predominantly Sunni), making it the second
largest Muslim nation in the world. Id. It is two percent Christian, with the remainder
split among Sikhs, Jains, Buddhists, and a few Jews. Id.
35. Id.
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A. CASTE AND THE RELIGIOUS, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORDERING
OF VILLAGE LIFE
1. Introduction to Varna and Jati
If caste is among the most basic of all social divisions in Hindu soci-
ety, it is also among the most difficult to describe or to understand. The
word "caste" itself is not of Indian origin; it comes from either the
Portuguese or Spanish meaning "not mixed" or "chaste,"", and schol-
ars have criticized it as describing too many things.37 It is easier to
start by referring to the caste system, which Bernard Cohn describes as
a "closed stratification system in which recruitment to its constituent
parts is by birth and in which there is little movement from one group
to another, either through marriage or through individual mobility."3"
The French structural anthropologist Louis Dumont (citing the nine-
teenth-century sociologist Celestin Bougle) further defines the caste
system as dividing society into different hereditary groups, distin-
guished from and connected to each other by three characteristics: (1)
separation in matters of contact; (2) division of labor, with each group
(theoretically or traditionally) having a profession from which it is diffi-
cult for members to depart; and, perhaps most important, (3) hierarchy
or the ranking of groups as relatively superior or inferior.19
Cohn and Dumont refer to "groups." The legal scholar Marc Ga-
lanter refers to Hindu India as the "compartmental" society.40 Indians
see themselves belonging to these "groups" or "compartments" and use
these categories to define their social relationship. There are many dif-
ferent groups and sub-groups within the caste system. The most impor-
tant are varna (from the Sanskrit for color),4 jati (from the Sanskrit
for rank or race),42 gotra, and khandan. This list should also include
pariwar, or family.
36. C. BOUGLE, ESSAIS SUR LE REGIME DES CASTES [ESSAYS ON THE CASTE SYS-
TEM] 4 (1927), cited in L. DUMONT, HOMO HIERARCHICUS: THE CASTE SYST.-!s AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS 21, 347 n.l la (rev. English ed. 1980).
37. P. MANDELBAUM, I SOCIETY IN INDIA 29 (1970).
38. B. COHN, INDIA: THE SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY OF A CIVILUZATION 125 (1971)
[hereinafter SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY].
39. L. DUMONT, supra note 36, at 21, 43.
40. M. GALANTER, COMPETING EQUALITIES: LAW AND THE BACKWARD CLASSES IN
INDIA 1 (1984).
41. J. PLATTS, A DICTIONARY OF URDU, CLASSICAL HINDI AND ENGUS11 1189
(1982).
42. Id. at 369. One also encounters the word quom, that is Arabic in origin and
usually refers to jati. Id. Qu'on can also refer to all members of a particular religious
community. Id.
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The first category, varna,'3 refers to the four (or five, if one counts
those who remain outside the varna system, sometimes known as "un-
touchables")44 major ritual/occupational groups in Hinduism. The
varnas consist of the brahmins (priests), the ksatriyas (kings or war-
riors), the vaisyas (those who have domain over commerce), and the
sudras (workers or slaves). A brief reference to varna is first found in
the Vedas, the oldest and only truly sacred collection of Hindu religious
writings, although varna is discussed extensively in post-Vedic religious
commentary. The historical origins of varna are unknown. As groups
delineating power and authority, varnas may simply have begun as
classes. Some scholars have suggested a partial racial theory, with the
higher varnas representing the invading Aryans, with the sudras and
those not belonging to varnas representing the enslaved aboriginal peo-
ples of the subcontinent. 5
Although not the most central groupings in contemporary day-to-day
Hindu social intercourse, varna categories, are nevertheless significant.
Contemporary Hindus frequently identify themselves with varna cate-
gories, particularly when they attempt to improve their hierarchical
status." Most Hindus have an idea of where they fit within the varna
scheme, and agree on the hierarchical nature of varna categories.
Perhaps most importantly, Hindus have an important relationship to
the next largest grouping, the jati.4
Most Hindus consider their jati (fellow jati-mates often refer to jati
as the biradari, or brotherhood) 49 as belonging to a particular varna,
and therefore fitting within a scheme of varna hierarchy. Unlike varna
43. R. LINGAT, THE CLASSICAL LAW OF INDIA 28-72 (J. Derrett trans. 1973).
44. M. SRINIVAS, SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN INDIA 3 (1966).
45. L. DUMONT, supra note 36, at 1-32.
46. M. SHARMA, THE POLITICS OF INEQUALITY 63 (1979). The British denoted
varna categories in the taking of censuses from 1901 until 1941. The census takers
attempted to rank various Hindu jatis in part through association with hierarchical
varna categories. In order to improve their relative rankings, leaders of various jails
attempted to describe themselves as belonging to higher-ranked varnas. M. SRINIVAS,
supra note 44, at 94-100; L. DUMONT, supra note 36, at 79-83.
47. Fox, Varna Schemes and Ideological Integration in Indian Society, II COMP.
STUD. IN SoC'Y HIsT. 27, 32-33 (1969). Broad groupings are more important in the
south of India, where brahmin, non-brahmin, and untouchable (those outside of the
varna) categories are more important. See M. SRINIVAS, supra note 44, at 102-14 (not-
ing that sub-varna groupings are more important in terms of day-to-day social, politi-
cal, and religious activities).
48. A. BETEILLE, CASTES OLD AND NEW 146-51 (1969) (explaining that the mean-
ing of the term jati shifts with geography and local tradition). Regional variation in
jatis are often referred to as sub-jatis. Id.
49. Scholarly writings on jali are voluminous. See A. MAYER, CASTE AND KINSHIP
IN CENTRAL INDIA (1960) (containing a good descriptive introduction on jai); see also
L. DUMONT, supra note 36.
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categories, jati is never mentioned in the Vedas, and is rarely men-
tioned in post- Vedic religious commentary. 0 Most jatis are associated
with a particular occupation: in fact, the names of most jatis are those
of occupational categories and many contemporary jatis continue in
their traditional occupational roles.5 ' Jatis are normally endogenous
and have elaborate rules regarding work, the eating and sharing of
food, religious rituals, and associations with other jatis (including phys-
ical contact).52 As with varna the historical origins of jati are a matter
of some debate. Because jatis are often identified with a particular type
of labor, some scholars have speculated that they arose originally as
guilds. Other scholars suggest that jatis were originally tribes or clans
because they maintain close social and religious ties.0
3
When one asks Hindus what their community is, they may reply
with their" varna, jati or gotra. Our experience in Kisanpur,m and the
experience of most students of Indian anthropology, reveals that
Hindus will provide their jati (or the regional sub-jati group, referred
to also as the jati). Other subgroups are also important. For example,
one or more gotras, normally exogamous sub-jati groupings that trace
their ancestry to a single person, may replace the jati as the principal
sub-varna grouping.56 Hindus will also define their place in society with
reference to the khandan, or large extended family, as well as to
smaller family groups. These subgroupings can play important roles in
defining contemporary political alliances. Most authors refer to the jati
or sub-jati when discussing reference groups or compartments. Al-
though jatis are divisible into regional sub-sub-jatis, it is still prefera-
ble to use jati as a corporate reference group.
57
The jati category is ubiquitous in India. Because each jati has rules
regarding labor, food, religious ritual, and is endogenous, jati affiliation
often directs social and political ties. Traditionally, jatis enforced their
50. See infra note 76 and accompanying text (explaining when jais is mentioned
in post-Vedic religious commentary).
51. See infra text at 678-81 (discussing the list of jais and traditional occupations
in Kisanpur). Not all jai names are those of professions, nor are the jai member
professions always related to the traditional professions of that jati. Id. Most jais en-
gage in agriculture. Id.
52. See L. DuMoN'r, supra note 36, at 92-183 (providing an overview of jati rules
and citing additional sources).
53. See id. at 1-32.
54. In conducting our interviews we used the term qu'om because it has an Arabic
origin and, therefore, is less likely to prejudice a response.
55. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
56. M. SHARMA, supra note 46, at 86.
57. L. DuMONT, supra note 36, at 62-64 (discussing Meyer's observations).
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own jati law through meetings of jati elders, known as panchayats.5 8
Class references, particularly to the ownership of land, usually corre-
spond to jati divisions. The Indian constitution, like central and local
law, refers to jatis in order to provide the Indian version of affirmative
action.59 Historically, members of individual jatis have banded together
to form political associations; today, from the village level to state and
national politics, jati affiliation is of extreme importance.6 0
One of the most obvious, and for the purposes of this essay impor-
tant, characteristics of jati is hierarchy. As we shall discuss in greater
detail below, contemporary Hinduism involves an elaborate hierarchical
ranking not only of varnas, but within varnas of jatis, a ranking indi-
cating the relative intrinsic worth of every Hindu. Reference to Hindu
religious dogma often justifies this ranking and elaborate jati rules re-
garding food, work, and social intercourse maintain the hierarchy.
Some scholars argue that hierarchy and dominance are the most cen-
tral aspects of Hindu religion.61 Most studies of equality in contempo-
rary India begin with discussions of varna and jati hierarchy and the
religious justification for such dominance.62 While contemporary village
India seems obsessed with hierarchy, however, its justification within
Hinduism is not certain. Because the hierarchy of varna and jati is
central to the position of the have-nots in contemporary India and be-
cause it has religious origins, an examination of Indian society must
begin with Hindu religious law.
2. Varna and Jati as Religious Law
As previously noted, the earliest and only truly sacred Hindu reli-
gious collection are the Vedas. Hindu scholars refer to the Vedas,
which dates to the second millennium B.C., as the shruti, literally
meaning "what is heard" or revealed. Within Hinduism, only the
Vedas constitute divinely revealed truth.6 3 The existence of varna cate-
58. See id. at 170-83 (describing a traditional jati panchayat acting in modern
times); R. Hayden, Fact Discretion and Normative Implications: The Nature of Argu-
ment in a Caste Panchayat (June 7, 1982) (unpublished manuscript on file with the
authors).
59. Sivaramayya, Equality and Inequality: The Legal Framework, in EQUALITY
AND INEQUALITY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 34-50 (A. Beteille ed. 1983) (providing a
simple overview of the legal framework for jati and positive discrimination); see M.
GALANTER, supra note 40, at 119-20, 282-92 (giving a detailed description of how jati
is used and defined in determining positive discrimination).
60. See J. BROWN, MODERN INDIA: THE ORIGINS OF AN ASIAN DEMOCRACY 103,
158-59, 252, 357 (1985).
61. L. DUMONT, supra note 36.
62. See Sivaramayya, supra note 59; M. SHARMA, supra note 46.
63. Embree, The Roots of the Tradition in THE HINDU TRADITION: READINGS IN
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gories is briefly made only once in a later Vedic poem." This one refer-
ence does not, however, make clear if membership in a particular varna
is considered hereditary or fixed. In fact, varnas could merely have sug-
gested the existence of different economic or social classes.
Elaborate descriptions of varnas, including rules defining their hier-
archical position and interrelationship, are found in post-Vedic religious
law and commentary. These texts are known as the smriti, or "what is
remembered," and Hindu scholars do not consider them divinely "re-
vealed."6 5 There is, according to these texts, a distinct hierarchy to the
varnas.66 The brahmin, as priest, is himself divine.07 The ksatrya, as
king and as soldier, directly controls earthly power but is nevertheless
required both to consult the brahmin and to honor him with gifts.68
The ksatriya rules the vaisya, while the sudra is only a servant or slave
of the other three.6 9 Post-Vedic writings on varna include strict prohibi-
tions on intermarriage, on performing the labor of the other varnas,
and on other activities.
7 0
In the earliest Vedas, the following of religious rules seemed primar-
ily a way of controlling natural events. But in the later Vedas, one's
place in the universe is seen as resulting from the operation of the law
of karma, literally "action." The law of karma is described as the
ORIENTAL THOUGHT 4-7 (A. Embree ed. 1972). The Rig Veda, composed during the
second millennium B.C., is the first of four parts of the Samhitas, the collection of
hymns used in Aryan rituals. The Samhitas, along with the more philosophical and
speculative works known as the Brahmanas, Aranyankas, and Upanishads, complete
the collection of Aryan religious texts known collectively as the Vedas.
64. HYMNS FROM THE RIG-VEDA 12 (A. MacDonell ed. & trans. 1966). The
Purushasukta, a poem that describes varnas as originating from different parts of a
celestial body, is generally considered a later interpolation of the Rig Veda. Id.
65. Embree, supra note 63, at 6; P. KANE, HISTORY OF DHARmASATRA (ANCIENT
AND MEDIEVAL, RELIGIOUS AND CIVIL LAWS) 27 (1962) (discussing how the most
important Varna categories are the Sutras and the Dharmusastras).
66. See L. DUMONT, supra note 36, at 66-68.
67. THE LAWS OF MANU 398 (G. Buhler trans. 1969) [hereinafter MANU]. Ac-
cording to the Manu dharmasastra, dated around A.D. 400 and considered as the most
important and authoritative smriti, the Brahmin is divine and possesses the Veda. Only
brahmins can perform religious rituals and teach the sacred religious texts. Id. at 24,
401.
68. THE VYAVAHARA MAYUKHA AND THE YAJNAVAKYA SNIRITi 20-21 (A. Madalik
trans. 1880). For example, the ksatriya must consult the brahmin when making secular
political decisions and also give the brahmin material gifts in order to obtain religious
merit. A brahmin can restrain an imperious ksatriya. MANU, supra note 67, at 399.
69. MANU, supra note 67, at 24, 401.
70. Id. at 401-30; THE BHAGAVAD GITA 7-8 (F. Edgarton ed. and trans. 1972)
[hereinafter THE BHAGAVAD GITA]. The Bhagavad Gita is perhaps the most popular
religious epic in northern India. Id. Composed around 200 B.C. to A.D. 200, it does not
provide detailed varna rules, but describes the performance of varna duties as essential
and notes that violation of varna duty, or the mixture of varnas, results in destruction
of family and the passage to hell. Id.
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"conservation of energy .. .applied to the moral world";7'specifically
each good deed rewards the doer, each bad deed punishes the doer.
What constitutes a good deed or a bad deed is described in the
dharma, or duty, of each person. At the end of a lifetime, a person is
reborn according to the net sum of good and bad deeds. As can be
imagined, the law of karma could act as a powerful tool of social con-
trol. As we shall discuss below, contemporary belief in the laws of
karma plays an important role in how both lower jati and higher jati
Hindus interpret their relative positions within village society. Individu-
als may use Karma as a moral justification for treating those born into
lower jatis as inferior. For example, it is believed jatis are born into a
lowly position as a consequence of bad deeds done in their previous
lives.
The post-Vedic brahmin commentators are greatly concerned with
defining the duty of each varna.2 It is clear that in this commentary,
the rules delineating each varna's duty constitute religious law. 3 Only
the Vedas, however, are the ultimate source of divine law because they
are the product of divine "revelation." Yet, the Vedas set out no rules;
the rules are found only in the post-Vedic law and commentary. These
commentators base the legitimacy of their detailed varna rules, and of
the dharma, or duty of each Hindu as a member of a varna, in the
tradition of the virtuous or "good custom. ' 74 These "good customs,"
apparently justifying jati rules, are based on the intrinsic worth of each
varna, and establish the appropriate treatment for other varnas. They
are, in effect, an essential aspect of hierarchy and stratification. But
what determines good custom? The authors of the post-Vedic legal
texts understood the past meaning of good custom. 75 But later com-
mentators have argued that the earlier writer's description of good cus-
tom is appropriate only for ancient times and is not necessarily applica-
ble to the present. 6 It is, in other words, subject to an interpretation
71. Edgarton, The Upanisads, and Later Hindu Thought, in THE BHAGAVAD GITA,
supra note 70, at 123.
72. We use the terms post-Vedic and classical Hinduism interchangeably.
73. R. LINGAT, supra note 43, at 176-77.
74. Lecture by Richard W. Lariviere on the Baradasnrtu and Hindu Law, Harvard
University (Mar. 15, 1988). Though the interpreters and preservers of what is 'good
custom' are Brahmins, the final source of the law subject to interpretation is not the
Vedas or the Shastras, but local practice. Id. "Anything goes as long as it is the prac-
tice of those the community thinks virtuous, although there is an attempt to tie this
practice to a forgotten Vedic text. The acceptance of this fiction is orthodoxy." Id.
75. Id.
76. See R. LINGAT, supra note 43, at 192-93 (discussing one commentator's view
that the sacrifice of cows, described in great detail in the earlier compilations of post
Vedic law, became so odious as to be forbidden).
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based upon contemporary "good custom." No conclusory rules are
spelled out.
While post-Vedic Hindu religious commentary is greatly concerned
with both the relative hierarchy of varnas and the duties associated
with them, there are few references to sub-varna categories such as
jati. There are no detailed rules regarding sub-varna orderings with the
exception of naming the occupation of a small number of jatis.7 Al-
though jati is rarely discussed in such commentary, the contemporary
religious justification for elaborate jati hierarchy, rules, and duty stems
principally from analogy to varna. There is one important reference to
jati in the Manu smriti, perhaps the most respected of post-Vedic reli-
gious law commentary. In Manu, the Hindu king is admonished to up-
hold the customs (dharma) of "jatis, countries, guilds and families." In
this principal reference to jati and to jati duty, Manu suggests that
proper behavior is that which in fact practiced, or "customary" behav-
ior. Although such a judgment is always made in consultation with the
brahmin, the Vedas do not precisely define who a brahmin is.78 British
East India Company judges, fulfilling the role of the Hindu temporal
power and unable to find jati rules in classical Hindu religious writings,
cited this provision and enforced contemporary jati customs. Initially
the judges consulted with brahmins.7'
In contemporary Hinduism, jatis have taken on the post- Vedic im-
portance of varna, and traditional jati rules have taken on an air of
immutability. According to post-Vedic commentary the interpretation
and enforcement of religious law is the duty of many: the brahmins,
who must interpret it according to the Vedas and according to virtuous
custom, and the king, who must see to it that the law is followed. But
the enforcement of such law also falls on each jati and individual. Each
jati maintains its own rules regarding almost every aspect of social,
economic, and political life. These rules define the duty of its members.
Because of karma, the proper following of these rules determines the
jati into which one is born. Only if one accepts the hierarchy of varna
and jati and the immutability of these rules does karma justify the
inferior treatment of some jatis.
77. See MANU, supra note 67, at 260 n.41 (referring to guilds, merchants, hus-
bandmen, and actors); id. at 412-14 (suggesting that jatis arose from offspring of
mixed varnas).
78. Id. at 260; see R. LINGAT, supra note 43, at 195 (discussing the Vedas lack of
definition for the Brahmin).
79. MANU, supra note 67, at 27, 260; Collector of Madura v. Moottoo Ramalingaa
Sathupaty, 12 Moore's Ind. Appeals 397 (P.C. 1868); see R. LtNGAT supra note 43, at
222-23 (noting that according to post-Vedic writers, the King could temporally punish
violations of the law).
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As many Hindu religious reform movements have noted, such ac-
ceptance is far from a requirement. First, according to the Vedas,
varna is not necessarily hereditary or even hierarchical. With the
Vedas constituting the only revealed truth, the hierarchy of varna or
jati found in the post-Vedic commentary is arguably not required. Even
if one accepts some or all of the post-Vedic commentary, varna rules,
including how one acts and how one treats other varnas, are open to
new interpretations based on the customs (perhaps new) of the virtu-
ous. Jati and jati duty are not even described in the Vedas and only
rarely in the post- Vedic commentary, thereby making jati and jati hi-
erarchy open to even greater interpretation. Even if one extends the
treatment of varna rules to jati rules, one may conclude that jati mem-
bership is not necessarily hereditary and that contemporary opinions of
the virtuous jati can constitute rules. Therefore, even accepting much
of post-Vedic commentary, the performance of new jati rules, rules
which may not be circumscribed by visions of dominance, may result in
good karma.
There is no clear consensus in modern Indian society as to the reli-
gious justification for varna, for jati hierarchy, or for traditional jati
rules. The scriptural gaps described above have resulted in numerous
reinterpretations of Hindu practices and beliefs. Most Hindus are fa-
miliar with such reinterpretations. It is true that most contemporary
Hindu practice follows the view that varna and jati membership is he-
reditary, that hierarchy is religiously ordained, and that jati rules are
immutable. But numerous sects within mainstream contemporary Hin-
duism have seized upon the lack of sacred textual support for varna
and jati hierarchy, for the immutability of jati rules, and even for the
existence of jati itself. It is possible, and many contemporary and popu-
lar religious leaders have so argued, for an ideology of equality to exist
within Hinduism. While it is clear that contemporary Hinduism in-
cludes jati hierarchy, we found that within the religious views of many
villagers, there were serious questions as to its validity. Reinterpreta-
tions of varna and jati play an important part in the contemporary
dynamics of religious law and politics. Even within classical or post-
Vedic Hinduism, a modern government may play the role of king, and
any virtuous man (such as Mohandas Gandhi, who was a vaishya) may
play the role of Brahmin interpreter. A denial of varna or jati hierar-
chy can follow, as can a rescripting of jati rules.
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3. Varna and Jati as Social Referents
Jati Structure in Kisanpur
Varnaso Jatitl Population"' Traditional
(percent) Occupation"
Brahmin Brahmar 3 priest
Mahabrahmin' I cremator
Ksatriya Rajput Thakur 36 prince/warrior
Jat 6 landowner
Vaisya Bania 2 shopkeeper
Baghaili" 13 shepherd
Sudra Barhai I carpenter
Kumhar I potter
(backward) 86  Lohar I ironmonger
Kohar 6 bearer
Nai 2 barber
Tell I oil presser
Untouchables' 7  Jatav" 16 leather worker
(Scheduled Castes) Dhobi 2 clothes washer
Dom I pigherder
Bhangi 4 sweeper
lirsa" Julaha I weaver
Manihar 2 bangle seller
The relative ranking of jatis seems to be based at least in part on the
traditional rules of each jati. The relevant issue is how these rules de-
termine (or are determined by) ritual pollution. Hinduism is obsessed
with the issue of pollution. Pollution is of two kinds; pollution affecting
only the individual as a participant in a polluting act (for example, a
80. Brahmin, ksatrlya and vaisya categories are fairly well agreed upon by all
jais, although see infra note 85 regarding Bagailis. Upper varna jatis agree on sudra
and untouchable categories. Jatis from these varnas tend not to refer to themselves as
belonging to varnas.
81. Ranking is our best estimate, arrived at by asking each person to rank jaiis
hierarchically.
82. Population percentages are approximate.
83. Traditional occupations are taken from the Hindi meanings ofjati names. With
the exception of Brahmars and Rajput Thakurs, at least some members of each jati
practiced the traditional occupation at least part-time.
84. Mahabrahmins, though a type of priest and generally, categorized as brahmins,
were traditionally considered untouchables due to their profession of handling corpses.
85. Baghallis were considered sudras at one time, but had recently managed to
gain acceptance as vaisyas.
86. These jatis identified themselves as backward classes.
87. These jatis identified themselves as scheduled castes. Higher jais identified
them as either lower jatis or scheduled castes.
88. Jatav is a jatis name designed to support the jatis' claim to ksatriya status (the
full name is sometimes given as Rajput Jatav). Jatavs, however, claim jail kinship to
Chamars, or leather workers.
89. Though Muslims are not properly part of the varna and jail system, their social
organization does display some aspects of these systems.
Mus
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person who touches beef, an upper-jati man who cohabits with an un-
touchable woman, or a woman who is menstruating) and pollution as-
sociated with an entire jati. In the former category of pollution, time or
ritual may remove the pollution, althoughu until the pollution is re-
moved, other members of the jati may not share with that person in
particular types of social intercourse, particularly eating. In the latter,
the impurity attaches at birth and nothing can alleviate the impurity.
Members of greater-polluted jatis may never engage in certain types
of social intercourse with lesser-polluted jatis. The least polluted jatis °
are brahmin jatis whose members traditionally performed no manual
labor. The lowest jatis, traditionally known as "untouchables" because
of the extremity of their pollution, usually were engaged in such tasks
as disposing of dead animals or cleaning latrines. The latter is more
polluted, in part because the jati is associated with an unclean
activity. 9
It is not simply that members of one jati touch the unclean and
others do not. Pollution is ritual, not literal, and in the case of jatis,
attaches at birth. The work of Mary Douglas demonstrates that, even
in contemporary Western societies, visions of cleanliness and filth are
often more ritual or psychological than actual.92 In India, the difference
between literal and ritual is considerably greater. One will find a hus-
band who will eagerly drink horribly polluted water drawn by his wife
from the Ganges River, but who would never drink from a hermetically
sealed soft drink bottle selected by her while she was menstruating. A
brahmin might not accept the latter from a member of an untouchable
jati regardless of actual occupation or objective state of cleanliness.
Still, the traditional occupations of different jatis do not seem so eas-
ily to fit into a simple scale of ritual pollution. For example, it is not
obvious why bearers should be ranked below shepherds, although the
respondents in Kisanpur made this distinction clear. But the distinction
is far less than that between the brahmin and the latrine cleaner. The
highest jatis demand respect from the lowest; they refuse to take food
from many jatis and will not even share close physical proximity with
90. See L. DUMONT, supra note 36, at 46-61.
91. See Stevenson, Status Evaluation in the Hindu Caste System, 84 J. ROYAL
ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 45-65 (1954); Harper, Ritual Pollution as an Integrator of
Caste and Religion, 23 J. ASIAN STUD. 151-97 (1964). In Kisanpur, for example, the
Mahabrahmins, who are the priests who care for the dead, are recognized as brahmins
and even live on the edge of the brahmin neighborhood, but are essentially
untouchables.
92. See M. DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPTS OF
POLLUTION AND TABOO (1970).
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some untouchables.93 Among less distant jatis, contact is easier and
more intimate.
Jati rules extend far beyond traditional occupations. In fact, the
principal occupation of most Jats in rural India is agricultural labor
and not the work associated with the jati's name. Elaborate rules re-
strict the types of food jatis can eat and how they must eat it. Some of
the highest jatis restrict even their vegetables (some brahmins will not
eat onions or garlic, for example), while some of the lowest jatis will
even eat beef. Some of these rules are clear signs of relatively higher or
lower jati status, though with some exceptions. For instance, meat-eat-
ing is generally a sign of lower jati status but is still permitted among
many ksatriya jatis94 Jati rules regarding other aspects of daily activ-
ity, from dress to marital and other social relations to worship, also
differ. As is the case with eating, it is usually easy to define which
activities are relatively "higher" and which are "lower."
Both jati-mates and members of other jatis enforce jati rules. Both
formal and informal social persuasion act to preserve conformity to the
rules. Councils of jati elders, known as panchayats, may take action
against members who fail to follow the rules. Possible actions range
from fines to "outcasting," or ejection from the jati. Higher jatis act-
ing like arbitrators or judges may also enforce rules on lower jatis9 6
Higher jatis often apply these rules to subjugate lower jatisYw Of
course, the upper jatis use physical intimidation and violence as the
ultimate sanction against lower jatis. Violence against the lower jatis
was not common in Kisanpur. However, the threat of violence, and in
one prominent case the actual murder of a number of Jatavs, was an
important factor in jati relations.
During the early British colonial period, the new rulers took the
traditional place of the king and enforced many jati rules in British
East India Company courts, particularly regarding marriage.ea During
93. See Mahar, A Multiple Scaling Technique for Caste Ranking, 39 MAN IN
INDIA 127 (1959). Relative ranking of various jails can be approximately determined
by comparing inter-jati pollution, or by ascertaining which jatis are considered pollut-
ing by other jatis, particularly with regard to the sharing of food or of hooka (water
pipe).
94. See M. SHARMA, supra note 46, at 26-27.
95. See Hayden, supra note 58; L. DUMONT, supra note 36, at 172-79.
96. See Gough, The Social Structure of a Tanjore Village, in VILLAGE INDIA 44-
52 (M. Marriott ed. 1955) (discussing how higher jati panchayats, or simply wealthy
or powerful individuals from higher jatis will sometimes act to settle disputes of lower
jati members); M. SHARMA, supra note 46, at 38-39.
97. See M. SRINIVAS, supra note 44, at 15-16.
98. M. JAIN, OUTLINES OF INDIAN LEGAL HISTORY 464-74, 479-83 (1981); J. DER-
RETT, RELIGION, LAW AND THE STATE IN INDIA 229-53 (1968).
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the nineteenth century, the British enacted statutes to overturn a num-
ber of jati rules, particularly those perceived as reprehensible. For ex-
ample, the statutes addressed restrictions on inter-jati marriage, re-
strictions on some higher jatis against the remarriage of widows, and
the condoning of child marriage. While Indian civil courts still enforce
some Hindu personal law (again primarily regarding marriage), it is a
law more or less devoid of restrictions based on jati. Civil law now
strictly forbids disabilities based on jati, particularly those relating to
untouchability.
In our interviews in Kisanpur, each jati member identified each jati
within the general scheme of jati hierarchy, though jati members inva-
riably placed their jati in a higher category (and, among the lower
jatis, often in higher varnas). Almost every aspect of social intercourse
from eating, to simple congregating and talking to marriage, was done
along jati lines. The higher jatis made numerous references to their
position of superiority within the Hindu system. The most important
jatis, both numerically and in terms of wealth, were the Rajput and
Jat Thakurs, who during interviews often reminded us of their ksatriya
status and of their descent from warriors and kings. In this sense, the
description of their jati status sounded more like a simple inheritance
from noble ancestors and less like a description of personal merit due to
karma.
Although, Jats held themselves equal to Rajputs and intermarriage
is now allowed between the two jatis, Rajputs still maintained that the
Jats are inferior. Both made reference to the relatively lower status of
the Brahmars in the village. One larger farmer noted that "brahmins
are supposed to be scholars, but these Brahmars in Kisanpur aren't
scholars, so they aren't real brahmins. We have to go outside of the
village to get brahmins for weddings." Contradictory views were often
given regarding jati hierarchy; for example, one Rajput said that
"Gandhiji opposed castism" and that "jati prejudice is holding back
the progress of the nation." One educated Rajput noted that "true
Hindus are followers of the Vedas, and there is no jati in the Vedas."'9
In general, however, the Ksatriyas were very proud of their jati posi-
tion and tradition.
As we progressed down the jati hierarchical ranking, respondents
made fewer comments explaining their relative ranking. Once below
the Jats, respondents were reluctant to discuss such information. In
99. In a further discussion with one powerful Rajput family, jaii hierarchy was
described as rivaj, the Hindi for folk custom, and not as riti, the Sanskrit word for
religious custom.
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fact, the question seemed to elicit blank stares, as if we should certainly
know the answer to the question. Respondents, with the exception of
the Jatavs, would answer only with their relative position and offer no
explanation. All respondents were, however, quite certain of their rela-
tive position above other jatis.
The use of panchayats to solve intra-jati disputes is still very com-
mon. Panchayats, however, do not operate in the traditional way, but
act more like forms of mediation; in fact, many villagers described go-
ing to panchayats as "using a mediator." These mediators are gener-
ally the wealthiest or most respected members of a particular jati.
Among the Rajputs, the panchayats consist of the leaders of various
factions within the village. While jati pressure ensures that the deci-
sions of the jati panchayat are important, it was clear that a reprimand
from this body is not equivalent to outcasting. In one instance, a Ra]-
put widower married a Jatav woman and adopted her two male chil-
dren. Although a Rajput panchayat discussed the issue, the only sanc-
tion imposed on the Rajput was that no one was to attend the wedding.
For a while the Rajputs in the village did not accept the adopted chil-
dren as Rajputs. Once the boys became older and began to take charge
of the running of the Rajput's farm, however, they were accepted.
They are all now invited to other Rajput weddings.
The influence of panchayats was relatively less pronounced when the
dispute concerned an economic as opposed to a social or religious issue.
In the case of land disputes, it was clear that the men consulted were
mediators only and normally unable to force their decision on a recalci-
trant loser. The loser would frequently go to the law courts.
It would be wrong, however, to suggest that complete intra-jati unity
ever existed. While jati panchayats traditionally work to solve intra-
jati disputes, it is highly unlikely that competition, jealousy, and envy
were ever absent within jatis. With the evolution of democracy at the
village level, intra-jati factionalism has become endemic, particularly
among the larger and more powerful jatis. These factions often seek
alliances with lower jatis as a means of mobilizing support.100 Competi-
tion over politics and over resources that political power brings have
accelerated the process toward factional alignment. Factionalism at the
village level, however, often gives way to unity when a particular jati is
under intense pressure from without, and often disappears as politics
100. See D.B. MILLER, FROM HIERARCHY TO STRATIFICATION: CHANGING PAT-
TERNS OF SOCIAL INEQUALITY IN A NORTH INDIAN VILLAGE 116-18, 124 (1968) (pro-
viding an overview of Indian village stratification). The village term for factionalism is
"parti bandi," meaning the separation of people into parties, and the word "parti'
comes from the English. Id.
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moves up from the village level. Nevertheless, this source of jati dis-
unity is an important force and discussed more fully below.
The maintenance of many jati rules is due simply to a belief in the
existing culture or tradition. Jati rules are enforced through repetition,
expressions of jati solidarity, the persuasive power of social approval or
disapproval, and an (uncertain) belief in their religious origin. As a
system, jati rules and jati hierarchy reinforce each other in daily life.
4. Jati and Economic Relations
Access to, and control over, economic resources results in power over
those who do not have this control and constitutes part of a social rela-
tionship.10 1 Similar to other aspects of village relations, economic hier-
archy closely mirrors jati hierarchy. Because economic power and jati
both constitute social relations in the village, they often tend to rein-
force each other. But because Jati relationships are such an important
aspect of society and their referents are so different from economic
power (status group vs. economic class), 0 2 they are rarely congruent.
The relative importance of the caste system, of class on social relation-
ships, and the transformative power of one upon the other are essential
issues in examining the affect of Western legalisms on hierarchy and
power.
a. Jati and access to land
The most important economic attrilbute in rural India is land owner-
ship. Land ownership, which mirrors the general pattern of jati rank-
ing, is perhaps the single most important determinant of status in a
village.10 3 Members of jatis who are dominant in a particular area in
terms of ritual ranking and in numbers, are usually the largest land-
holders.104 Scheduled castes tend to constitute the greatest percentage
of landless laborers.10 5 According to government surveys, a little less
101. Some of the ideas expressed in this section are derived from Desai, Power and
Agrarian Relations: Some Concepts and Measurements, in AGRARIAN POWER AND
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY IN SOUTH ASIA 171-97 (1984) (containing a theoretical
economic analysis of the relationship between land ownership and power).
102. See M. WEBER, THE RELIGION OF INDIA: THE SOCIOLOGY OF HINDUISM AND
BUDDHISM (H. Gerth & D. Martindale trans. 1958).
103. L. DUMONT, supra note 36, at 207; A. BETEILLE, STUDIES IN AGRARIAN SO-
CIAL STRUCTURE 43 (1974).
104. A. BETEILLE, supra note 103, at 26.
105. NATIONAL SAMPLE SURVEY (GOv'T OF INDIA), No. 233, 25TH ROUND TA-
BLES, WITH NOTES ON EARNINGS, INDEBTEDNESS, CULTIVATED HOLDINGS AND ASSETS
OF THE WEAKER SECTION HOUSEHOLDS IN RURAL INDIA 20 (1976).
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than 80 % of the rural population in India actually owns some land.
Half this number owns less than an acre.106 In all, 90% of the popula-
tion owns only 40 % of the land.107 Although jati affiliation is no longer
a part of the All-India Census, it is safe to assume that the upper jatis
own the vast majority of all the land. In Uttar Pradesh that means
Brahmars, Rajputs, and Jats own most of the land.
In north central India, the dominant pre-British land use system con-
sisted of local magnates known as zamindars, or landholders, who col-
lected revenues from others living within their zamindari, a portion of
which they then sent along to the local ruler.10 8 Everyone, from the
king to the zamindar, to the actual tillers and laborers, had certain
rights to the produce of the land. These rights, as well as duties to each
other, were primarily based on each person's place in the jajmani sys-
tem, the jati-based patron-client structure.
As the British took control of larger areas in the first half of the
nineteenth century, this system was formalized. The zamindar, whose
holding could include many villages, had actual title to the land and
had to collect all land revenue. These zarnindars would let out land to
tenants who paid rent, usually in kind, and who in turn let out land to
others. The larger tenants normally had legally enforceable fixities of
tenure whereas the smaller tenants held their pieces of land more or
less at will. Elements of jajmani continued to exist.100
In 1951 Uttar Pradesh abolished zamindari and replaced it with a
"land to the tiller" program that eliminated tenancies.110 Zamindari
abolition had a number of important effects, some presumably unin-
tended, that this article will later address.""1 The abolition of
zamindari, however, accomplished little in the way of transferring
106. NATIONAL SAMPLE SURVEY (GOV'T OF INDIA), No. 215, 25TH ROUND TA-
BLES, ON LAND HOLDINGS, ALL INDIA 67 (1978).
107. Id.
108. See T. METCALF, LAND, LANDLORDS, AND THE BRITISH RAJ: NORTHERN IN-
DIA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1979) (describing land tenure in British North
India). Other methods of land ownership were instituted in Punjab, that eliminated
intermediaries and where land was held by the tiller directly from the government. R.
Gordon, The Social Origins of Punjabi Nationalism (May 1978) (on file at Sterling
Library, Yale University).
109. See Pouchepadass, Peasant Classes in Twentieth Century Agrarian Move-
ments in India, in PEASANTS IN HISTORY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF DANIEL THORNER
147 (E. Hobsbawm ed. 1980) (explaining that the difficulty of classifying rights of
ownership in land continued during zamindari and was directly related to whether or
not persons received a principal part of their livelihood from an area of land. This
definitional problem made the abolition of zamindari particularly difficult). Id.
110. Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land-Reforms Act 1950 (U.P. Act 1
of 1951). Other Indian states also abolished tenancy with similar statutes.
111. See infra notes 234-38 and accompanying text.
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large tracts of land to the landless.
Anyone who owns land, even a small amount, has a relatively de-
pendable source of income (with the exception of the vagaries of
weather). Naturally, the sense of financial security increases with the
size and quality of the land. In addition to providing edible or marketa-
ble crops, land is important for other reasons. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, land provides pasture and fodder for farm animals. Water buf-
falo, cow, and goat ownership is widespread in rural India; milk is
consumed or sold and male buffalo and bullocks are often used as draft
animals. Each village is supposed to preserve common lands for village
pasture, but the amount is rarely sufficient and is often barren during
the summer months.
Land is also needed to store crops, which have been harvested or
paid in wages for manual labor, as well as to store manure or other
cooking fuels. One of the most important uses of land is as a place for
human defecation. Rising in the morning is difficult if one does not
have a nearby plot. Land is also needed to extend or improve houses as
family size increases. If a house is built of sun-dried mud, which is
often the case with poor villagers, land can provide a source of building
materials. Finally, the ownership of land makes it easier to secure bank
loans.112
Villagers fall into three categories: those whose landholdings are too
large to work without hired labor; those who own enough land to sup-
port themselves; and those who own either no land or not enough to
support themselves. 113 In villages in jhe district in which Kisanpar is
located, those who seek labor other than agricultural work on their own
lands include agricultural landless labor constituting 25 % of the vil-
lage, marginal holders having less than .5 hectares equalling 30%, and
small holders having between .5 and 2.5 hectares, at 20%. Those who
would normally not need to seek outside labor, and who might have to
hire occasional agricultural workers, are those having medium-sized
holdings of between 2.5 and 7 hectares, or 20% of the village. The
remaining 6 % of the village hold more than 7 hectares and are depen-
dent on hiring additional labor.' 4
112. See infra notes 279-80 and accompanying text (discussing the issuance of
bank loans to landowners).
113. D. THORNER, THE AGRARIAN PROSPECT IN INDIA 9-11 (1976). Thorner clas-
sifies rural society into three principle groups: the malik, kisan, and mazdur; these
classifications refer respectively to the proprietor, working peasants, and labourers. Id.
114. Percentages are approximate, from data provided in Zeela Sankhyikeeyay
Kiryalay, Aligarh, Sankhyikeeyay Patraka Aligarh Zeela (District Statistical Office,
Aligarh, Statistical Digest for Aligarh District) (1983) (copy on file at the District
Statistical Office, Aligarh, U.P. India).
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The only jati-related set of statistics that government agencies
gather is information regarding scheduled castes. In the district, a little
less than one-half of all scheduled castes were landless, with 30% mar-
ginal and 18% small farmers, with most of the remaining 4% consist-
ing of medium-sized holders." 5 Interviews with Kisanpur residents re-
vealed other approximate jati ownership patterns. Specifically, three
Jatav families owned medium-sized holdings: they were the only sched-
uled caste members to do so. Approximately 30% of the others have
marginal holdings. Among the middle-level jatis, perhaps 25 % of the
Baghailis are small holders and another 30 to 35% are marginal hold-
ers. Other middle-level jatis are relatively less well off. The five largest
landholders are Rajputs; 30% of Rajputs have medium-sized holdings
or larger, 30% are small holders, and the rest are marginal holders or
landless. Jats are less well off and rank between the Rajputs and the
Baghailis, although closer to the Rajputs in terms of landholdings. The
few Brahmar families are divided between medium and small-sized
holders.
Those who do not own enough land to support themselves must seek
outside work, a process we discuss at greater length below. The mem-
bers of the landless or marginal holders of that group, composed pri-
marily of scheduled castes, experience greater problems. There are in-
sufficient amounts of village common land to provide fodder, mud for
building or repairing houses, and places for defecation for all marginal
and landless laborers. As a result, they must seek permission from the
landed to use their property for these purposes. This gives the larger
landowners a powerful tool over the landless; nearly all poorer or lower-
caste respondents lamented this problem.
b. Jati and labor
As described above, most jatis are traditionally associated with the
performance of certain economic activities; in fact, these tasks form
part of their traditional religious duty. One form of organization facili-
tating the flow of goods and services among jatis is referred to as
jajmani.116 Jajmani involves the exchange of goods and services in kind
at levels determined by tradition. While the overall jajmani system can
115. Computed from the Statistical Notes of the Block Development Office regard-
ing the Integrated Rural Development Programme (Mar. 23, 1983).
116. See W. WISER, THE HINDU JAJMANI SYSTEM: A Socio-EcoNo.MIc SYSTBI
INTER RELATING MEMBERS OF A HINDU VILLAGE COMMUNITYv IN SERVICE (1936)
(presenting a detailed introduction to the traditional jajntani system); see also L. Du-
hioNr, supra note 36, at 92-108 (discussing the division of labor traditionally associated
with the jajmani system of hierarchy).
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be said to include the reciprocal duties owed by each jati to another, it
is dominated by the relationship between the landholder (usually re-
ferred to as the jajman, or patron) and those who perform services for
the landholder (referred to as prayas, or clients). The tie between par-
ticular patrons and clients is usually hereditary.
There is also a close tie between jajmani and traditional concepts of
land ownership. Services (or the provision of goods) to the patron are a
duty; so are the reciprocal provision of services to the client. The type
of service to the patron depends on the jati of the client and its duty.
Services to the client can be varied, including handling relations with
people outside the village, mediating disputes, and providing additional
material resources when necessary.11 The most important service is a
share in the proceeds from the land."" 8 These proceeds are distributed
in a hierarchical fashion mirrored, more or less, by the ranking of jati.
They are, however, more easily analogized to a right in the land than to
a payment for services. As Dumont notes, unlike the provision of ser-
vices in a market, where the orientation is to the individual, jajmani is
oriented to the whole. 1 9
In modern times, jajmani relationships are most clearly pronounced
between the patron and the lowest jatis, particularly, those who provide
the most obviously religious (usually in terms of dealing with ritually
polluting activities) or social functions. In Kisanpur, for example,
jajmani is most clearly distinguished from payment for labor in the
case of Nais, Dhobis, and Bhangis.'20 Nais, whose primary function is
to serve as barbers, have also played other important roles, particularly
those of messengers and negotiators. The largest landholders in
Kisanpur maintain close jajmani relations with particular Nais, who
help make wedding arrangements and preparations for other social and
religious events. In return, the Nais receive either a standard allocation
of grain from their patrons or, as in one instance, a small piece of land.
Nais would not perform similar services for others for compensation.
The relationship between patron and Nai is hereditary. The incapacita-
tion of a Nai does not affect the requisite share of produce or land.
Like Nais, Dhobis, or washers, play an important religious and social
117. Asistance in arranging and providing for marriage is still one of the most im-
portant services provided by patrons to clients. A. Rekhi, The Status of Women in
India (Feb. 12, 1988) (draft manuscript on file with the author).
118. See supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text (discussing other important
uses of land within the client/patron relationship).
119. L. DUMONT, supra note 36, at 105.
120. See M. SHARMA, supra note 46, at 68-69. The distinction between jajimani
and payment for labor also applied to the Nais and Dhobis in Sharma's village of
study. Id.
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role, particularly regarding childbirth and the purifying of polluted
garments. We found that Dhobis would do our wash at a per-piece fee,
although it was unclear if they would do so for other villagers. Bhangis,
who clean dwellings and remove night soil, also had strong jajmani
ties. In addition to these traditional tasks, however, the members of
these jatis also perform agricultural labor.
One scholar has drawn a distinction between relationships based pri-
marily on religious services, described as true jajmani (like those of
Nais, Dhobis and Bhangis), and those that are more economic in na-
ture.121 A number of important points arise. First, most jatis, regard-
less of their traditional occupation (including Nais, Dhobis and
Bhangis), provide agricultural labor. Second, most nonlandholding jatis
(in the case of Kisanpur this includes all jatis except Brahmars,
Rajputs and Jats) partake in the provision of their jati-defined tradi-
tional goods and services on at least a part-time basis. This means that
although the landless must perform agricultural labor for upper jatis,
they also provide traditional goods and services. Consequently, the rela-
tively nonreligious agricultural work of all jatis, as well as the rela-
tively nonreligious but still jati defined provision of other goods and
services, may fit less well into the definition of traditional jajmani re-
ciprocal relationships.
In Kisanpur, outside of the traditional "religious" services of the
Nais, Dhobis and Bhangis, the pure and paradigmatic form of jajmani
does not really exist. There are, however, many variations in work rela-
tionships. Jajmani can be thought of as one end of a continuum with
individual market-based transactions on the other.12 2 In Kisanpur, rela-
tionships vary from one end of the continuum to the other. It is unclear
if the paradigmatic jajmani system ever existed in nonreligious trans-
actions. It is clear, however, that in general the pattern has been
changing along the continuum away from jajmani and toward a mar-
ket, a subject which we will address in greater detail below.Y-
The paradigmatic jajmani relationship reinforces jati hierarchy in
terms of deference to and close dependence on higher jatis, in terms of
the uniqueness of jati duties, and in terms of ritual pollution. It also
suggests a patron-client relationship that entitles the client to a share of
121. See Pocock, Notes on Jajmani Relationships, 6 CONTRIBUTIONS TO INDIAN
Soc. 78 (1962), quoted in L. DuMoNT, supra note 36, at 103-04 (commenting on
religious specializations properly called jajmani and economic pseudo-specializations).
122. See Cohn, From Indian Status to British Contract, 21 J. ECON. HisT. 613
(1961) (evaluating jajmani systems in light of modern day market-based systems).
123. See infra notes 270-73 and accompanying text (providing further textual com-
parison between a traditional jajmani system and a modern market-based system).
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agricultural produce, and other services. This share of wealth, however,
cannot be altered (at least not easily) by the actions of the client.
Rather, tradition, as affected at the patron's discretion, is the determin-
ing factor.
At the other end of the continuum is the economic relationship, in
which hierarchy is defined in terms of control over assets, particularly,
although not exclusively, land. Religious and social hierarchy is af-
fected far less. While the client may have greater choice, in terms of
for whom he or she might work or under what circumstances, the client
has no entitlement to services from the patron. The relative extent of
economic opportunities open to the client, as well as the freedom from
social and religious hierarchy gained from a more market-oriented rela-
tionship, will determine if the client is better off in a market relation-
ship than under a more traditional jajmani relationship.
B. SHIFTS AND STABILITY IN THE HIERARCHY: SOURCES OF
CHANGE AND SOURCES OF REINFORCEMENT IN THE STRUCTURES OF
RURAL DOMINANCE
1. Jati and Religion: Continuity and Change
124
Hindu society has retained a certain stability; the prominence of jati
and hierarchy, reinforced with custom and religion, is striking to the
Western observer. While Hindu society is changing, its relative stabil-
ity is perhaps the most puzzling aspect. A social system must con-
stantly renew itself. Renewal requires its participants, or at least a
number of the most influential of its participants, to derive benefits
from that system. In order to understand the forces of change in a
society, it is first necessary to understand who benefits and how from
the status quo. This includes not only those at the top, but also those at
the bottom of the system.
It is the brahmin who is the principal keeper and mediator of reli-
gion and who is in control of a system which not only makes him supe-
rior in terms of ritual hierarchy, but which justifies his position through
moral appeal. Those jatis lying below the brahmin, in Kisanpur most
particularly the Rajputs and the Jats, benefit from the system of hier-
archy in relation to those lying below them. Social theorist Peter Ber-
ger's conclusions that ideology often exists to legitimate the vested in-
124. David Mandelbaum's two volume work suggested the title of this section. D.
MANDELBAUM, SOCIETY IN INDIA: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE (1970) and D. MANDEL-
BAUM, SOCIETY IN INDIA: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY (1970).
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terests of various sectors of society 25 is clearly manifested in the jati
system. The lower jatis, the have-nots in such a system, however, are
not in an enviable position. How much do they accept what we have
outlined as the Hindu view of society?
a. Reform and perpetuation from below
There are many ways lower-jati members can view their place within
the system. We will start first by examining the more traditional social
view, at least in part because this view is an important one in Kisanpur.
As noted above, the most numerically significant of the scheduled
castes in Kisanpur are the Jatavs. The name Jatav was coined in the
early years of the twentieth century by leaders of the Chamar jati in
what was then called the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh (now
mostly the state of Uttar Pradesh). The Chamars are an "untoucha-
ble" jati whose traditional occupation included taking possession of
dead animals and tanning their skins into leather. By 1931, many
Chamars in the United Provinces reported themselves as Jatav
Rajputs, of the ksatriya varna, to the government census takers. 22 6
Many members of the jati collectively asserted that they were miscat-
egorized as untouchables, and were higher in jati ranking. Besides the
new name, the Jatavs in Kisanpur adopted other upper-jati styles. For
example, they became vegetarian even though Chamars traditionally
ate not only meat but beef. 27 They refused to carry away the carrion
of Kisanpur, although they did provide such services for a fee to resi-
dents of neighboring villages. Also, the Chamars did not engage in the
traditional occupations of leatherworking in the village. Only one fam-
ily had relatives who worked for a shoe manufacturer in a nearby city.
In matters of religious ritual, the Jatavs also adopted higher-jati tradi-
tions.12 A number of Jatav informants, for example asserted that they
would not eat at the house of Thakurs because the Thakurs were
"unclean."
The assertion of higher-jati status and the subsequent adoption of
higher-jati rules is a process known as sanskritization. Sanskrit is the
language of Hindu religious writings that discuss the performance of
125. P. BERGER, INVITATION TO SOCIOLOGY 111 (1963).
126. Gov't of India, Census of India, 18 UNITED PROVINCES OF AGRA AND OUDH
530 (1931).
127. Id.
128. See M. SRINIVAS, supra note 44, at 149 (addressing various examples of reli-
gious rituals that the jais adopted). Several of these rituals include saptapadi, an elab-
orate ritual for marriage, a prohibition on widow remarriage, and the partial adoption
of purdah for women. Id. Only the higher jatis traditionally followed these rules. Id.
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higher-jati rituals. 129  Sanskritization is a phenomenon common
throughout the lower jatis in India. As discussed above, according to
Hindu religious law each jati should perform its own jati duty based on
its own customs. It is not wrong, per se, to eat meat or to permit widow
remarriage. It is only wrong so to do if a jati's "virtuous" customs pro-
hibit such actions. In fact, failure to perform a jati task, such as re-
moval of carrion, is in strict violation of Hindu law if one accepts such
a task as a "virtuous custom." One Rajput complained that Jatavs vio-
lated their jati rules because they refused to remove dead animals from
the village. By acting like a higher jati, the Jatavs sought to prove to
others, or to themselves, their status as Rajputs.
Jati mobility is not unknown in Indian history. It was the duty of the
king to maintain the caste system and jati rules, and in such capacity,
to make the ultimate determination as to which jati was which. 130 The
claim of untouchables to British census takers that they were Rajputs
or Brahmars can be understood as a type of petition to the king for
higher-jati status. This behavior suggests two possible motivations; an
actual belief in the system, with the stipulation that one should have
higher status or a belief only in the inevitability of the system and
therefore a strategic acceptance of the rules by which others play.
There are many instances where anthropologists have discovered that
lower jatis, while not accepting their own place in the hierarchy, accept
the validity of the system overall. After questioning the degree to which
the lower jatis believed in the system of hierarchy, Berreman con-
cluded that Himalayan untouchables considerably accept the system of
hierarchy.131 He further noted that the same individuals who generally
accepted the system did not accept their position within it, 1"2 with a
number of excuses offered for the current low status of each respon-
dent. According to one, his jati had been mistakenly categorized as
untouchable because a Rajput ancestor had married an untouchable. 8'
Another respondent asserted servants had tricked him out of his Raj-
put status when he had tried to bestow presents on a brahmin in a
previous life. A servant took the presents instead and the respondent
129. See id. at 1-46, 148-53 (providing an introduction to the concept of
sanskritization).
130. See Singh, The Changing Pattern of Social Stratification in India, reprinted
in DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN INDIA 139 (M. Srinivas, S. Seshaiah & V.
Parthasarathy eds. 1972) [hereinafter DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL CHANGE] (explaining
how the pattern of social stratification in India is based on the caste system).
131. G. Berreman, Caste in India and the United States, 66 Am. J. OF Soc. 120,
127 (1960).
132. G. BERREMAN, HINDUS OF THE HIMALAYAS 220-24 (2d ed. 1972).
133. Although jati status derives from the father, not the mother. Id. at 222.
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was therefore reborn as an untouchable. 134 Additional stories are simi-
lar. In no instance did Berreman find a rejection of jati hierarchy in
principle. He did, however, discover that the same untouchables invari-
ably asserted superiority over those jatis with traditionally accepted as
being lower in status than their own. 35
Moffat found another untouchable jati with similar beliefs regarding
the overall system of karma and rebirth. They asserted that they were
once a higher jati, and that their downfall resulted from honest errors
on their part. Moffat also found virtually no criticism of the legitimacy
of the system itself.136 Similarly, Cohn reports that the Chamars of
Senapur claimed either a Rajput or a brahmin lineage.
1 37
There is a difference between accepting one's place in the system as
valid but not justified ("I am an untouchable, because of a virtuous
error I or my ancestor made in an earlier lifetime") or invalid because
of the error of others ("I am not an untouchable but a Rajput, because
others have classified me incorrectly"). In either instance, however, the
individual still accepts the system of hierarchy and the religious ideol-
ogy that supports it. In Kisanpur, the Jatavs generally accepted the
system, to the extent they had sanskritized and in their insistence on
their higher status than other untouchables.
Sanskritization, however, is a difficult process. It requires the en-
forcement of often stricter jati rules and may evoke strong opposition
from upper jatis. 38 Sanskritization also often results in a tighter jati
cohesiveness, both at the village level and beyond. 139 If the Kisanpur
Jatavs' attempts at sanskritization were merely to impress the higher
jatis into accepting their Rajput status, it was clear they had failed,
though there may have been other effects on the upper jatis, which we
will discuss later. 140
There were other, more ambiguous indications of the Jatavs' accept-
ance of the legitimacy of jati hierarchy. The reverence felt by the lead-
ers of the Kisanpur Jatavs for Dr. Ambedkar, the untouchable political
134. Id.
135. Id. at 224-25.
136. M. MOFFAT, AN UNTOUCHABLE COMMUNITY IN SOUTH AsIA: STRUCTURE
AND CONSENSUS 147 (1979).
137. B. Cohn, The Chamars of Senapur: A Study of the Changing Status of a
Depressed Class 112 (1954) (Ph.D. dissertation, available University Microfilms, Ann
Arbor, Michigan).
138. P. KOLENDA, CASTE IN CONTEMPORARY INDIA: BEYOND ORGANIC SOLDAR-
ITY 101-02 (1978).
139. See Sharma, Stresses in Caste Stratification, 4 ECON. & POL WEEKLY 217,
221-22 (1969) (discussing the effects of sanskritization on lower jatis on a village-wide
or larger basis).
140. See infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
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leader who organized mass conversions from Hinduism to Buddhism in
the 1950s, is just one indication. Ambedkar, who had played an impor-
tant role in fashioning Republican India's Constitution, embraced Bud-
dhism, which shares many aspects of Hindu theology but rejects the
caste system, after concluding that it was impossible to reform Hindu-
ism of jati hierarchy."" While the Jatavs of Kisanpur often spoke posi-
tively of Ambedkar's leadership of the dalits (literally the "oppressed,"
a word used by some militant Buddhist political leaders), they still re-
mained Hindus and not Buddhists.142 Although we cannot be certain
(and although some Jatav converts to Buddhism seem to have accepted
its anti-hierarchical ideology),143 it appears that most of the Kisanpur
Jatavs approve of Dr. Ambedkar's quest for political, economic, and
social benefits but not his religious conclusions.
Religious conversion, in and of itself, does not often materially affect
the secular life of the convert. For example, members of the dominant
Hindu community do not act any differently (or perhaps worse) toward
the convert.' 44 Moreover, the new religion itself seems to perpetuate
141. See D. KEER, DR. AMBEDKAR: LIFE AND MISSION 68-75 (1962); B.
AMBEDKAR, ANNIHILATION OF CASTES WITH A REPLY TO MR. GANDHI (1945) (relat-
ing Ambedkar's views on Hinduism and subsequent adoption of Buddhism); Dalton,
The Gandhian View of Caste, and Caste after Gandhi, reprinted in INDIA AND CEY-
LON: UNITY AND DIVERSITY 171-74 (P. Mason ed. 1967) (providing Gandhi's views of
the caste system and his thoughts on Hinduism); M. GALANTER, supra note 40, at 29-
40 (discussing the compartmentalization of Hindu society). Ambedkar originally
sought the elimination of jati within Hinduism. In this regard, his views contrasted
greatly with those of Gandhi. Id. Gandhi originally believed in the maintenance of
traditional jati occupational categories in order to prevent pernicious competition while
simultaneously eliminating hierarchy from the system. Id. Ambedkar eventually aban-
doned Hinduism, concluding that it could never purge itself of jati and hierarchy. Id.
Before deciding on Buddhism, he initially contemplated a mass conversion to Sikhism
because it does not recognize the caste system. Id. Gandhi eventually accepted the
impossibility of retaining varna, eliminating hierarchy, and including untouchables
within the sudra varna. Instead, he argued for complete elimination of all jati and
varna distinctions. Id.
142. Examples of mixing Hinduism with Ambedkar's political views appeared
throughout Kisanpur. In one instance, Ambedkar's name was found over the portico of
the house of an influential Jatav, along with a traditional symbol of Hinduism, the
mantra om.
143. See B. JOSHI, DEMOCRACY IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY 100-107 (1982) (explain-
ing that Ambedkar's religious beliefs were not accepted as fully as his views on political
change throughout the social and economic realm of the jati system). Even among
untouchable jatis who actually convert to Buddhism, however, the emphasis is more on
Ambedkar as a leader than on Buddhism as a religion. Lynch, The Politics of Un-
touchability: A Case from Agra, India, reprinted in STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN IN-
DIAN SOCIETY 209 (M. Singer and B. Cohen eds. 1968) (analyzing the views of Bud-
dhist converts relating to Ambedkar as a leader).
144. See Granpat v. Presiding Officer, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 420, 424 (noting that con-
verting to Buddhism does not prevent prejudice by higher Hindus); see also Zelliot,
Buddhism and Politics in Maharashtra, reprinted in SOUTH ASIAN POLITICS AND RE-
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existing jati distinctions.145 In addition, the law holds that conversion to
Buddhism, Christianity, or Islam may result in the forfeiting of benefits
accorded to untouchables under modern legislation.146
Rather than adopting stricter forms of upper-jati Hinduism (sanskri-
tization), or converting to different religions, other communities of.un-
touchables have instead embraced forms of Hinduism that reject jati
hierarchy or limit its importance. One of these alternate forms of Hin-
duism known as bhakti dates back to approximately 1400 A.D. and
literally means "devotion."' 4 Bhakti accepts the Vedas, and places su-
preme importance on individual acts of devotion to God rather than on
jati. Active today among some Chamars in Uttar Pradesh,4 8 the
bhakti ideal is essentially an ascetic one. It involves the adoption of
ascetic values such as vegetarianism that, because they are often also
brahmin jati rules, are associated with styles of sanskritization. 49 Un-
like sanskritization, however, bhakti is not associated with improving
LIGION 191, 205 (D. Smith ed. 1966) (explaining that while the self-image of untouch-
able Buddhist converts improves, upper jati Hindus still subject them to abuse); M.
GALANTER, supra note 40, at 25-34 (describing the long-standing Hindus' fear that
untouchable jatis will convert to other religions and reduce the numbers and political
clout of Hindus); Conversion Convulsions, India Today, June 30, 1986, at 78-80 (ex-
plaining that untouchable converts from Hinduism, especially those to Islam, the larg-
est non-Hindu community, may experience more opposition than they did when
Hindus).
145. See Aggarwal, Caste Hierarchy in a Meo Village of Rajasthan, reprinted in
CASTE AND SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AMONG MUSLIMS IN INDIA 148-53 (1. Ahmad ed.
1978) (observing that in the Gurdaspur district of Punjab in 1977, Sikhs recognized
jati and imposed upon mazhabis, or "untouchable" Sikh jatis, including those untouch-
able Hindus who converted to Sikhism, many of the disabilities assocated with un-
touchability in Hinduism). Because Mazhabi Sikhs tended to support the Congress (I)
Party against the principal Sikh religious party, the Akali Dal, this attitude may be
changing, along with the evolution of radical, fundamentalist Sikh politics; see also
Bhatty, Status and Power in a Muslim Dominated Village of Uttar Pradesh, reprinted
in CASTE AND SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AMONG MUSLIMS IN INDIA, at 210-14 (explain-
ing that Muslim Indians often recognize a divisional hierarchy analagous to jati and
that converts from low Hindu jatis are treated as being at the bottom of the hierar-
chy). In addition, village conversion of untouchables often means that fellow religion-
ists are sometimes far away and unable to offer much support. A Muslim student who
assisted us in our fieldwork, for example, introduced himself to local Rajputs with the
explanation that his ancestors were also Rajputs, who had converted to Islam in the
early nineteenth century. After hearing this, Rajputs invariably treated him in a far
friendlier manner than before, and were far more likely to offer him food.
146. See M. GALANTER, supra note 40, at 319-33 (commenting that Hindu caste
order requirements mandated the exclusion of Buddhists).
147. See Edgarton, The Way of Devotion to God, reprinted in THE BHAGAVAD
GITA, supra note 70, at 172-78 (explaining that Bhakti is associated with Krishna
worship).
148. See R. KHARE, THE UNTOUCHABLE AS HIMSELF' IDEOLOGY, IDENTITY, AND
PRAGMATISM AMONG THE LUCKNOW CHAMARS (1984) (providing an overview of
bkakti ideals among Chamars).
149. See M. SRINIVAS, supra note 44, at 25-27.
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the position of one's jati within the system. Instead, bhakti strives to
avoid the system entirely and emphasizes individuality rather than
collectivity.
150
Some scheduled caste jati members in Kisanpur vehemently criti-
cized the jati system entirely. These main criticisms came from individ-
uals claiming to be secular or atheist. Some others criticized the system
in Ambedkar's terms, or in terms associated with bhakti. But, while it
may seem counter-intuitive, lower jatis exhibited a surprising degree of
acceptance of the overall legitimacy of the jati hierarchy system, at
least within social and religious contexts. At the same time, however,
there exists a longing to find a way out of their lowly position in that
hierarchy.
b. Reform and perpetuation from above
It takes less imagination to understand the attractiveness of the sys-
tem to those who see it from the top. There is no doubt that those at
the top accept much of the religious legitimacy of the system. Their
lives within the system, combined with the practical benefits realized
thereby, work together constantly to reinvent the system and its beliefs.
Even the highest of the upper jatis, the Brahmars, Rajputs, and Jats
had reservations about the system. In Kisanpur, there are a number of
Arya Samajists among the Brahmar community. The Arya Samajists,
began as an anti-caste system movement of substantial influence in
North India in the later nineteenth century. The movement emphasizes
the Vedas, denies brahminical authority, and calls for the eradication
of untouchability and the readmission of converts to Hinduism through
a ceremony known as shuddi, or purification.151 The Arya Samajists,
like a number of other "return to the Vedas " reform movements, seek
to eliminate the hierarchical aspects of contemporary Hinduism for
philosophical reasons (such aspects are opposed to fundamental con-
cepts of human rights, they are opposed to the Vedas) and to prevent
large numbers of untouchables from leaving the Hindu fold and joining
competing religious communities. 152 Arya Samajism is primarily a
movement of upper-jati Hindus and not of untouchables. In fact, in
Kisanpur there are no Arya Samajists among the untouchables at all.
150. See R. KHARE, supra note 148, at 51-63, although there is still accountability
to the community.
151. See K. JONES, ARYA DHARAM: HINDU CONSCIOUSNESS IN 19TH CENTURY
PUNJAB (1976) (providing a good introduction to the Arya Samaj).
152. See J. FARQUHAR, MODERN RELIGIOUS REFORM MOVEMENTS IN INDIA
(1915) (supplying a helpful, albeit dated overview of religious reform movements).
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One Brahmar shopkeeper, a fervent believer, insisted on sharing ciga-
rettes and food with untouchables in the village. He and his family
associated with a regional Arya Samaj organization. Some of the other
upper-jati members in Kisanpur ostracized him. He had once been
physically assaulted for "encouraging the lower jatis to be disrespect-
ful." He had a successful shop, however, and he had no recent difficulty
with the upper jatis.
One of the most important Hindu religious and political leaders in
Indian history is Mohandas Gandhi. Gandhi commanded enormous re-
spect from Hindus largely because of the extreme version of personal
asceticism he practiced. It is difficult to suspect the sincerity of Gan-
dhi's beliefs.
Gandhi's combination of political and religious leadership made him
uniquely able to command the role of "virtuous man" and delineating
"virtuous custom." Gandhi always opposed untouchability, although at
first he did not oppose jati dharma per se, only a hierarchical ranking
of jatis. Later he opposed all jati distinctions. a 3
Gandhi not only represented a return to Vedic Hinduism free of
caste distinction but a "virtuous man," one who could reinterpret or
redefine proper dharma. In Kisanpur, many upper-jad members made
reference to Gandhi's views on jati and untouchability. Some spoke in
terms of there being nothing polluting in formerly polluting activities
("Gandhiji lived with untouchables, did their work with them"); or the
dharma of lower jatis as no longer being exclusive to them ("Gandhiji
said that we must all clean up after ourselves, carry away our own
night soil"); or the desirability of the elimination of the jatis
("Gandhiji said we must get rid of this caste system").
We believe that each of these views had some effect on the religious
beliefs of the upper jatis in Kisanpur. While Gandhi's name was usu-
ally used when discussing these opinions, his views were only reflections
of traditions preexisting in Hinduism. These traditions continue
through such organizations as the Arya Samaj and others.
To the extent that Hindu religious movements focus on these issues,
acceptance of nonhierarchical beliefs as a part of Hinduism may grow.
That is not to say that these views are fully accepted. However, it is
important that they coexist with post- Vedic views of pollution, dharma,
and hierarchy, and moderate those views and create an opportunity for
153. See M. GALANTER, supra note 40, at 37 (presenting Gandhi's conclusion that
untouchability can end only if varna and jaii are completely eliminated from Hindu-
ism. Once this is achieved, Gandhi explained "there will be only one caste known by
the beautiful name of Bhangi, that is to say, the reformer or remover of all dirt"). Id.
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change.
The effects could be seen in the manner in which lower jatis were
referred to and treated by upper-caste members in daily social inter-
course. Most upper jati members referred to the untouchables as
"lower jatis" and almost never used the more traditional and denigrat-
ing term "untouchable." In this regard, most upper jati members told
us that there wasn't any real untouchability anymore. For example,
even the lowest jatis could now use wells and containers belonging to
higher jatis, although this practice was forbidden "in times gone past."
While most aspects of jati separation remain, such as prohibitions on
inter-dining and intermarriage, the lower jatis themselves commented
on the end of strict untouchability and the overall improvement of their
social position.
Actions of the lower jatis themselves constitute other notable forces
for change. The sanskritizing activities of lower jatis often bring on the
active opposition of the higher for diverse reasons. More obvious rea-
sons include the higher jatis fear of the lower jatis acting "uppity" and
demanding more rights and respect, a fear of losing lower jati services
such as the removal of carrion and night soil, or even a religiously-
based belief that sanskritizing behavior of the lower jatis violates their
dharma. Sanskritization also means that lower jatis no longer do or do
less of those things that the upper jatis find polluting, such as removing
carrion and night soil. Over a period of time, seeing the lower jatis act
more like themselves may remove some of the feelings of otherness or
distance from the upper jatis. Even though pollution is status-based,
attaching at birth to lower jatis, the mere fact that they no longer en-
gage in polluting activities may make them seem somewhat less pollut-
ing. The most sanskritized members of the Jatav community seemed to
be treated with less distance by the upper jatis than were the lesser
sanskritized members, and certainly more than those who had not
abandoned their traditional polluting activities.
Sanskritization of the lower jatis may reinforce in some upper jatis
some of the "Gandhian" religious views. Some aspects of sanskritiza-
tion, such as abstention from eating meat, are ascetic and may attract
more admiration from upper jati Hindus. Sanskritized behavior can
also suggest a redefinition of dharma on the part of the lower-jatis. For
example, although it is wrong to act according to another's dharma, it
is possible to change one's own dharma. If Gandhi advises that it is
virtuous to treat the lower jatis as equals, it is far easier to do so if the
upper jatis believe it is a virtuous custom. While it is not clear, we
sometimes detected a certain grudging respect for the most sanscritized
of the lower jatis invariably accompanied, however, with complaints of
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"uppity" behavior.
While we do not know exactly how potent the Vedic (including the
ascetic, bhakti, or Gandhian) traditions in Hinduism are among higher
jatis, we believe that in Kisanpur there is an element in the religious
consciousness that suggests that jati hierarchy is not completely valid.
A shift toward greater religious identification and observance, which
appears to be taking place among Hindus throughout North India,
could actually accentuate this admittedly limited opposition to jati hi-
erarchy or at least to untouchability.
Why the Vedic view of hierarchy appears more prominent in the up-
per jatis than in the lower is not readily apparent. Perhaps the ad-
vantaged upper jatis simply have a greater reason to feel guilty. Also,
the upper jatis are generally more educated and more likely to know
about Vedic religion as opposed to village interpretations of Hinduism.
They are possibly less concerned with the validity of a system based on
competition because they are already at the top of that system. Or the
upper jati are more aware of a need to put on a good face for the
researchers from "egalitarian" America.
We do not mean to make too much of the fact that lower-jatis
seemed preoccupied with sanskritization while the upper-jatis seemed
marginally less so. What we do believe is important is that many of the
lower jatis seem to accept the existing system of hierarchy (while many
others also question it) and that many of the upper jatis question the
system's validity (while many also accept it). For the purposes of our
analysis, it is these two counterintuitive facts that we find particularly
interesting.
c. Jati and religion: society and change
Both jati and hierarchy have an important place in contemporary
Hindu society. That which separates one jati from another creates a
strong sense of solidarity among jati-mates. For the lower jatis who
wish to improve their status and position, this solidarity is* best ex-
pressed when the jati acts collectively through sanskritization, or less
frequently, when an entire jati converts to a new religion. Logically,
jati solidarity is not enhanced when religious change emphasizes indi-
vidual action, such as asceticism, or through movements that deny the
importance of jati.
Jati solidarity is multifaceted. Practically, the jati can provide a
physical support network among members, similar to a family, a close
community, or organization. Perhaps even more importantly, however,
the jati can give the individual a sense of belonging or meet what Un-
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ger refers to as the need to be an "insider."' 15 The anthropologist Clif-
ford Geertz suggested that religion can make suffering both under-
standable and bearable.15 5 In the case of the Hindu vision of jati,
religion can make suffering understandable either through karma, ("we
are here because we deserve it"), or through sanskritization, ("but for
an error we should be higher"). In addition, this suffering is more bear-
able, ("we have each other, we are better than others, we are doing
god's bidding"). As reform movements have discovered, escaping both
jati and hierarchy while preserving benefits of the system is not an easy
task. An alternative to fully rejecting all aspects of jati, is to move
relatively away from the hierarchical aspects. It may also be possible to
retain some of the beneficial aspects of jati. We will discuss this issue
at greater length below.
We see a number of important conclusions. First, lower jatis do not
act in a socio-religious context devoid of hierarchy. It appears unlikely
that, left to their own devices, they would embrace an ideology of
equality. While many wish to improve their status, at least in the con-
text of society and religion, they implement that wish primarily
through a hierarchy perceived as partially legitimate. The Western
view, that at least formally identifies individuals as equal, seems far
more egalitarian than does the view dominant among those below. In
addition, those that wish to achieve a higher position in the hierarchy
may accept a Western view that advances their relative position.-As we
shall see, such Western views, through Western institutions, have been
accepted by those below as useful tools to improve their position. We
also feel, however, that increased adoption of these views may also fa-
vorably serve to influence hierarchical views at the social and religious
level as well. Fears that Western institutions might reify inegalitarian
views rather than advance equality are misplaced.
On the other hand, while those above also embrace hierarchy, its
acceptance is far less than we originally expected. We have already
seen that an ideology that does not embrace hierarchy need not clash
with Vedic Hinduism and in practice it often does not. Even the san-
skritizing activities of the lower jatis may contribute to this. Because of
the importance of solidarity to the use of Western legal institutions by
lower jatis, the issue is an important one. An ideology based in part on
Western concepts of equality need not clash completely with accepted
154. See R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 137-38 (1976) (describing individ-
uals' need to identify with a group or belong as insiders in society).
155. See C. GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 43 (1973) (discussing
the utility of religion as a method of coping with suffering).
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religious and social values and practices among those at the top. Any
fears that Western views would run completely counter to existing reli-
gious and cultural views are misplaced. And certainly, to those among
the have-nots who reject Hindu hierarchy, as well as those among the
haves who accept it, these arguments hold equally true.
2. Westernization and Secularization.: Continuity and Change
Sanskritization, the reform of Hinduism, and conversion all describe
methods of religious change sought from both above and below, but
within the context and according to the internal logic of ancient tradi-
tions. Over the last several centuries, Westernization has tremendously
affected relationships within Indian society. "Westernization" is a
catch-all term used to describe the new technology, institutions, and
values either brought to the subcontinent from the West or strength-
ened by it.158 Sometimes referred to as modernization, it is the
predominantly secular force of change and includes industrialization,
Western-style education, and the development of legal and democratic
institutions based on an ideology of individual equality. Though less a
Western development, mass politics is an integral part of this process.
Important both to upper and lower jatis, this process constitutes an
essential element of caste mobility.117
Control over the forces of Westernization and access to its benefits
constitute important issues in effecting change in rural India. It also
has a profound effect on the individual's view of oneself and others
within the hierarchy of Hindu society.
a. New rights and politics
i. Democracy, rights, and benefits
Of great importance is the effect of secularizing relationships among
jatis with the introduction of an individual rights-based, rather than a
strictly status-based, legal and political system." 8 Indian independence
156. See M. SRINIVAS, supra note 44, at 46-88 (providing an overview of
Westernization).
157. See Oommen, Analyzing Rural and Social Change: A Perspective, in DMEN-
SIONS OF SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 130, at 96-97; and Singh, The Changing Pattern
of Social Stratification in India, in DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 130,
at 137-39 (listing religious conversion, sanskritization, modernization and political
movements as the principal patterns of social change). Singh particularly notes the
connection of modernization and politics with traditional patterns of caste mobility in
pre-British India. Id.
158. Cohn, Some Notes on Law and Change in North India, 8 ECON. DEv. AND
Soc. CHANGE 79, 91 (1959) (noting a shift to equality of status under law, particularly
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was won in a flurry of mass politics at both the level of educational and
jati elites and organized, lower-jati (particularly untouchable) polit-
ics. 1 59 In addition to universal adult suffrage and relatively free elec-
tions for representative bodies, ranging from the village statutory
panchayat (somewhat similar to a board of selectmen) to the national
parliament, seats are reserved in each of these bodies for scheduled
caste members.
Authority for these reservations is found under a provision in the
constitution designed to guarantee a minimum representation for the
scheduled castes in all levels of government.16 0 Laws abolishing caste
disabilities and guaranteeing civil rights, reforming various other
Hindu social practices, and providing certain financial and other bene-
fits for those from lower jatis have been strengthened and expanded
over time. 6' Many of these new rights and social programs have had
relative success, while others have provided little real benefit to their
intended beneficiaries. Land reform legislation, for example, has failed
to turn over meaningful amounts of land to the landless, notably the
lower-caste jatis.'62
One of the most important developments is the increased political
participation of the lower jatis who attempt to enforce their new rights
through political and legal action. National and regional party politics
has involved appeals to "backward" jatis and to untouchable jatis. This
has sometimes alienated higher jatis and caused a violent backlash ef-
fect. 6 ' Scheduled caste associations exist at the national level, both
in courts). The anthropologist Max Gluckman referred to status-based relationships as
"multiplex," or those in which a person "tends to occupy the same position relative to
the same set of other persons in all networks of positive ties-economic, political, pro-
creative, religious, educational." M. GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICAL PROCESS AMONcG THE
BAROTSE OF NORTHERN RHODESIA 19 (1955), quoted in Cohn, supra at 91.
159. See M. SRINIVAS, supra note 44, at 114-17 (maintaining that the so-called
backward classes, or anti-Brahmin movement, originated primarily in the southern In-
dian states, where Brahmin dominance was more pronounced than in the North); see
also S. SARASWATHI, MINORITIES IN MADRAS STATE: GROUP INTERESTS IN MODERN
POLITICS (1974) (noting that a split existed between upper and lower non-Brahman
movements). In the North, there is a constant struggle between "dominant" jatis,
"non-dominant" jatis (or "backward classes") and scheduled castes.
160. INDIA CONST. arts. 330, 332; U.P. Panchyati Raj Act (Act 26 of 1947), Rules
7, 9; see M. GALANTER, supra note 40, at 44-55 (describing these reservations in na-
tional and state parliaments).
161. See infra notes 279-81 and accompanying text (discussing economic rights).
162. See Newell, Ideology and Realities: Land Redistribution in Uttar Pradesh,
45 PAC. AFF. 220 (1972); 2 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR SCHEDULED CASTES AND
SCHEDULTED TRIBES 22 (1981) (documenting the relatively insignificant amount of
land that lower jatis own).
163. Benefits generally accepted as legitimately belonging to the scheduled castes,
are increasingly extended to higher and higher jatis. This has occurred to the disadvan-
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formally and informally, to protect their preferred position under the
constitution and under substantive laws.""
Despite widespread poverty throughout the country, and a relatively
long history of mass political involvement, revolutionary politics has
had a checkered career in India. The Naxalite movement, centered pri-
marily in Bihar and West Bengal, was brutally put down by state po-
lice action in the early 1970s. Although Naxalites and other revolution-
ary left movements still exist, many observers have concluded that the
preoccupation with jati identity partially explains the apparent absence
of large class-based movements among the peasantry. The connection
between class and jati in India, however, is often a close one. In Bihar
especially, battles between landowners, who are almost entirely upper-
jati, and the landless, who are mostly scheduled caste, have raged with
particular brutality.1 6 5 Landlords and landless have formed groups
which they label "armies"; even the police have often served as private
armies for the landed.1 66
ii. Village politics and factionalism
As we have described, it is inaccurate to suggest that the traditional
patterns of hierarchy, jati solidarity, or jajinani were ever complete. It
is likely that the paradigms of Hindu religious and social organizations
are only paradigms, and that diversity and competition have always
existed in rural India in a manner which at times contradicts that para-
digm. What we describe here may be only a development that moderni-
zation and the influence of politics and law have accerlerated. They
are, however, different from what might be called traditional Hindu
ideals. There is a current of change that is working both within and
against the primary Hindu social and religious structure.
Hindu social structure revolves around jati solidarity and hierarchy,
both of which have religious origins. Villages do not contain representa-
tage of those jatis not so classified and even to the disadvantage of the scheduled
castes, whose benefits are diluted and bear some of the opprobrium of the highest jals,
who are given no additional advantages. The main reason for the continued extension
of benefits to an ever-widening group of "backvard classes" is politics. The state gov-
ernment that extends benefits is likely to gain greater support from the new benefi-
ciaries. See M. GALANTER, supra note 40, at 161 (discussing the legal ramifications of
extending benefits to backward classes).
164. Joshi, "Ex-Untouchable'" Problems. Progress. and Politics in Indian Social
Change, 53 PAc. AFF. 193, 197 (1980).
165. Sinha, Report: Class War, Not Atrocities Against the Harijans, 9 J. PEASA .T
STUD. 148 (1982).
166. Sinha, Bihar: Teaching the Landless a Lesson, 20 EcoN. & POL. WEEK<LY
343, 344 (1985).
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tives of each jati equally, nor do all jatis carry out their jajmani func-
tions exclusively. Absolute numbers and control over economic re-
sources, such as land, have always played an important role in the
relative power of different jatis. Srinivas coined the term "dominant
caste" in the 1940s to describe the jati that had the greatest influence
in a particular area, the jati upon which even those who were ritually
superior depended. 
1 7
Factors determining the dominant jati include its hereditary ranking,
its numerical strength, its economic power, its ownership of land, its
relative educational development, and its control of the local political
apparatus.1 68 There is often symmetry among these categories although
the symmetry is not always complete. New factors affecting the deter-
mination of dominance, including politics and changes in economic
structure, have further muddied the paradigmatic Hindu social
hierarchy.
North Indian villages can, by and large, be divided into three types:
those in which only one particular jati lives; those in which many dif-
ferent jatis live but in which there exists some semblance of balance
among several strong jatis; and those in which one jati is numerically
dominant (though not necessarily in an absolute majority). The last is
the most common.16 9 In Uttar Pradesh, numerical and economic power
are usually held predominately either by Brahmars or Rajputs, de-
pending on the location.170 Even in villages where there is no clearly
dominant jati, there is usually a jati that is dominant for a wider group
of villages.
There are three important constraints on jati solidarity and hierar-
chy: first, dominant jatis are quite large; second, there is sometimes a
scarcity of village resources; and third, areas of competition are forever
increasing.' 7' In villages where the dominant jati is quite large, cleav-
ages in the jati may form. Factions can form around traditional divi-
sions such as the exogamous sub-jati groups known as gotras, around
lineages or families, or simply around friendships of those who tend to
167. M. SRINIVAS, supra note 44, at 151-52.
168. See Dube, Caste Dominance and Factionalism, 2 CONTRIBUTIONS TO INDIAN
Soc. (NEW SERIES) 58, 59-60 (1968) (listing the factors that determine dominate jati
status as numerical strength, economic power, political power, ranking of caste (jati),
and education, in that order); Oomen, Political Leadership in India, Image and Real-
ity, 9 ASIAN SURV. 515-17 (1969) (concentrating on land ownership and hereditary
ranking).
169. SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY, supra note 38, at 143-45.
170. M. SHARMA, supra note 46, at 20.
171. Id. at 134-59; see Mayer, Caste in Local Politics in India, in INDIA AND CEY-
LON: UNITY AND DIVERSITY (P. Mason ed. 1967).
[VOL. 5:655
LEGAL AID IN INDIA
share economic interests. Each can become a corporate group with a
different definition than the traditional jati.
72
In Kisanpur, the Rajputs clearly represent the dominant jati because
they are more numerous than other jatis, are high in the jati ranking,
own more land, and dominate the local panchayat. Changes induced by
or accelerated by westernization, however, are evident. Land reform
legislation has caused inceasingly fragmented land ownership among
the Rajputs. Instead of extended Hindu undivided families holding
land in common, increasingly smaller sub-jati corporate groups now
hold land. The creation of new resources, including government loans
and agricultural inputs, have also heightened intra-Rajput competition.
Because control or at least influence over the allocation of these re-
sources lies in the democratically elected panchayat, intra-Rajput com-
petition for control of that body has helped to intensify Rajput
divisions.
The belief in jati hierarchy can work, along with these forces of
Westernization, to the detriment of jati unity. Not all Kisanpur
Rajputs, for example, are large landowners or well-educated. Less
wealthy Rajput families have a strong sense of deprivation because
they too were descendants of a princely varna and deserved what their
wealthier jati-mates already had. Jealousy, which would perhaps be ex-
pected anyway, seemed to be exacerbated by the sense of entitlement
that all Rajput families hold as an attribute of their jati identity.
The lower jatis in Kisanpur are smaller and less engaged in intra-
jati competition. Having less to begin with, they understood that their
only real chances of attaining benefits would come in acting together.
Furthermore, the new legal rights have altered the lower jatis self-im-
age with potentially important implications for jati solidarity and inter-
action. One immediately visible change is is the manner in which un-
touchable jatis refer to themselves. When asked to what community
they belonged, every member of an untouchable jati replied first with a
jati name (Jatav, Bhangi, etc.) followed by, in English, "scheduled
caste". 173 When asked to describe the use of the term, many described
it as coming from both the Constitution and from statutes designed to
protect their welfare. While the Jatavs, for example, clearly stated that
they were of a higher rank than the other untouchables, and while they
still maintained ritual separation, they also noted that these other jatis
172. SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY, supra note 38, at 125-26.
173. See R. KHARE, supra note 148, at 118-22 (contrasting in his study of
Chamars, the language of "guilt-raising" terms like "untouchable" and Hindu re-
forming terms common in Arya Samajism or in Bhaki with "secularlizing terms" like
"scheduled caste").
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were also scheduled castes. 17' The new rights, therefore, have resulted
in new, inter-jati solidarity and identification, as opposed to what has
happened to the upper jatis. We will discuss this at greater length
below.
Much of the intra-jati competition of the dominant Rajputs jati, and
the somewhat tenuous solidarity of the lower jatis is played out in the
arena of elective politics, particularly the politics of the statutory vil-
lage panchayat.17 5 Panchayats are elected by adult suffrage. 17 A
pradhan, or president, heads each panchayat, calls meetings, signs the
disbursement of funds, 17 and is viewed as the representative of each
village. There is an up-pradhan or vice-president, and seven other
members, with scheduled castes in theory holding the same percentage
of seats as they do in the village population. Also, each panchayat must
include at least one woman. 8
The panchayat controls or influences the control of numerous scarce
resources. Among the most important are control over the management
of the village lands, 179 control of drought relief and certain public
works programs from higher levels of government, 80 overseeing the al-
location of benefits under the Integrated Rural Development Pro-
gramme, 8 ' and control in general over relations with the outside world.
Because control of the panchayat represents substantial benefits, elec-
174. See Harris, Why Poor People Stay Poor in Rural India, 85 Soc. SCIENTIST
20, 58 (1979) (finding that lower jatis, while not seeing themselves in terms of relative
ranking, remained separate and uncooperative with other lower jatis); M. SIDDIQUI,
AGRARIAN UNREST IN NORTHERN INDIA 117 (1982) (noting that while jati separation
was maintained in ritual matters, peasants, including lower jatis, were able to unite on
a broad political front).
175. U.P. Panchayati Raj Act (Act 26 of 1947), Rules 7, 9; see K. VAN DESAND,
FOUNDATIONS AND PROBLEMS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN RURAL INDIA (1980) (offer-
ing an introduction to local government in India). We describe here the statutory
panchayats in Uttar Pradesh as of this writing. Other states, most notably Karnataka,
have delegated substantially more authority to village panchayats than Uttar Pradesh.
On May 10, 1989, the Congress (1) proposed a constitutional amendment to create
new, federally required statutory panchayats throughout India with mandatory powers,
proportional representation for scheduled castes and tribes, a 30% reservation for
women, and powers over finance, development, planning, and expenditure. Given the
recent loss by Congress (I)'s of its substantial majority in the Federal Parliament, form
of this amendment, it is uncertain whether some form of this amendment, which would
be the Constitution's 65th, will pass. Chawala, Panchayati Raj: From Doon to °Dehat',
INDIA TODAY, May 31, 1989, at 18-21.
176. U.P. Panchayati Raj Act (Act 26 of 1947), § IiB.
177. Id. Rule 47.
178. Id. Rules 7, 9.
179. Acting as the Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti. Id. § 28; U.P. Zamindari Abolition
and Land Reforms Act (Act I of 1951), §§ 117 & 122.
180. V.P. Panchayati Raj Act (Act 26 of 1947), § 15.
181. Government of Uttar Pradesh, U.P. Integrated Rural Development Pro-
gramme Manual (1983).
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tions to and control of the panchayat are among the most frequent
causes of modern factionalism within a dominant jati.8 2
In Kisanpur, the modern panchayat plays a very important role in
social and political life, although it would be a mistake to suggest that
it is a fully functional governing body. Perhaps one of the panchayats'
most significant roles is as an arena for and intensifier of factional con-
flict. According to most Rajputs, before the beginning of modern
elected panchayats, traditional panchayats dominated by elders and in-
cluding all members of the jati settled all disputes. Over time, however,
traditional panchayats became increasingly less important. Now, fac-
tionalism is so strong that only factional rumps of the traditional jati
panchayat meet and then only to solve family problems. Almost every-
one blames factionalism on the advent of modern elections.
In the context of village politics, where the panchayat is often the
focal point, factions within dominant jatis often form alliances with
other jatis or even with factions within other large jatis. Traditional
jajmani ties often form the basis of inter-jati factional alliances. Entire
jatis may form alliances with one or another faction based on implicit
or explicit promises from a faction within the dominant jati. As such,
jati cooperation in factional struggles may be bought and kept only so
long as the alliance is beneficial to the nondominant jati, and only for
so long as the rival faction does not hold out the promise of greater
benefits if allegiance is switched.18 3
At the time of this study, the dominant Rajput community consisted
of two clearly defined factions: one led by the former president, Jas-
want Singh, and the other led by the current president, Dev Singh.'"
Jaswant Singh was the largest landholder in the village and his sup-
porters were in control of the panchayat before the schism of the
Rajputs into two clearly defined factions. Dev Singh's faction evolved
from those disgruntled with Jaswant Singh's presidency. Each faction
accused the other's leader of corruption while acting as president. Each
accused the other of using the office to sell village land and of pocket-
ing the money to help family and faction members. As president, Jas-
want Singh apparently did turn over village common lands to his rela-
tives and used certain drought relief funds to build a road to one of his
fields. Since that time, factions had become increasingly active, and the
182. See Nicholas, Elites, Class and Factions in Indian Politics: Review Article, 6
S. ASIA REV. 143, 145-53 (1973); Yadava, Factionalism in a Haryana Village, 70 A, .
AN'HROPOLOGIST 890, 898-910 (1973) (providing further discussion of this
phenomenon).
183. M. SHARMA, supra note 46, at 134-59.
184. The authors have changed all proper names of the residents of Kisanpur.
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search for allies among the lower jatis had become vigorously competi-
tive. In a number of instances, for example, people supported fellow
faction members of different jatis in land and boundary claims against
jati-mates who were members of the other faction.
While factionalism existed among the Kisanpur Rajputs at the time
of this study, it had not yet reached the stage whereby relations had
completely broken between the two groups. Faction members would
still attend each other's weddings and other ceremonial events. This is
in contrast to a nearby village with a three-fourths Rajput population,
and three existing factions. The factions had split so completely in that
village that all friendly social intercourse reportedly ended.
The method of participation in village factionalism varied from jati
to jati. The Brahmar jati, which lies ritually above the Rajputs, and
the majority of whose members owned land seemed largely above the
factional fray. One politically active Brahmar family, however, tended
to side with the Jaswant Singh faction. The Kohars (bearers) sided
primarily with the Dev Singh faction, because they perceived Dev
Singh as less corrupt than Jaswant Singh, and because he has a reputa-
tion of not favoring Rajputs from other factions over non-Rajput mem-
bers of his own faction. The jati panchayat of the Baghailis formally
decided not to participate in the factions. The jati managed, with the
help of a loan from a wealthy Baghaili who lived in the nearby market
town, to expand from its traditional sheep and goat herding work into
transporting agricultural goods. They also managed to purchase land
and some families owned three or four acres. Because the jati members
shared at least some resources, they managed to expand their fleet of
bullock carts and substantially increased their wealth. They did not
wish to join a faction for fear of alienating any potential Rajput clients.
The Jatavs, the second largest jati numerically and the most San-
skritized of the scheduled castes, had become deeply involved in village
politics and were important players in the panchayat elections. The
majority of Jatavs lived in one section of the village. Krishna Singh, 8 5
a small cultivator and educated Jatav led their active jati panchayat.86
Krishna Singh was already a reserved member of the village panchayat
and decided to run for panchayat president in the next village elections.
The struggle between the main Rajput factions for control of the
panchayat and the importance for both sides of gaining the support of
185. Most Jatavs adopted Singh, normally the surname of Rajputs and Jais, prob-
ably as part of their jati sanskritization.
186. This Jatav's family received its land during the end of zamindari as a token
distribution of land to scheduled castes. Two other Jatav families worked as marginal
cultivators and received their land at the same time and under the same circumstances.
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lower jati allies in that struggle is amply illustrated in the following
case.
Case 1: The Presidential Election
After nearly twenty years as president of the panchayat, Jaswant
Singh decided to retire and let another member of his faction run for
president. A number of individuals decided to stand for office including
a Brahmar and a Baghaili, who were not associated with any faction,
Krishna Singh, and two Rajputs, one from each faction. Both Rajput
candidates set about to garner as many votes as they could. Both made
promises to members of all jatis that their candidate would be more
"open" as president. They also made specific promises to members of
the scheduled caste jatis that upon election they would make donations
of wheat and would let scheduled caste jati -members use their land for
grazing animals. The secrecy of the ballot prevented easy intimidation
of voters.
After some time, it became clear that most of the Jatavs would vote
for Krishna Singh. Krishna Singh had been leading a court fight to
return certain Rajput captured lands (described in Case 5, below). The
Rajput belonged to the Jaswant Singh faction. If the suit were success-
ful, these lands would be distributed to other scheduled caste jatis. A
committee composed of many of these jatis organized to prosecute the
case and it appeared as if they too would support Krishna Singh's
candidacy.
Jaswant Singh invited a number of scheduled caste jati members to
his house, many of whom worked as laborers in his fields, saying that
he had gifts and bonuses for them. Thinking that this was simply an-
other election eve bribe, many went. Each person was brought individu-
ally into Jaswant Singh's walled courtyard. Jaswant Singh then offered
the person a glass of cool water. After he had drunk, Jaswant Singh
offered a small amount of wheat and asked if the person would vote for
his faction's candidate. Knowing the ballot was secret and wishing to
keep the gift, each person assented. At this point, Jaswant Singh would
reveal that the water from the glass had been taken from the Ganges
River during a tirth yatra18 7 and to break the oath would be a great
sacrilege.
After this incident, the Jatav panchayat met and agreed that the
oath "had been given improperly, and that it was invalid, and that
187. A tirth yatra is a pilgrimage to collect holy water and return it to villages for
use in religious rituals.
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there was no sacrilege to God." They also agreed that they would do
better to support the anti-Jaswant Singh group than to "throw away"
their vote on Krishna Singh. They decided that, if they voted for Dev
Singh, he would be far more likely to help them in their lawsuit against
Jaswant Singh's relatives. In addition, it seemed that Dev Singh would
be more honest than Jaswant Singh. If Dev Singh knew that the Jatavs
helped to elect him, perhaps they would have more influence with him.
Consequently, they voted for Dev Singh. According to the Jatavs, at
the last minute the other scheduled caste jatis became afraid of the
oath and voted for Jaswant Singh. Nevertheless, Dev Singh was in fact
elected.
If the Jatavs have derived some benefits from the increasing disunity
and competition among upper-jati factions, there are schisms within
the Jatav community itself that weaken its political strength. One
small group of Jatavs did not join in the decision to support Dev Singh
nor did it participate in another Jatav-led collective action against the
Rajputs (the land suit described in Case 5). This group of fifteen fami-
lies lives in a neighborhood colony cut off from the rest of the village,
and consists of small to medium sized cultivators. According to this
group of Jatavs, their ancestors reclaimed the land from the jungle
hundreds of years earlier and managed to have their land rights re-
corded under the British Administration. These Jatavs shared little in
the way of jati unity with other Jatavs in the village. One person from
the majority Jatav group explained "they are landholders-they are
like the Thakurs; they don't care about us poor people at all." The
minority community, however, claimed that they were afraid to help
because they were physically isolated and more vulnerable to higher
jatis physical intimidation. As described in Case 6, a group of Rajputs
physically attacked some of the Jatavs in the colony and killed one.
The majority community of Jatavs apparently offered no assistance to
their jati-mates in this matter. The continued vulnerability of the
Jatavs to the upper-jati faction leaders manipulation is illustrated by
the following case.
Case 2: The Election for Vice-President
In 1983, the panchayat consisted of four Rajputs, one Brahmar, two
Baghailis (shepherds), one Kohar (bearer), and three Jatavs. Each
Jatav was a "reserved member." The president was Dev Singh; two of
the Rajputs, the Kohar, and the Brahmar supported the Dev Singh
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faction,' 88 the Baghailis supported no faction, and the Jatavs, including
Krishna Singh, tended to side with Dev Singh. An election was an-
nounced to fill the vice-president's position in the panchayat. The vice-
president is elected from the membership of the panchayat. Besides
acting in place of the president when the latter is not present, the vice-
president also serves as clerk and has access to all records.18 9 The
Jatavs decided that easy access to the records of the panchayat was
important. This would enable them to determine if and how much land
and other resources had been improperly withheld from the scheduled
castes or improperly given to the higher jatis. The Jatav panchayat
decided that one of its number, although not Krishna Singh, should
contest the elections. This Jatav secured the tentative support of the
Dev Singh faction in return for the Jatav vote in the next presidential
election. It seemed as if the Jatav would win.
The candidate of Jaswant Singh's faction was a Rajput. Jaswant
Singh approached the other two Rajput members of Dev Singh's fac-
tion and urged them to vote for their jati-mate. He told them that they
should not support an untouchable because they were becoming too
bold in challenging the hierarchy of jatis. One member of the Dev
Singh faction changed sides but the other held fast.
Jaswant Singh then approached the Jatav candidate and told him
that he must withdraw his name from the nomination. Jaswant Singh
threatened to see to it that no one would hire him if he ran, and that he
would not be able to use Rajput land for grazing animals or as a la-
trine. Jaswant Singh also threatened him with physical violence.
The candidate was not too concerned about his being locked out of
work or land use, because the members of the Dev Singh faction would
certainly hire him, but the Jatav panchayat feared violence on election
day. They went to the local police station and filed a First Information
Report 9 ' alleging assault and requested the presence of the police in
the village during the election. On election day, a police sub-inspector
went to the village to observe. It turned out that the policeman knew
Jaswant Singh's son, a judicial magistrate in eastern Uttar Pradesh
where the policeman had earlier been posted. Instead of seeing the vil-
lage president, the policeman visited Jaswant Singh, who gave him a
cup of tea and sent him home.
After the policeman left, Jaswant Singh went to see the Jatav candi-
date. Jaswant Singh apologized and offered the Jatav eight quintals of
188. Most Brahmars in Kisanpur eschew factionalism.
189. U.P. Panchayati Raj Act (Act 26 of 1947), § I IC.
190. A first information report is a criminal complaint.
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wheat if he would resign from the race. The Jatav took the wheat and
withdrew his name from the ballot on election day. Jaswant Singh's
candidate won. After the election, Jaswant Singh informed the Jatav
that the wheat was only a loan, and that any gift would have been a
bribe and illegal. Although the Jatav candidate was not formally out-
cast, the other Jatavs in the village turned him out from the panchayat
and have little social intercourse with him or his family.
The Jatavs often seemed obsessed with the possibility that there was
a spy in their midst, someone who was reporting to the Rajputs on
their actions. "The Thakurs always know what we are doing. When we
file an application [court case], they always know. Jaswant Singh, he
always knows. They pay some one of us, and they find out." Krishna
Singh reported that the law of the Rajputs was "divide and rule," us-
ing the English phrase. He said that the Rajputs wanted to keep the
scheduled castes divided so that they could not challenge the rule of the
Rajputs.19'
The political involvement of the "religious" jatis, including the Nais
(barbers), Dhobis (washers), and Bhangis (sweepers) had, until re-
cently, followed a different pattern from that of the Jatavs. For the
most part, these jatis had divided along traditional jajmani lines. Indi-
vidual families supported the faction to which their patron belonged.
This, however, was changing because in the previous election individual
families and entire jatis were promised special favors if they voted for
the candidate of a particular faction. Jajmani relations among the
Dhobis and Bhangis and their traditional jajmani patrons had begun to
break down. Both jatis began to present their interests as a group,
sometimes along with other scheduled castes, and conditioned their
support upon receiving reciprocal benefits. Nevertheless, the next case
illustrates the persisting importance of patron-client relationships in the
context of present day village politics.
Case 3: The Capture of the Village Lands
This case involves a wealthy Rajput family whose farm abutted the
commons, and their "grabbing" of village common lands. The Rajput
family was closely related to Jaswant Singh and they had aquired the
land during his tenure as village president. In theory, village commons
are under control of the entire panchayat as the bhumi samiti, or "land
committee." Land ownership, however, is registered with a state
191. M. SHARMA, supra note 46, at 177. Sharma notes that, according to Chamar
(the original jad name of the Jatavs) informants, the biggest obstacle to empowerment
is a lack of Chamar jaii unity.
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records office.1 92 The Registrar presides over the state records and is
under the supervision of the District Land Officer.1 9 3 The Rajput's pos-
session of the common lands caused particular hardship to one Bhangi
(sweeper) named Ram Das. The amount taken was not large, perhaps
only an acre, but it was on this particular section that Ram Das had
usually grazed his animals.
Ram Das performed the ritual services of a Bhangi for a Rajput, a
member of the Dev Singh faction. Ram Das complained about the land
capture to his patron who directed him to the District Land Officer.
The District Officer ordered the Registrar to make an investigation into
the complaint. While traditionally most government officials from
outside the village report directly to the President of the panchayat, the
Registrar went directly to the Rajput who had captured the land.
There he secured a bribe, returned to the Land Officer, and reported
that the land was private property. It turned out that the Registrar was
also a Rajput of the same gotra.
After hearing the Land Officer's decision, Ram Das went to Dev
Singh, the president of the panchayat. Ram explained that the decision
was improper and threatened to file a lawsuit. Dev Singh knew that
Ram Das was a member of his faction and that the Rajput who had
captured the land was a member of the Jaswant Singh faction.9 4 Dev
Singh assured Ram Das that he would handle the situation. Dev Singh
summoned the Registrar back to the village and ordered the recorda-
tion of the land as common. As president of the panchayat, he then
ordered the offending Rajput to vacate the land and threatened that
the panchayat would take legal action if he did not. Faced with these
prospects, the Rajput relented and returned the captured land.
Other cases have been reported in which encroachment by landown-
ers on common lands has successfully been reversed in the Collector's
Court. 95 It is clear that in Kisanpur untouchable jatis have adopted
revised attitudes based on their new legal and political rights. Tradi-
tionally, lower jatis would have little or no say in the operations of the
village. Bhangi Ram Das' action, however, was in a sense grounded in
tradition. Ram Das' right to a limited use of a certain piece of land is a
192. The Registrar is known in English as well as in Hindi by the vernacular name
Lekhbal.
193. The District Land Officer is known in English as well as in Hindi by the ver-
nacular name Tehsildar.
194. It is unclear if Ram Das' patron had gone to see Dev Singh on Ram Das'
behalf, or even if Ram Das had ever gone. We suspect that Ram Das may have taken
credit for his patron's actions in order to impress us during the interview.
195. See Gaon Sabha v. Hakim, 1986 B.R. 95.
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benefit concordant with traditional jajmani principles. Ram
Das'relationship with his jajman patron proved crucial in his receipt of
the benefit.
Cases 1 and 2 are better indications of the changes new legal rights
have encouraged. The cases arose from the introduction of democrati-
cally elected village governments, from the legislative empowerment of
those governments, and from caste reservation principles. The lower
jatis felt entitled to these new rights and, as we will discuss further,
there was even some inter-jati scheduled caste identification and soli-
darity. But even here change has been limited. In Case 1, jati unity
worked to hold together the vote of the Jatavs. In Case 2, inter-jati
cooperation between upper and lower jatis based upon unity of interest
played an important role. The unity has weaknesses, however, as evi-
denced in one Rajput member switching from supporting his faction to
supporting his jati-mate.
The establishment of new political rights has altered the balance of
power in Kisanpur and holds great potential for future change. First,
these new rights have helped to change how lower jatis perceive them-
selves. Second, they have created a system whereby politics can ad-
vance change for the benefit of the have-nots. The manipulation of fac-
tions in the village by lower jatis could improve not only the delivery of
those services provided by the panchayat but all aspects of social and
economic life in the village.
The Jatavs were willing to call in the police when they thought that
they might lose the election through intimidation. Although we found
no example in Kisanpur of election-related court filings, records in the
local magistrate's office revealed numerous instances of court cases con-
testing allegedly unfair elections in other villages. Though each of the
cases we examined appeared to have been filed by upper jatis, the cases
demonstrate the potential for the Jatavs to remedy unfair election tech-
niques (such as bribery or intimidation) through court action. As of
this writing, however, the issues in Kisanpur politics appeared to be
related to traditional social and economic relations as confronted by the
institution of democracy and panchayati raj, and not of overtly illegal
behavior.
In Case 3, the Bhangi Ram Das used the threat of legal action in
making his case to the panchayat regarding the theft of common land.
In the next section, we discuss in greater detail the use of courts and
the changes brought about by this use. In our examination of village
life, we discovered that the institution of courts, like the new political
rights, has already effected substantial changes and that the have-nots
have already begun to use the courts to their advantage. We will dis-
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cuss some specific examples of court use, particularly among the lower-
jatis. But it should be noted that the use of courts is only one part of
the broader process of the adoption of new rights that include political
participation as the most important component. In the cases described
here, legal action is taken along with political action through tradi-
tional jajmani patron-client relations, through the harnessing of fac-
tionalism, or through the inter-jati solidarity. The development of polit-
ics and of court use constitute related parts of the changing dynamic
that Westernization has instigated in village society.
b. Courts, police, and the new rights
i. The modern formal judicial structure'0 0
India's move toward mass representational and interest group politics
began in earnest in the twentieth century. The move to a British style
common law court system, however, began much earlier.197 The system
changed dramatically from colonial judges enforcing jati rules and con-
ventions' 98 to a law that theoretically applied to all persons regardless
of social or religious status. 198 Indians have flocked to the courts since
colonial times, and this practice continues today.
India's common law system was imposed upon it in the eighteenth
century by British colonial rulers who were eager to have a legal sys-
tem that would maintain law and order and secure property rights.
Parliament in London or the Governor General in Council enacted leg-
islation. The highest court of appeal, the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council, was located in London. Courts were relatively few in
number; steep ad valorem court fees discouraged their use for civil
cases. Lower courts, which Indians increasingly controlled over time,
196. Much of this section is taken directly from M. Galanter, R. Gordon, and J.
Lindsay, Affidavit of Marc Galanter, In Re: Gas Disaster at Bhopal, India, MDL No.
626 (J.F.K.) Misc. No. 21-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (Dec. 1985) [hereinafter Galanter Affi-
davit] (copy on file with the court and the authors) (summarizing both the British roots
of the Indian judicial system and its modern form).
197. See M. JAIN, supra note 98 (providing a summary of the Indian legal system
from the 1600s through the 1960s).
198. See Galanter Affidavit, supra note 196, at 11 (discussing the British system in
India and its lack of concern for the needs of Indians).
199. See id. at 414-23 (summarizing the Lex Loci Act that asserted that English
law should govern members outside the Hindu and Muslim communities). Specifically
religious law, or at least law the British understood as "religious" at that time, was not
immediately affected. Id. The Caste Disability Removal Act of 1850, however, abro-
gated the Hindu and Islamic requirement that converts to other religions forfeit their
property. This began the secularization of the Indian legal system. Id. at 423.
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were generally not trusted by the colonial appellate judges, who were
almost always British. This resulted in provisions for the appeal of al-
most every lower court interim decision and order.2 00 Executive officers
exercised criminal jurisdiction, and juries were virtually eliminated.210
After gaining independence, India adopted a democratic government at
both the federal and state levels. The Supreme Court of India is now
the highest court of appeal with remarkable original jurisdiction in cer-
tain areas involving the abridgement of fundamental rights. 2 Criminal
jurisdiction has passed into judicial hands. The tradition of relatively
few judges and courts, of high court fees, of frequent appeals, and of no
juries, however, has remained. In many ways, its colonial precursor has
profoundly influenced India's legal system.
Since the adoption of its independent Constitution in 1950, India has
maintained a unified system of courts. At the apex is the Supreme
Court, consisting of a Chief Justice and an authorized level of twenty-
eight puisne, or associate judges. Burgeoning case loads have caused its
expansion from seven judges in 1950 to its present size. In its early
years the Court sat en banc, but it now sits in benches of two, three,
five (in constitutional cases) and (extraordinarily) seven or more
judges.
The Supreme Court is the highest appellate court in all matters of
law. Its authority extends to state as well as central law. Its appellate
jurisdiction extends to the state and federal territory high courts and
through them to all inferior courts and all quasi-judicial tribunals.
Jurisdiction is exercised when a high court has certified that a case
involves substantial questions of law of general importance; or, if such
certification is refused, where the Supreme Court grants special leave
to appeal. The Supreme Court has a limited but much used original
jurisdiction under Article 32 of the constitution to issue writs to pre-
vent violations of the constitution's chapter on fundamental rights. The
Supreme Court justices are appointed by the President of India, which
effectively means the federal cabinet in the Indian parliamentary sys-
tem, in consultation with the Chief Justice. Traditionally, the most sen-
ior member of Court is selected as Chief Justice. Judges must retire at
200. See Galanter Affidavit, supra note 196, at 20 citing Gledhill, The Expansion
of the Judicial Process in Republican India, 8 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 4, 13 (1964) (com-
paring British and Indian appellate procedures). The Indian lower courts generally only
prepare a record of evidence so the appellate court serves as the first real step in the
process. Id.
201. See M. JAIN, supra note 98, at 145 (discussing the British criminal justice
system established in India).
202. See id. at 317-20 (discussing the very broad jurisdiction granted the Supreme
Court under the new Constitution, especially in the area of fundamental rights).
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age sixty-five.
There is no lower central (federal in American terminology) judici-
ary. Each state and the Union Territory of Delhi has a single judicial
hierarchy with a high court at its head.203 The high courts exercise an
extensive jurisdiction to review the lower courts, and share with the
Supreme Court under Article 226 of the Constitution an original juris-
diction to issue writs against violations of fundamental rights. Also
under that Article, the high courts have jurisdiction to issue writs
against violations of any right guaranteed under law.
The high courts, which vary in size from two judges to more than
forty, sit as single judges, division benches of two judges or, occasion-
ally, as Full Benches of three, five, or even seven or more judges. In
some instances an appeal or a reference on a point of law is possible
from a smaller to a larger bench of a high court.
Below the high courts are the district courts. These consist of district
judges and include a chief judge, who is analogous to the American
chief judges of federal district courts. These judges sit for civil cases in
the "district" court and for criminal cases in the "sessions" court. Ap-
peals, revision petitions, and references are sent from the district court
to the high court.
Below the district courts are various judicial tribunals, such as, the
collector's court (that hears land dispute issues), family and renters'
courts, lower-level criminal magistrates, and various quasi-judicial
tribunals. Appeals from these may go to the district court or directly to
a high court. Judges of the district courts and of the lower judiciary are
filled through competitive examination at the state level.
The doctrine of precedent, or stare decisis governs Indian courts, like
those of other common law systems. Not only the narrow holding but
the dicta of Supreme Court decisions bind the courts. The body of pre-
cedent consists of the decisions of the Supreme Court and of the high
courts; in addition, certain other decisions are also reported, such as
some decisions of the collector's court. Reporting is slow and often
more than a year may elapse before a decision of even the Supreme
203. The high courts themselves occupy a mixed status. The constitution discusses
them under the heading of "the States," and various state governments and the Union
Territory of Delhi appoint the staff and bear the administrative expenses. Judges are
paid from the federal Consolidated Fund of India, and the President makes appoint-
ments in consultation with the Chief Justice of India and the chief justice of the partic-
ular high court. The central Parliament controls removal through impeachment. The
central government can transfer judges from one high court to another. There are cur-
rently 18 high courts, one for each state, except that the far eastern states share a high
court, as do Punjab and Haryana. The Union Territory of Delhi has had its own high
court since 1966.
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Court is widely available. In the Supreme Court and in the High
Courts cases are argued, decided, and reported in English. In the
subordinate courts and tribunals, evidence may be taken in English, in
Hindi, or if the local language is not Hindi, in that local language.
Perhaps the most salient feature of the Indian legal system is its
enormous backlog of cases and inability to cope adequately with
problems of delay. Professor M. P. Jain, in his work Outlines of Indian
Legal History, notes that: "the problem of law's delay has been a per-
ennial problem in the Indian judicial sphere since the introduction of
the Cornwallis code in 1793. It has engaged the attention of the gov-
ernment from time to time, but still it has defied solution.
20 4
In 1964, the Indian Law Commission noted that "the appalling backlog
of cases. . .has unfortunately become a normal feature of nearly all the
courts in the country. ' 05 Fifteen years later, another Law Commission
noted that "the problem has persisted" and has attained "gigantic pro-
portions."210 In 1985, the Supreme Court of India had pending some
15,017 constitutional cases and 25,062 non-constitutional cases, not in-
cluding criminal cases. Roughly half of these criminal cases had en-
tered the Supreme Court in or before 1981, approximately one quarter
had entered the Court in or before 1978.207 In the summer of 1985, a
conference of chief justices of the high courts, chief ministers, and law
ministers of the states addressed the problem of the mounting backlog,
then estimated to equal over ten million pending cases throughout the
Indian judicial system. The Agenda Notes, after recounting the last
decade of proposals for reform congluded "unfortunately, there has
been no perceptible improvement in the situation and the arrears are
increasing steadily.
'20 8
204. M. JAIN, supra note 98, at 254 (summarizing the historic and continuing
problem of enormous backlog in Indian courts).
205. See Galanter Affidavit, supra note 196, at 22 (quoting LAW COMMISSION,
27TH REPORT, THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908, MINISTRY OF LAW 6 (1964)).
206. See id. (quoting LAW COMMISSION, 77TH REPORT, DELAY IN TRIAL COURTS,
MINISTRY OF LAW 1 (1978)).
207. See Galanter Affidavit, supra note 196, at 24 (citing R. Dhavan, Materials on
Judicial Backlogs in the Supreme Court of India 27-34 (July, 1985)) (discussing the
enormity of the Supreme Court's backlog and summarizing the problems). Most of the
cases came to the Supreme Court after spending many years in lower courts and tribu-
nals and the total duration of the suits is often far greater than the period of their
pendancy in the Supreme Court.
208. Galanter Affidavit, supra note 196, at 22, F-i (quoting from Agenda Notes
from the Conference of Chief Justices of the High Courts, Chief Ministers, and Law
Ministers (Aug. 31-Sept. 1, 1985) (copy on file with Prof. M. Galanter, University of
Wisconsin School of Law, Madison, WI) (discussing the problems of backlog in the
Indian legal system and summarizing the number of cases instituted, disposed of, and
pending from 1950-1984).
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The harmful results of such delays are obvious. In L. Babu Ram v.
Raghunathji,0 9 a suit instituted in 1950 and finally disposed of over
twenty five years later, the Supreme Court observed that:
[a]t long last, the unfortunate and heroic saga of this litigation is coming to an
end. It has witnessed a silver jubilee, thanks to our system of administration of
justice and our callousness and indifference to any drastic reforms in it. Cases
like this, which are not infrequent, should be sufficient to shock our social as well
as judicial conscience and advise us to move swiftly in the direction of overhaul-
ing and restructuring the entire legal and judicial system.
Because final decisions are delayed for years, judicial cases are turning
into prolonged battles of attrition. In such instances, those who have
sufficient financial resources to fight a long judicial battle are naturally
at a profound advantage.
There are numerous reasons for such delays. One is the paucity of
courts relative to the population.2 10 Another is that Indian judges work
in the poorest facilities, with often poorly qualified staff, and with rela-
tively low pay. In view of the poor facilities and staff, the disparity in
the quantitative presence of courts is even greater than any numerical
comparisons suggest.
The ingrained work habits and culture of lawyers make for an ineffi-
cient use of scarce judicial resources. Following the old English tradi-
tion, Indian lawyers normally make time-consuming oral arguments
rather than presenting written motions and briefs. Even in the high
courts and the Supreme Court, oral arguments on points of law, not
fact, can go on for days, weeks, and even months. In trial courts, there
is a tendency to over-prove both essential and inessential and to pro-
tract cross-examinations.211 Part of the reason for this is the Indian
Code of Civil Procedure does not provide for pretrial depositions. While
provisions exist, for limited interrogatories, production and inspection
of documents, and the securing of admissions, there is no provision for
pretrial depositions, and they are unknown in Indian legal practice." 2
209. L. Babu Ram v. Raghunathji, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1734, 1735.
210. See Galanter Affidavit, supra note 196, at 15-16, C-I (discussing India's large
population and relatively small number of judges). India has on!y 10.5 judges per mil-
lion. Comparable figures for the United States are 107 per million, Canada 75.2 per
million, and England and Wales 50.9 per million. Id.
211. Id. at 16 (citing U. BAXI, THE CRIME OF THE INDIAN LEGAL SYSTEMt 74-75
(1982) (reviewing the problems with the Indian legal system).
212. INDIA CODE CIV. PROC. § 30, Order 11 (1908). Even here, the use of discov-
ery is limited. Discovery is limited to parties, and does not extend to witnesses. Inter-
rogatories "may not extend to the evidence wherewith the opposite party intends to
support his case at the trial." Jamaitrai v. Motilal, 1960 A.I.R. (Cal.) 536, 537. The
discovery of documents is confined to those "which do not themselves constitute exclu-
sively the other party's evidence of his case or title." M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur, 1972
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Various Law Commissions have noted that even the limited forms of
discovery provided for in the Code are rarely used. In 1973, the Law
Commission noted that the Code provision for pretrial discovery is
rarely used.213 Nevertheless, in a recent consideration of trial delay, the
Law Commission, while reiterating this observation, rejected proposals
for enlargement of the provision for pretrial discovery. 14
Indian civil procedure does not include any counterpart of the pre-
trial conference, nor is there usually any attempt by judges to engineer
compromises or settlements among the parties.21 The Supreme Court
attempted to depart from tradition and negotiate a settlement in the
Bhopal gas disaster case. Strong public reaction against the settlement
and attempts to overturn it, however, may have negated any preceden-
tial value from the attempt."'
Cases are plagued with frequent adjournments and are normally
heard only in fragments, with day to day hearings as the exception and
interrupted hearings as the rule. 17 The constant fragmentation of pro-
fessional effort is reflected in a district court bar of a study of that civil
lawyers on the average appear in 14.3 court proceedings each day.218
Superimposed on these delaying practices in the trial court are oppor-
tunities for a profusion of appeals. As the Law Commission noted in its
14th Report:
Since the early [eighteen hundred] seventies, the Indian legal system has met
with the criticism that it permits a multiplicity of appeals causing enormous de-
lays and costs. . . .There may be-and there, not infrequently, are-cases where
the same matter may be given three or four or even five hearings. . . . Even the
party emerging as the ultimate victor may find that he has achieved only a pyr-
rhic victory, for his unrecoverable costs may exceed the value of the judgment he
has obtained. . . . [A] litigant today . . . can never know when his case will
A.I.R. (S.C.) 2379, 2382. The difficulty of challenging the adequacy of the response of
the party from whom discovery is sought further limits the discovery of documents. "If
a party states in his affidavit . . . that he has no documents relating to the matters in
question in the suit . . . his oath is conclusive." K. MULLA, THE CODE OF CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE 508 (1lth abr. & ed. 1982 Supp. 1985).
213. LAW COMMISSION, 54th REPORT 142 (1973).
214. LAW COMMISSION, 77th REPORT, Ministry of Law 16-17, 51 (1978).
215. There is a provision for the court to examine parties for purposes of framing
issues. INDIA CODE CIV. PROC., § 30(a), Order 10, Rule 1 (1908). This technique,
however, is rarely used. As V.R. Krishna Iyer, later a Supreme Court Justice and a
former member of the Law Commission wrote, "(O)ur judiciary now views active pro-
motion of settlement of disputes with unconcern and as even objectionable." V.
KRISHNA IYER, LAW AND THE PEOPLE, A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 137 (1972).
216. This was suggested by Mr. Michael Macy.
217. LAW COMMISSION, 14th REPORT, Reform of Judicial Administration: Ministry
of Law 335 (1958) (discussing the constant interruption of most hearings).
218. J. GANDHI, LAWYERS AND TOUTS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE LE-
GAL PROFESSION 89 (1982).
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end.21 9
There are not only appeals of final decisions, but a profusion of op-
portunities for interlocutory appeal. A vast number of rulings and or-
ders taken to higher tribunals can, given the state of arrears in the
appellate judiciary, stay proceedings for years. A recent Supreme
Court case lists some fifteen types of orders that have the requisite fi-
nality and are appealable.220
The Indian legal profession is a unified one, with a single set of qual-
ifications for practicing in any court or engaging in any aspect of legal
practice. Traditionally, however, most lawyers divide themselves into
primarily civil or criminal practices. The Indian lawyer, particularly in
rural settings, is primarily a courtroom advocate rather than an advi-
sor, negotiator, planner, or investigator. Except for limited exceptions
confined to large cities, lawyers practice on their own, though occasion-
ally leading members of the bar take on a small number of juniors
recently out of law school. Lawyers rarely employ specialized investiga-
tors or paralegals trained to conduct factual inquiries. The low priority
given to fact-gathering and research is reflected in lawyers fee arrange-
ments: lawyers typically charge their clients based on court
appearance.
A number of entrenched features of Indian legal practice inhibit the
use of whatever specialized expertise exists and discourages its cultiva-
tion. Contingent fees are not permitted, so that there is no way for
lawyers to finance litigation for claimants who are unable to afford law-
yer's fees. There are provisions for free legal assistance in each of In-
dia's states, but the amounts appropriated are tiny and rarely sufficient
to compensate adequate counsel. State-sponsored legal aid programs,
typically without staff lawyers of their own or back-up facilities, rely
upon the same solo practitioners for delivery of legal services. 221 Bans
on solicitation and advertising help to prevent an assembly of an appro-
priate set of related cases. The practice of awarding costs, including
lawyer's fees, against the losing party also inhibits pioneering litigation.
In this setting, there are few incentives to invest in developing any ex-
pertise in problems likely to affect the poor.
Juxtaposed against these numerous deficiencies are the remarkable
219. LAW COMMISSION, 14TH REPORT, Reform of Judicial Administration: Minis-
try of Law 364 (1958). There is no indication that this situation has improved since the
issuance of the report.
220. Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben, 1981 A.I.R. (S.C.) 1786. 1817 (listing fif-
teen interlocutory orders appealable from a lower to a higher court).
221. See infra notes 363-64 and accompanying text (discussing the question of free
legal aid).
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accomplishments of the Indian courts. Unlike much of the third world,
the Indian judicial system remains relatively independent and free from
corruption, although some corruption apparently does exist, particu-
larly in the lower judiciary.222 Judges themselves appear relatively free
from jati prejudice and take their neutral role seriously, particularly
within the higher levels of the judiciary. In addition, the higher judici-
ary controls the lower judiciary through the close supervision of ap-
peals. In general, the judiciary helps to preserve and extend the rule of
law as enacted through democratic government. In addition, the judici-
ary acts as a potent check on governmental arbitrariness and protects
the nascent democratic processes.
One of the most important developments of the Indian judicial sys-
tem is the special jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, under Article 32
of the Constitution, and of the high courts, under Article 226, to issue
writs, orders, and directions for the protection of fundamental rights.
Parties are permitted to petition these courts directly to invalidate leg-
islation or set aside an administrative order that contravenes a peti-
tioner's fundamental rights. The courts have proven themselves willing
to exercise this power and have struck down governmental action in
numerous circumstances. One respected constitutional commentator
notes that:
The Law Reports bear witness to the fact that legislative and executive inter-
ference with fundamental rights has been effectively checked by the courts. How-
ever, the Law Reports tell only a small part of the tale because for one case that
goes to Court there are hundreds in which actions violating fundamental rights
have been restrained by the knowledge that a cheap and effective remedy exists
for their enforcement.
22 3
The writ jurisdiction has proven extremely popular with litigants,
and lawyers exercise considerable ingenuity to cast client's claims in
the form of a writ. In addition, recent Supreme Court holdings have
limited rules of standing for public interest cases. In fact, even a letter
addressed to a court can act as a petition for redress of fundamental
rights.224 However, with a few exceptions, most notably involving the
prohibitions against discrimination in public access on the basis of reli-
gion, race, caste or gender, against the practice of untouchability, and
against bonded labor,225 fundamental rights run only against the state.
222. See our discussion in Case 6, at 728 (discussing the case of the Rajput Ban-
dits who bribed a judge and were then found innocent).
223. H. SEERVAI, I CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA 212 (3d ed. 1983).
224. See infra notes 317-21 and accompanying text (discussing the Indian courts'
recent strides in accepting more public interest cases).
225. See Galanter Affidavit, supra note 196, at 14 (explaining that writs are used
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In addition, because these petitions are admitted primarily on the basis
of affidavits before what are essentially courts of appeal, it is often diffi-
cult to deal with substantial factual controversies. We will discuss the
use of this type of legal action in greater length below when we address
the role of public interest litigation.226 In addition, under Article 226,
the high courts may entertain petitions for writs or orders to prevent
the violation of any rights of a petitioner as guaranteed under law.
Again, these rights, with the above exceptions applicable to fundamen-
tal rights, normally only run against the state.
Despite its flaws, the Indian legal system has become an integral and
important part of Indian society. Individuals from all walks of life con-
tinue to flock to the courts, and it is impossible to dismiss their
importance.
ii. The Indian legal system in village life
Scholars have disagreed on the extent to which courts, with their
emphasis on equality of status, have been accepted by village society as
a method of adjudicating disputes. At least in theory, neutral courts
should provide an opportunity for the lower jatis to enforce their new
rights in a forum not unaffected by their continued inferior status in
village politics. Cohn has suggested that the continuing clash of values
between village and court has encouraged Indians to use the courts to
further and not solve disputes.227 Mendelsohn has argued that the vil-
lagers' use of the legal process as a weapon against an opponent, rather
than as a device to settle disputes, is due to the fact that the vast ma-
jority of legal cases involve land.228 Courts were viewed as part of a
larger administrative system dealing with vast complexities of land
ownership and could not handle these issues in a simple, adjudicatory
manner.2 29 Other scholars have suggested that "lawyer's law" is ac-
to protect the people's fundamental rights from government violation).
226. See infra notes 334-61 and accompanying text (discussing the use of petitions
in public interest litigation).
227. See Mendelsohn, The Pathology of the Indian Legal System, 15 MOD. ASIAN
STUD. 823, 824 (1981) (stating that Indian peasant society and British society had
antagonistic methods of dispute resolution); Galanter, The Displacement of Tradi-
tional Law in Modern India, 24 J. OF Soc. IssuEs 65 (1968); Khare, Indigenous Cul-
ture and Lawyer's Law in India, 14 CONP. STUD. IN SOC. AND HiST. 71 (1972).
228. See Mendelsohn, supra note 227, at 842-50, 860 (discussing the clash of val-
ues between British policymakers and the Indian villagers over rights to land). Accord-
ing to Mendelsohn, most criminal cases, including trespass and assault, are also related
to land disputes. 0. Mendelsohn, Remarks Delivered to the Conference on the Career
and Propspect of Law in India, University of Wisconsin-Madison (June 8, 1982).
229. See id. at 859 (summarizing Cohn as blaming the lack of acceptance of the
courts on the difficulty of new land administration policies.
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ceptable only in very limited circumstances where there is no deep con-
flict with traditional values.2 30 For example, cases involving family dis-
putes or ones where Hindu beliefs are paramount would remain within
the traditional system.23 l
In Kisanpur, the most common types of lawsuits were those brought
by the male offspring of large landowners, mostly Rajputs and Jats,
involving the partition of land between them.23 2 There are two types of
partition battles: those involving inheritance and those involving land
ceiling laws. Because there is no tradition of primogeniture in Hindu-
ism, assets are divided up evenly among all male children upon the
death of the father. 33 Traditionally, such divisions were simple, be-
cause families normally lived together and divided up the land's pro-
duce evenly. Because land ownership is now legally recorded and broth-
ers may wish to leave the village, there is a greater interest in making
certain that one's inheritance in the equal share of land is legally re-
corded, Major court disputes can arise over the relative size and quality
of each brother's inheritance.
23 4
Disputes centered on the land ceiling laws are a permutation of the
inheritance partition battles. In Kisanpur, for example, the state gov-
ernment has set an ownership limit of a little over forty acres per fam-
ily. 23 5 In order to stay under the limit and not forfeit land to the state,
230. See LAW COMMISSION 14TH REPORT, supra note 219.
231. Singh, Legal Perceptions and Usages in North Indian Village Disputes, 19 J.
OF Soc. RES. 14, 26 (1976).
232. M. SHARMA, supra note 46, at 136-38. In the principal village of Professor
Sharma's research, a lack of funds to pay lawyers prevented intra-jati disputes over
land from going to court. She discovered that mediators or "big men" resolved these
disputes. Only inter-jati disputes went to court. Id. This is not the case in Kisanpur. In
one instance, a particularly litigious Rajput landowner had instituted over fifty law-
suits, almost all against his Rajput neighbors. While faction leaders often resolved in-
tra-jati conflicts, conflicts involving land often went to court. Inter-factional conflicts
almost always went to court.
233. See B. COHN, supra note 38, at 146-47 (discussing the frequency of disputes
among brothers who inherit land). Traditionally, while men received land, women re-
ceived istridhun, or bride wealth, upon marriage, usually in the form of jewelry. Id.
The practice of istridhun is possibly the precursor to the spreading modern practice
among most upper and middle-level jatis of the payment of dahayj, or dowry. Id. Un-
like istridhun, which is the property of the woman, dahayj is in effect a groom-price
paid to the parents of the groom, usually based on the earning potential of the future
husband. Id. In modern times, women are legally entitled to an equal share of land,
and the law prohibits the payment of dahayi. In an attempt to battle the practice of
dowry, the Indian Supreme Court has recently held that dahayj is equivalent to is-
tridhun and, thereby, converts into the property of the wife.
234. M. SHARMA, supra note 46, at 54. In her primary village of study, Sharma
found that most court cases involved disputes with neighbors and not members of the
same family. Rivals go to court, she concludes, while relatives or members of the same
faction do not. Id.
235. U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act (1960) (Act I of 1961), §§
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it often becomes necessary for the family to make a fictitious partition.
These partitions often turn into bitter court battles.230 Fictional divi-
sions among relatives often become real as de jure transfers of land
become de facto partitions.237
Another common form of legal action involves land disputes among
neighbors. The often poor quality of surveying and the legal recording
of land ownership serves as a basis for disagreement. A common exam-
ple of land disputes is the subtle moving of irrigation barriers (often at
night) onto neighboring pieces of land in an attempt to expand owner-
ship. These claims frequently result in litigation. Because such actions
usually involve Rajputs or Jats, these disputes may reinforce factional
divisions or create new ones.2 38
At least among those upper jatis who own land, courts have become
familiar allies in local power struggles. Almost all of these families
have a passing acquaintance with the courts and view them as a man-
ner of furthering their cause in a dispute. It is noteworthy that the
focus of litigants is often less on the actual outcome of the lawsuit than
may be the case in most Western countries.
One of the most important effects of legal process appears to be its
usefulness in harassing one's opponents. As we noted in our discussion
above, there is no provision in the judicial system for taking depositions
outside of court. Due to adjournments and frequent appeals, most cases
remain in trial for long periods of time, frequently months and even
years. Continued court appearances over a period of months or years to
give testimony is a very expensive, time-consuming, and degrading ex-
perience. Besides lengthy court battles, another powerful weapon, is the
ability to secure interim orders and temporary injunctions. The effect
3 & 5 (1961), § 4 (1961). A family of more than five members is allowed an additional
eight acres per child, with a maximum of twenty-four acres extra. Id.
236. See 0. Mendelsohn, The Role of the Courts in the Failure of Indian Land
Reform 23 (June 1982) (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors) (paper
presented at "The Career and Prospects of Law in Modern India" Conference, Univer-
sity of Wisconsin, Madison) (explaining that transfers of land to distant relatives, man-
agers, temple keepers, etc. occurred in order to enable larger landholders to keep land).
237. V. GAIKWOD, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT THROUGH COMMUNITY Ac-
TION: SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS (Indian Institute of Management Technical Report No.
98, 1975), cited in Vyas, Changes in Land Ownership Pattern: Structural Change in
Indian Agriculture, in PEASANTS IN HISTORY, ESSAYS IN HONOR OF DANIEL THORNER
187 (E. Hobdbawn ed. 1980). Vyas notes that at the very least, land reform has pre-
vented big owners from getting any bigger. Id. at 187-88.
238. In fact, we witnessed the creation of a new third faction when Jaswant Singh
allegedly moved his irrigation ditch onto one of his neighbors' land. The neighbor, a
member of Jaswant Singh's faction, was another Rajput. It is unclear whether this
Rajput would eventually join the Dev Singh faction or not. As of this writing, he ap-
pears to be a faction unto himself.
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of actual legal judgments (both interim and final) in these cases is less
clear. In most instances, the mere threat of police action to enforce
eviction seemed sufficient to end the dispute. The threat of police action
also assisted the legal victor in negotiating a better compromise outside
of the court. Criminal trespass could result in the actual arrest of an
individual, a potentially terrifying and extremely embarrassing experi-
ence in India.2 39 In addition, the ability of the victor to register land
with the Land Office is important because only registered land can be
effectively sold or used as collateral for a loan.
Within the village forum, jati status and jati solidarity continue to
play a major role in determining outcomes of disputes. Thus, one might
not expect a higher-jati member to bring a dispute with a lower-jati
member to a neutral court that would not extend traditional respect to
the higher-jati. One might, however, expect a lower-jati member to
bring a dispute with a higher-jati member to a court. Unlike the tradi-
tional rules of jad, jati status or hierarchy theoretically do not affect
the judicial system. The judicial system allows the lower jatis to en-
force new legal rights and to present cases in a forum unconcerned with
their inferior status in village politics. Factors determining court use
include the lower-jati members' awareness of their legal rights and
their wish to take advantage of them, whether they have the stamina to
fight the case, the perceived degree of the court's neutrality, and the
effect that legal action might have on furthering the lower-jati mem-
ber's claim versus some alternative form of action.
Case 4: The Road
A road has always existed from the village proper, past the small
colony of Jatav families, toward the principal metalled road. During
land consolidation, 40 the Land Officer recorded that the land under the
road actually belonged to a neighboring Rajput. The Land Officer,
however, then recorded that the road itself lay through some land be-
longing to one of the Jatavs. The Rajput started to construct the road
through the Jatav property and to cultivate the actual road.241
The Jatav, who owned the property through which the new road lay,
239. See infra notes 256-60 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of police
action).
240. See infra notes 245-46 and accompanying text (discussing land consolidation
and a case arising from it).
241. According to the Jatav informants, the Rajput paid the Land Officer to
change the records, but we could find no one to confirm this part of the story. Further-
more, the informants did not offer a convincing explanation as to how they know that
the Land Officer had received a bribe.
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went to see a Bania lawyer in a nearby town. Soon afterward, the
Bania referred the case to another Jatav lawyer. The Jatav lawyer and
the landowner then apparently went to see the Land Officer, but he
refused to see them. It is not clear if he asked for a bribe or simply
refused to talk to them.
The two then went to see the Sub-Divisional Magistrate (S.D.M.), a
member of the state administrative service who oversees all local civil
affairs, including the police. The S.D.M., who was also a Rajput,
agreed to come to the village to make an investigation. While there, he
visited the Rajput who claimed title to the land where the road had
been. The Rajput landowner knew a jati-mate, who had a prostitution
business, in the same market town as the location of the S.D.M.'s of-
fice. 242 The jati-mate sent a prostitute to see the S.D.M.243 and she
spent three or four days with him. The S.D.M. then refused to act on
the case.
The two Jatavs, landowner and lawyer, then went to see the Collec-
tor, who is the chief local tax official, the direct superior of the Land
Officer, and the presiding officer of the Land Court. Although the Col-
lector did not send someone out to see the village, the same prostitute
was sent to the Collector for a period of four days. The Collector then
also refused to act on the case.244 The lawyer never filed a formal case
before the Collector's Court. As the lawyer stated: "What would be the
point? We have no money to fight a court case."
The frustrations the Jatav litigant encountered in Case 4-a lack of
resources to follow through on a legal challenge and a feeling that the
upper-jatis easily manipulated outside authorities-were not atypical
of the stories related to us when we raised the question of the use of
courts. Perhaps this elaborate tale of prostitutes and the Collector is
somewhat apocryphal, but these stories shape village attitudes even if
they are exaggerated. Nonetheless, existing side by side with this fre-
quently expressed cynicism about the value of pursuing legal strategies
is a countervailing perception that lower jatis can benefit from the
court system. Those who most effectively articulated the frustrations
simultaneously expressed this belief. The following case illustrates the
242. The relationship between the two Rajputs was not clear, but they apparently
were not relatives.
243. A number of Jatavs insisted that the woman was not a prostitute, but simply
the daughter of the jati-mate.
244. We have some doubt about the prostitute visiting the Collector. The Jatav
relating the story seemed embarassed that he never actually filed a case before the
Collector's Court. He may have embellished the story to show that he did not file a
case because of lack of money and corruption in the system.
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persistence of this belief.
Case 5: The Capture of Consolidation Land
This case involved capture of certain lands by several Rajput fami-
lies after the completion of land consolidation. Consolidation is a statu-
tory program that reconfigures property ownership so that landowners
no longer have numerous, noncontiguous pieces of land. In return for
their old and scattered properties, landowners received new, undivided
lands equal in agricultural output to their original holdings. The pur-
pose of consolidation is to make cultivation more efficient, and to pave
the way for mechanization. Because of the increased efficiency and con-
templated enforcement of land ceiling legislation, consolidation usually
results in a small surplus of land after the reassignment of all prior
holdings. According to the statute, the Registrar is supposed to dis-
tribute the surplus land to landless villagers, beginning with the sched-
uled castes.245
During Jaswant Singh's tenure as president, a number of his rela-
tives received title to the surplus land. Jaswant Singh directed the Reg-
istrar, who was from the same jati and gotra, to record title in the
names of his relatives, who apparently also paid the Registrar hefty
bribes.24 These transfers involved a significant amount of land and a
number of Rajput families benefited.
Krishna Singh, the leader of the Kisanpur Jatavs, heard about the
statutory distribution scheme for scheduled castes from a Jatav lawyer
in a nearby town. Krishna Singh knew of the numerous court cases
involving land partition among the upper jati landowners. In addition,
he had previously spent three years in Delhi working as a brick kiln
worker. In Delhi, he participated in litigation concerning back pay due
to kiln workers under the state minimum wage act. A Delhi Jatav law-
yer prosecuted the litigation, taken on behalf of all kiln workers, most
of whom were scheduled caste members from different jatis. The case
succeeded and Krishna Singh and his fellow workers received a sub-
stantial financial settlement. Krishna Singh felt that a court case might
force the Rajput land grabbers to return the land and force the
panchayat to distribute it to the scheduled castes in the village. He
organized a committee,247 including members from each of the other
245. See U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, Rule 24A (outlining the rules for
land distribution and the permissible uses for reserved land).
246. This is the same Registrar as in Case 3.
247. Although they normally used the English word "committee", occasionally they
also used the word panchayat, possibly suggesting that the committee was like a
panchayat for the "scheduled castes." This also suggests that some may have thought
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scheduled caste jatis, to fight the case.
The majority Jatavs decided at a jati panchayat to support the suit.
The other scheduled caste jatis failed to reach an unanimous decision.
A small number of families split on factional lines and declined to be-
come involved while others decided to support the committee even
though they had ties to patrons associated with Jaswant Singh's fac-
tion. The committee collected a small amount of money from each
family and engaged a local Jatav lawyer to prosecute the case. The
Jatav lawyer filed suit before the District Magistrate, who ordered the
Registrar and the District Land Officer to conduct an investigation and
report back to him. The Registrar arrived in the village and went di-
rectly to see Jaswant Singh, the president, who had made the initial
arrangements to register the land in his name. The Registrar agreed to
drop the investigation.
Shortly thereafter, one of the Rajputs, who received some land,
stopped Krishna Singh on the road and threatened to kill him if he did
not stop the lawsuit. After learning of this threat, the committee de-
cided to wait. They did not go to the police because they feared that
the police would only go to the president, who would send them away.
In the next election for president of the panchayal, the committee de-
cided to support Dev Singh, who ultimately won the election. Krishna
Singh then went to Dev Singh and asked for his help. Dev Singh said
that he would not oppose the filing of the case or the decision of the
court.2 48 The case is still in litigation but the committee is no longer
afraid to summon the police. The committee has vowed to fight the
case as long as they can afford to do so.
As our discussions with the committee continued, we noted a sub-
stantial interest among the scheduled castes in working together to use
the courts to advance their collective interests. The scheduled castes are
in Kisanpur surprisingly aware of their constitutional and legislative
rights and have an interest in learning more.24 9 Scheduled caste leaders
clearly understood the importance of courts in village land disputes; we
often heard stories concerning legal battles among the upper fatis from
of the "scheduled castes" as constituting a new type of jali.
248. At this moment, Krishna Singh approached both the member of the Legisla-
tive Assembly [M.L.A.] and Member of Parliament [M.P.) from their constituency for
help. Because both were reserved constituencies and Jatavs, Krishna Singh expected
some help. The M.L.A., however, and the Rajputs became friends after the election
and would not do anything except refer the case back to the Magistrate. They received
an encouraging letter from their M.P., but no offer of help.
249. D. KHosLA, MYTH AND REALITY OF THE PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS LAw:
A CASE STUDY OF UNTOUCHABILITY IN RURAL INDIA (1987) (discussing how legal
information is communicated in a village).
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lower jati faction members. Krishna Singh's experience with the brick
kiln lawsuit impressed upon him and others the advantages of working
together and the potential power of the courts. Not surprisingly, some
skepticism existed about the outcome of the consolidation case and
about the final effects of a positive judgment. One Jatav stated that
"the new president is going along with [the Court petition] because it is
harassing a member of the opposing faction. But if anything ever
comes of it, then the facts will disappear and the Thakurs will stand
together against the scheduled castes, so nothing will come of it." Nev-
ertheless, most scheduled caste members accepted the courts as an ef-
fective tool in furthering the interests of the lower jalis.
The committee also informed us that it planned to file a case in the
Collectors Court regarding a parcel of land for a scheduled caste col-
ony. The land consolidation legislation provided for some land to be set
aside for untouchable housing. The committee formally requested the
panchayat to set aside the necessary land for a new colony, and it
planned to petition the government for the necessary loans to build the
houses.250 The president replied that some land had been set aside, near
the small and heavily polluted pond in the back of the village. Krishna
Singh explained, however, that the land "is unhealthy; it floods all the
time and is dirty. And, anyway, the local Rajputs have captured it."
Apparently, some land near the Jatav colony was considered, but the
committee decided that it would split up communities represented by
the committee and would be unsafe because of exposure. The commit-
tee planned to file a suit in the Collector's Court, but it lacked money
at that time to pay a lawyer.
We repeatedly asked other members of the scheduled caste commu-
nity if they planned to make greater use of the courts. Although some
complained about the poor quality of lawyers, the length of legal pro-
ceedings, and the difficulty of enforcing judgments, they agreed with
near unanimity that they would make further use of the courts. In fact,
the substantial delays involved in court litigation, plus the necessity of
repeatedly travelling to court over long periods of time, did not seem to
bother the members of the committee. The committee did not perceive
of the time and expense involved in travelling to court as a problem
because of cooperation among members and the high level of underem-
ployment. The committee believed that the defendants have a greater
burden because they lose time .and prestige in repeatedly attending
250. Provided under the Integrated Rural Development Programme. See infra
notes 279-86 and accompanying text (outlining the government assistance program for
rural development).
[VOL. 5:655
LEGAL AID IN INDIA
hearings to dispute a claim that a lower jati instituted. When we asked
about the problem of delay, the committee members noted that this
annoyed them, but not enough to prevent them from fighting the case.
Once again, members noted that dragging the defendants into court is
a part of the battle. Everyone agreed that the only major problem is
finding enough money to pay the lawyer. We asked about petitioning
the court for legal aid money to pay their lawyer and they professed
complete ignorance of such a possibility. If they could find such fund-
ing, they said, they would certainly use it.
The lack of expertise among lawyers in the area of litigating lower
jati rights presented another problem. Though the lawyer in the case
brought by the committee belonged to a scheduled caste and knew of
the general law regarding the rights of the lower jatis, he had no expe-
rience litigating this type of case. We interviewed the lawyer, and
though he clearly had some expertise in land cases in general, he had
little in this particular area. He hoped to turn to other scheduled caste
lawyers for assistance, but discovered that no one in the local bar had
any experience. He did not know where to turn for help in preparing
the case. We also asked him about filing a writ petition in the High
Court to secure an injunction against the panchayat requiring the crea-
tion of a scheduled caste colony. He stated that a writ petition is im-
proper because the issue of whether the proposed sight is unhealthy is a
factual issue and the trip to the high court to file the petition is expen-
sive. We questioned the lawyer about the problem of delays, particu-
larly in the High Court. He concluded that not many issues are ap-
pealed because of the expense of taking a question to the High Court.
The lawyer acknowledged that only very big cases are appealed to the
High Court, but that if the opposing party files an appeal, he would
consider taking some action. He noted that he had a relative, meaning
a jati-mate, who had a High Court practice and who could handle any
necessary appeal. He conceded that an appeal consumes a great deal of
time and money. The lawyer speculated that the opposing lawyer would
also probably have a relative in the High Court. He also noted that
delays are fairly minor in the Collector's Court and related to constant
adjournments, but that they do not go on indefinitely as they do in the
High Court. We also asked the lawyer about using legal aid funds to
fight the committee's cases. He replied that these funds are so limited
that they accomplish very little and are quickly depleted. He noted that
he would receive the small amount of Rs.12 per court appearance,
which was "nothing at all."
The fear of upper jati retaliation for filing court cases varied from
one community to the next. Unlike the scheduled caste members, who
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live in the heart of the village, the Jatav residents of the colony reacted
negatively to the idea of free legal aid. They said that because of their
vulnerability to physical attack, prosecuting cases would incite violence
against them.251
Of great importance is the use of jati networks to transfer informa-
tion regarding legal rights and to find lawyers to fight those cases in
courts. The Jatav lawyer, who prosecuted the case for the committee,
entered law school under a reservation plan. He admitted that his ad-
mission as a member of the bar was partially due to scheduled caste
reservations and scholarships. Although the Jatav lawyer only had min-
imal skills and was not particularly eager to spend time on the case, it
is clear that the committee members felt more comfortable in ap-
proaching him simply because he belonged to the scheduled castes.2 "
In addition, he often communicated with other scheduled caste lawyers
and noted that he would use this connection to secure assistance when-
ever he could.
Any appraisal of the have-nots' use of courts must consider the rela-
tionship of the have-nots and the larger community with the Indian
police, the supposed enforcers of legal judgments. The Indian police are
noted primarily for their high level of corruption, their use of imper-
missible force, and their repeated violations of civil and human
rights.2 53 Numerous studies reveal that poor villagers rarely turn to the
police for assistance because of the fear that the police will always side
with those who pay them the most. In some areas, most notably certain
districts in Bihar, the local police are little more than private armies of
the landed.254
The upper jatis' ultimate sanction against the lower jatis is physical
intimidation and violence. The criminal justice system should act to
protect those who are subjected to physical coercion. The Protection of
251 -One of these Jatavs noted that the panchayat offered to purchase land for the
scheduled caste colony, but no one would move to this site because of its dangerous
nature, even if the land was free.
252. In fact, the attorney ignored the case until we and Dean Rekhi of the Aligarh
Law School interviewed him. After the second interview, where Dean Rekhi suggested
that the attorney failed to pursue the case with the vigor required of a member of the
bar, he apparently did some actual legal research and filed numerous motions with the
Collector. As of our last examination, he is pursuing the case with a renewed vigor.
253. See Bayley, The Police and Political Order in India, 23 ASIAN SuRv. 484
(1983) (discussing the increased political activity of the police force and its ability to
exercise power in Indian society for its benefit).
254. See Ahmed, Private Armies, INDIA TODAY, Mar. 15, 1984, at 72 (noting that
landlord's private armies often threaten and kill extremists in order to maintain the
landlord's dominance); Ahmed, Armies of the Night, INDIA TODAY, Jan. 15, 1986, at
76, 77 (discussing the attacks of private armies on extremist and innocent villagers).
[VOL. 5:655726
LEGAL AID IN INDIA
Civil Liberties Act is theoretically designed to facilitate the scheduled
castes' use of the criminal justice system's protection.ars Some police
have filed occasional cases under civil rights acts, in an attempt to help
scheduled caste members.2 58 However, these cases rarely deter the up-
per castes' use of physical assaults and social boycotts; they may actu-
ally increase the frequency of such incidents. Even the police them-
selves are subject to attack.257 Of course, the alleged corruption of
many members of the police and their simple physical inability to con-
trol or coerce powerful lawbreakers greatly diminish the practical im-
portance of court decrees. Victories to the landless in court may result
only in further violence against them at home.258
Scheduled caste informants in Kisanpur stated that they would
rarely summon the police. "They just come and have tea with the
Thakurs, take some money from them and go," stated Krishna Singh.
This statement referred to the visit of the police during the vice-presi-
dential election described in Case #2.259 Others said that the police
would only come and threaten to beat them up if they did not pay a
bribe.
The antipolice sentiment extended to the upper jatis as well. Jaswant
Singh, the former president who exercised considerable influence with
the police, noted that "they are all corrupt. They only take your
money." In fact, we found no one in the village willing to say anything
positive about the police, and only on rare occasions did anyone call
them to the village. According to Krishna Singh, only in cases such as
murder or threat of death would they summon the police because of
necessity.2 6
0
255. See Protection of Civil Liberties Act [originally entitled the Untouchability
(Offenses) Act (Act 22 of 1955)] (creating a means of protecting untouchables and
members of lower castes from discrimination in public places).
256. See Kannabiran, Scheduled Castes: Who's Afraid of the Law?, 19 EcoN. &
POL. WEEKLY 930 (1984) (discussing the violence and rioting that result from the
lower caste members' attempt to enforce their rights through the police and the
courts).
257. See Joshi, Whose Law, Whose Order: "Untouchables," Social Violence, and
the State in India, 22 ASIAN SURV. 676, 679 (1982) (discussing a group of villagers'
attack on two constables summoned to restore order).
258. See id. at 678 (recounting that after a group of sharecroppers won a lawsuit
against their landlord for illegal eviction, a mob attacked their huts and killed four
sharecroppers).
259. See supra notes 189-96 (discussing the vice-president's election case).
260. Krishna Singh explained that the case of the vice-presidential election was
different, because the general publicity given to the elections would reduce the chance
that the police would act violently.
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Case 6: The Rajput Bandits
Some difficulty arose between one Rajput family, made up of rela-
tively passive members of the Jaswant Singh faction, and one of the
landowning Jatav families, who lived in the separate Jatav colony. One
member of the Rajput family stopped a Jatav and scolded him for
dressing like a Rajput and for not giving the Rajputs enough respect.
Later, one of the Rajputs approached this Jatav and demanded that he
sell the Rajput his land. The Jatav refused.
Some time later, ten or twelve Rajputs dressed as bandits. The group
of bandits included the man who had earlier tried to buy the land and
most of the others came from a neighboring village. They assaulted
some of the Jatavs, including the man who refused to sell his land, and
caused minor damage to a few homes. The Jatavs who were assaulted
went to the local police headquarters and filed a First Information Re-
port. They included in the report the names of the Rajputs from
Kisanpur.
Soon afterward, a number of Rajputs, including four from Kisanpur
and two of their relatives from a nearby village, staged another attack
on the colony. During the attack, one of the bandits shot and killed the
son of the man who had refused to sell his land. The father went with
some other residents of the colony to file another First Information Re-
port at the police station. They gave the exact identity of the assailants,
and accused them of murder.
The police returned to the village. They bypassed the village presi-
dent because of the case's importance and went straight to see the the
family of the dead Jatav. The family directed them to the houses of the
Rajput bandits. All four were in hiding somewhere outside the village.
Instead of arresting anyone, the police confiscated as much property as
they could find and one of them assaulted the pregnant wife of one of
the Rajputs. One week later, the four Rajputs went to the judicial
magistrate to proclaim their innocence. They hoped that, with the pay-
ment of a bribe, they could collect their property and return home.
Instead, the magistrate ordered the immediate arrest of the four
Rajputs. The police had already arrested two others from a neighbor-
ing village, charged them with murder, and set bail at a very high
amount. It took over two months for the families of the Rajputs to
raise enough bail money for release. Apparently some Rajput members
of the Jaswant Singh faction contributed to the fund, but not very
much.
While the Rajputs were still in jail, a group of around sixty Rajputs
surrounded the Jatav colony and demanded that the charges be
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dropped. After a short period of time they left. The Rajputs did not
attack, said one of the Jatavs, because an attack would look bad to any
judge who would try the criminal case. Also, many of the Rajputs had
had complaints registered against them already and were in danger of
becoming classified as habitual criminals under Section 10 of the Crim-
inal Procedure Code. Classification as a "number 10" increases one's
vulnerability to police harassment. One Rajput, who belonged to the
Jaswant Singh faction but who did not directly participate in the at-
tack, said that the group was gaining a reputation as "a bunch of ban-
dits" bringing dishonor on the Rajput community. The community
placed pressure on them to stop.
The Jatavs, distrusting the competence of the government prosecu-
tor, hired their own lawyer for a private criminal prosecution of the
Rajputs. They settled on one of the best lawyers in the District Court
Bar, who would charge them a substantial amount of money. As soon
as they learned of the private prosecution arrangement, the Rajput de-
fendants managed to hire the attorney first. The Jatavs abandoned the
idea of a private prosecution.
The murder trial lasted a few weeks. Toward the end of the trial, the
judge's clerk approached the defendants and asked for a bribe of over
Rs. 100,000. The judge found the defendents innocent after they paid
the bribe. Although they were freed, the defendants were financially
insolvent after paying for both the expensive lawyer and the bribe.
They were forced to sell all of their land and are now working as agri-
cultural laborers. The family of the murdered Jatav, fearing future
harassment, sold its land and moved to Delhi.
The first and most obvious aspect of this case is the vulnerability of
the lower jatis to physical intimidation. Perhaps, more importantly, is
the deeply flawed fashion in which the courts and the police "punished"
the bandits. It is true that the Jatavs suffered great damage and were
forced to leave the village. It is also true that the Rajput bandits bribed
their way out of a hanging.
The system, however, still imposed substantial punishment on the
bandits. First, a social stigma attached to their illegal behavior. While
the harassment of the Jatavs was initially deemed acceptable, the re-
peated conflict with the courts and police became an embarrassment
and a blot on the honor of the Rajput jati. Second, the police, who
often act in a lawless manner themselves, directed their hostility toward
the Rajputs in this instance. Possible reasons for this police behavior
include the relative severity of the crime, the magistrate paying greater
attention to police actions, and an opportunity to keep a percentage of
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the Rajput's property seized during the police visit.2 6'
We were also told a number of other personal stories involving the
police, mostly concerning matters relating to marriage and adultery. In
these instances, fights between rivals resulted in disturbances big
enough for the president to call in the police. Apparently, police pres-
ence acted as an effective deterrent to these disturbances because the
police normally demanded bribes from both parties with the threat of
arresting the party who did not pay. Presumably, police corruption
targets the more powerful and wealthy members of the community who
own money and property that the police can confiscate. In some ways,
the poor are judgment proof. It also means that the poor are less capa-
ble of bribing the police to do their bidding. Thus, poverty and wealth
can cut both ways in such cases.
First, although the judge accepted a bribe and dismissed the charges
against the bandits, the substantial bribe destroyed the perpetrators fi-
nancially. We interviewed a large number of lawyers in Krishnapur
about the prevalence of bribes in judicial cases. They did not consider
bribery a problem in the courts, although the lowest-level magistrates
allegedly accept bribes in petty cases. In general, they reported, a judge
would only take bribes prior to transfer to a different jurisdiction and
any judge known to accept bribes forfeits any chance for advancement.
In addition, the lawyers noted that judges would accept bribes only in
close cases. This is due, in part, to the appellate courts' relative liberty
in overturning trial court findings of fact. A holding clearly contrary to
the evidence would be appealed and likely reversed, not only invalidat-
ing the effect of the bribe but embarrassing the judge. One lawyer
noted that the more the equities against the defendant the higher the
bribe. The higher the bribe, the greater the indirect form of a "fine."
Although this system is hardly perfect justice, or even rough justice,
it is still better than no justice at all. In its own way, it can advance the
cause of the weaker over the stronger. The Jatavs in Case 6 understood
the benefits of hiring a lawyer for a private criminal prosecution. A
number of lawyers pointed out that the victim's successful hiring of
counsel often acts to manipulate the system for the benefit of the
261. There was another story, which we could not verify sufficiently to be reasona-
bly certain what happened, that involved the murder-for-hire of one Rajput by a
Bhangi. The Bhangi had been paid to kill the Rajput by his patron, with whom he had
a dispute over some land. The Bhangi had originally been arrested by the police, who
had beaten him until he had admitted that he had been paid by the Rajput to commit
the murder. The Rajput was then arrested and was hanged. The Bhangi only served a
few years in prison, and was then released. We spoke with the Bhangi involved, who
admitted that he had served in jail for a murder-for-hire, but would not discuss any
other facts, which had been told to us by others not directly involved.
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weaker. This occurs even when the public prosecutor already agrees to
pursue the case and a private criminal prosecution is not technically
necessary. Such legal representation for the victim can monitor the pro-
gress of the prosecution and force the government to move quickly and
effectively. In addition, the monitoring of the case, combined with the
threat of instituting a private prosecution, can act as a kind of "corrup-
tion management."
As may be seen, the courts and police may advance the agenda of
the have-nots in a number of important spheres. The legal system has
preserved and advanced a number of the new rights. In the political
sphere, these rights are in the area of land use and land entitlements
and protection against physical intimidation. In each of these areas, the
have-nots in Kisanpur knew of the potential effectiveness of legal insti-
tutions in advancing these causes. Often the legal system served merely
as a tool, an adjunct to either the old politics of jajmani patron-client
or to the new politics of democracy and factionalism. The legal system
did not replace action in these spheres, it enhanced it. The courts and
police did not appear as alien imposed institutions, but rather as tools
available to fight to improve one's situation. These legal institutions,
perhaps as (albeit imperfect) instruments of a more egalitarian order or
perhaps as an imperfect expression of a relatively nonhierarchical ideol-
ogy, appear to foster intra-jati cooperation among the poor.
For the upper jatis, the courts remain an important forum for ad-
vancing various disputes among themselves. The legitimacy the upper
jais attach to the courts in such disputes helps to protect the legiti-
macy of the courts when they take the side of the lower jatis against
the upper jatis. However, if the courts were to become more of a men-
ace by advancing the cause of the lower jatis against the upper, they
might overall lose a greater part of their legitimacy. The more the
courts are successful in helping the have-nots, the less legitimate they
may seem in the eyes of the haves.
Numerous problems exist for the poor in using the legal system, the
most notable of which is a lack of funds to fight cases. A second prob-
lem is the lack of expertise in fighting cases by scheduled caste lawyers.
These problems, however, are not unsolvable. In fact, a well designed
legal aid program may reduce them substantially." 2 The basic legal
set-up, as currently in effect in Kisanpur, clearly suggests that the
courts do currently play a role in mitigating the lot of the have-nots.
Although the legal system has been embraced in the areas of politics,
262. See infra pages 769-72 (discussing a proposal to provide legal aid to disadvan-
taged people in rural areas).
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land, and in certain instances, physical protection, it is not used in ad-
vancing other new rights, mainly economic entitlements to the poor.
These entitlements, that we shall discuss in the context of economic
change in the village, constitute some of the most important benefits
available to the have-nots. The potential for use of the legal system in
improving access to these benefits as well, though in Kisanpur yet un-
tapped, appears substantial.
c. Economic change
i. Changes within the village
Land ownership is the most important determinant of power and in-
dependence in village India. Patterns of land ownership continue to
change with the most important changes involving partition. Although
far from effecting a major redistribution, land reform efforts have de-
stabilized unity and furthered factionalism among property holders.
This has provided opportunities for the lower jatis to form new, and
often fruitful, political alliances. In addition, some actual redistribution
has taken place.
In Kisanpur, the government recorded the transfer of approximately
twenty hectares from landowning jatis through the abolition of
zamindari or through consolidation. The government added half of the
recovered land to the village commons. Though mostly land of bad
quality, this common land was not insignificant. The few family recipi-
ents of redistributed land (one acre or so on the average) 2 3 noted that,
at the very least, the land provided a place to store crops or to defecate.
One Bhangi, who received about an acre, commented that any amount
of land is "helpful for something." As demonstrated in Case 5 any en-
largement of common lands helps the landless become less dependent.
Each lower-jati member whom we interviewed agreed that any success-
ful efforts to claim land for the use of the landless is worthwhile.
For those who own land, the securing of necessary inputs, fertilizer,
water, and seeds can greatly increase yields. The government instituted
programs to help improve farm productivity with combinations of loans
and grants for farmers in general, and for backward and scheduled
castes in particular. The benefits of the Green Revolution are not re-
stricted to large landowners. 64
263. 2 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR SCHEDULED CASTES AND SCHEDULED
TRIBES 34 (1980) (noting that the government reports one to two acres, on average, in
U.P.) [hereinafter R.C.S.C.S.T.].
264. See infra notes 279-81 and accompanying text (explaining the types of gov-
ernmental assistance and the agencies that coordinate rural development efforts).
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While some continue their jati tasks, the advent of new modes of
technology and the presence of nearby bazaars and services outside the
village system suggest that many jati traditional activities will become
increasingly less economically viable.26 15 Some jatis will adapt-the
Barhais or carpenters, for example, purchased more modern tools, and
the Baghailis, the animal herders, plan to purchase a truck. The advent
of a modern market economy is unlikely to affect the employment of
those jatis with more distinctly religious functions. For the vast major-
ity of the lower jatis, however, daily survival means working for the
landed. Most of the land poor or landless work not within the jajmani
relationship, but either as contract laborers or as wage laborers.200
Contract labor is like sharecropping. 6 A group of laborers contract
to farm a section of a larger landholder's property in return for a share
of the harvest. Contract labor accounted for less than ten percent of all
labor in Kisanpur and is declining, primarily due to the shrinking num-
ber of large farms. Most landholders hired wage laborers who were
paid daily in kind, which could be exchanged for cash at any one of the
village shops. The supply and demand of labor at particular time deter-
mined wages. Unlike contract laborers, wage laborers did not tend to
work for any particular or repeat employer; they simply work where
help is wanted.
There are two basic crop seasons in Northern India, with a third in
areas with substantial irrigation. Demand for labor depends on the sea-
son. During planting and harvest times, which last for about ten to
twelve weeks every year, there is a shortage of labor.263 Wages may
rise to Rs. 15 to 16 per day at the height of harvesting and fall to half
that amount during slack periods. This is particularly true in Kisanpur,
where Green Revolution technology increases both the productivity of
the land and the amount of labor needed to fertilize, tend, and harvest
265. See M. SHARMA, supra note 46, at 74-75 (discussing the effects of various
social and technological changes on the jati culture).
266. As suggested above, traditional jai labors can sometimes turn into profitable
village handicraft industries, particularly if modern technology is used. Traditional jati
work can extend beyond the village. A number of Jatavs from the district have become
very wealthy shoemakers, with factories in the neighboring town. Due to the stigma
attached to technology, competition in this business sector may have been relatively
less.
267. See U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act of 1950 (noting that
sharecropping is prohibited in Utter Pradesh). This labor use system is described as a
contract between the land owner and the contractor. The contractor hires laborers and
pays them for their work, and receives a fee based upon the laborers' productivity.
268. These shortages are reduced during a prolonged drought, such as the drought
that affected the 1987-88 kahrif and rabbi crops.
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269the crops.
During the off-season, owners offer use of their land for fodder, stor-
age, or as a source of building mud. They also offer loans of food or
money. Wage laborers are caught in a difficult bind. If wage laborers
become tied to a particular owner during the harvest months, it reduces
their ability to command the highest wages possible. Laborers often,
however, must turn to employers for help during the slack season. They
need the use of the owner's land for themselves and for their animals
because common land is so sparse. In particular, medical emergencies
and weddings require large sums of cash and are often impossible to
avoid. In many villages, local moneylenders charge high rates of inter-
est for such loans. In Kisanpur, the local Banias (merchants) charged
an average of 20 % to 25 % over the rate of inflation. Apparently these
high interest rates drove borrowers away very few people turned to lo-
cal money lenders. Instead, people turned to their employers, their pa-
trons, or occasionally, their faction members or relatives. In return for
lending money at low or no interest rates, landowners required the bor-
rower to work for them during the periods of slack labor until the debt
was paid off."'
Although we discovered an extensive knowledge about legal rights
among many lower jatis, especially among the scheduled castes, they
demonstrated no awareness of minimum wage law. Under both federal
and state law, a committee is empowered to set minimum wage stan-
269. See B. DASGUPTA, VILLAGE SOCIETY AND LABOUR USE 65 (1977) (discussing
the effects of irrigation on labor demand). The effects of Green Revolution technology
on labor use are disputed. Because farmers owned relatively small landholdings, little
use existed for tractors in Kisanpur. Over the course of the revolution, the use of high-
yielding crops, fertilizer, and pesticides increased and required more labor than the old
low-yielding varieties. In addition, irrigation increased double cropping. Id. These fac-
tors, when taken together, seem to result in increased labor demands. Id. at 65-74
(providing charts that illustrate the relationship between labor demand and irrigation).
Increased farm incomes resulted in greater education for the sons of larger landowners,
thereby, increasing the migration of sons from farms to jobs in towns and cities. Id. at
78. In a perhaps unrelated development, larger numbers of landless have immigrated to
manufacturing jobs outside the village. Id.; Saini, Green Revolution and the Distribu-
tion of Farm Incomes, 11 EcoN. & POL. WEEKLY 20-22 (1976) (noting that the Green
Revolution employed capital intensive technology that benefitted only farmers with ad-
equate financial resources). The Green Revolution technology may have increased the
disparity in income between those who own land and agricultural landless laborers.
270. See Pradesh, The Burden of Freedom, INDIA TODAY, Apr. 15, 1983, at 126-
28 (explaining that freed bonded laborers do not enjoy typical freedom, do not receive
equal rights under the law, and are underpaid). Unlike in other parts of India, bonded
labor is not a problem in Kisanpur. Debts rarely extend past a year, and wages are paid
to the debtor at a rate between the low and high demand rates; see also Bandu Mukti
Morcha v. Union of India, 1984 A.I.R. (S.C.) 802 (describing bonded labor and laws
enacted to prevent it and to rehabilitate bonded laborers).
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dards for the state; in 1986, the law called for a minimum wage of Rs.
12 per day, paid in cash and not in kind. 1 When we informed laborers
of the minimum wage law, no one appeared either surprised or inter-
ested. Laborers understood the role of the market in setting wages and
exhibited a disbelief that anything short of changing market conditions
would affect rural wages.27 2 The Block Development Officer informed
us that he knew of no rural area where minimum wages are paid and
suggested that the minimum wage would be impossible to enforce.273
Sometimes a dispute would arise between a particular landowner and
a laborer, members of the landowner's particular faction would not hire
the laborer and a boycott would ensue. We were told that if a major
dispute developed between a scheduled caste and a Thakur, the
Thakurs would unite and make it impossible for the scheduled castes
to get employment anywhere.
Case 7: The Agricultural Workers' Union
In late 1979, Krishna Singh, the leader of the Jatav caste panchayat,
decided to organize a union of agricultural laborers. Krishna Singh ob-
served the benefits of working together as a brick kiln worker and he
was eager to organize within the village. He spoke with a local Com-
munist Party of India (Marxist) worker, also a Jatav, who urged
Krishna Singh to organize the masses.
Krishna first persuaded the other elders of the Jatav caste panchayat
to accept the idea of organization. One of the landowners learned of
the scheme, probably from one of his Jatav clients, and sent word that
he wanted to see Krishna Singh. The landowners told Krishna Singh
that if he tried to organize a labor union the landowners would boycott
him and anyone else who joined in. Krishna Singh decided to continue
with his plans, but he succeeded only in recruiting the five members of
the panchayat Krishna Singh thought the laborers feared lack of em-
ployment during the slack periods.
That year produced a particularly bountiful harvest and a severe
271. See Minimum Wages Act (Act 11 of 1948) (providing the fixed minimum
rates of wages in certain occupations); The Minimum Wages (U.P. Amendment) Act
(U.P. Act 20 of 1960); U.P. Minimium Wages Rules, 1952, Ch. II (discussing the
various terms and functions of the minimum wage committee); Notice of Agricultural
Minimum Wage, U.P. Gazette, Mar. 1980, at 32.
272. See discussion of Case 7 at pages 735-37 (discussing the agricultural laborers
attempts to form unions).
273. See Pradesh, The Wages of Hypocrisy, INDIA TODAY, June 15, 1983, at 62-66
(discussing the wealthy landowner's denial of minimum wage to agricultural workers
and the government's failure to alleviate the situation during the 35 years of the Mini-
mum Wages Act).
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shortage of agricultural labor. Despite this, the landowners refused to
hire Krishna Singh or the five others in the union. Krishna Singh tried
to appeal to the different factions, but did not succeed. Although
Krishna Singh owned some land, and could manage for some period of
time without wage earnings, the others could not. They abandoned the
labor union idea. As soon as the landowners heard that they no longer
planned to organize, all five received jobs.
Krishna Singh concluded from this episode that the only way to suc-
ceed is to have one's own economic resources. The securing of land,
either common or personal provides a large measure of independence.
Aside from this, a modicum of independence from the landlords can be
accomplished in two basic ways: leaving the village and finding work in
the cities or finding supplementary nonagricultural employment in the
village. The practice of traditional jati occupations continues and some
earn cash in the village market. The Kumhars (potters), Barhais
(carpenters), and Manihars (bangle sellers), for example, all supple-
ment their agricultural work with the sale of their traditional jati prod-
ucts. The jati occupations of the lower castes are defiling, however, and
those involved in sanskritization eschew them .1 7 For others, the advent
of technology and industrialization has and will continue to undercut
their traditional crafts economy. Others managed to add a new, often
related, business to their traditional occupation. The Baghailis, for ex-
ample, progressed from their traditional task of herding sheep and
goats to keeping more profitable herds of water buffalo. They then
started a lucrative transport business using the male buffaloes. One
Baghaili told us that he planned to purchase a truck.
Still others managed to begin new cottage industries unrelated to
their traditional jati occupations. According to the scheduled caste in-
formants, the landowners, especially the Rajputs, oppose any lower jati
employment. The reasons for this opposition include keeping wages
down, having something to hold over the heads of the scheduled castes,
and requiring demonstrations of respect.27 5 The most obvious success
story is the Jatavs lockmaking enterprise, as described in the following
case.
274. The jatis have not completely eschewed lower class occupations. Krishna
Singh knew a jati-mate who owned a profitable factory that made shoes.
275. See M. SHARMA, supra note 46, at 191 (discussing the landowner's attitude
toward Chamars). The landowners believe that if the Chamars receive sufficient money
or food, they will rebel and demand more. Id. Brahmin landowners tend to interpret
every dispute as a sign of Chamar revolution. Id. at 176. This view is based on the
Chamars' potential for disobedience, power, large numbers and the Brahmin's reliance
on the Chamars for cheap labor. Id.
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Case 8: The Jatavs and Lockmaking
A Jatav heard through a jati-mate, who had left a nearby village
and moved to the nearby city of Krishnapar, of available jobs. The
Jatav's family owned no land, and the Jatav wanted an additional
source of income. He went to the lock factory looking for work, and
met the manager, a Rajput. The Rajput, an Arya Samajist, befriended
the Jatav and explained that he could do lockmaking piecework for his
factory in the village. The Jatav had to acquire some simple tools used
to assemble the locks.
On returning to the village, the Jatav tried to secure a loan to buy
the necessary tools through the local branch of the State Bank of India.
The loan officer demanded a substantial bribe in order to put through
the loan application, but the Jatav could not afford to pay. The Jatav
then approached another Rajput, his patron, and asked him if he would
either lend him the money directly or act as an intermediary with the
bank officer. This Rajput perceived these requests as too bold and
maintained that Jatav untouchables "must stick to their jati work as
God commands." 276 The Rajput warned the Jatav of danger if he tried
to enter the lockmaking business.
The Jatav returned to Krishnapur and informed the Rajput manager
that he could not secure the money to purchase the tools. The Rajput
agreed to lend him the necessary tools without charge. The Jatav had
to return the tools as soon as he could afford to purchase new ones.
The Jatav returned to the village and began to assemble locks with a
few of his close jati-mates. After a few months, another ten or so Jatav
families joined the lockmaking business because of large profits. A few
days after they began making locks, one of the larger Rajput landown-
ers, an important member of the Dev Singh faction, came to the
Jatav's house. The Rajput said that they should not be so presumptu-
ous, and that they should return to the fields where they belonged. If
they did not abandon their lockmaking business, he warned, they could
not work as laborers nor use any landowner's fields for fodder for their
animals.
The Jatavs continued their lockmaking business and expanded their
operations among new families. The landowners did exclude the
lockmaking Jatavs from agricultural work. The landowners, however,
never physically assaulted the Jatavs. At one point, some Rajputs did
disrupt a Jatav wedding but no violence ensued and the Jatavs simply
276. The Hindi word zabardusti might also be translated as "uppity" in this
context.
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ended the wedding procession. The Jatavs primarily used the common
land and the income from their business to survive until the harvest
season. At that time, the boycott broke down, first among the members
of the Dev Singh faction. Since then, these Jatavs have spent most of
their time making locks and working in the fields only when the wages
are high. In addition to making locks, a number of Jatavs work as
tailors doing piecework for a factory in the nearby market town. These
families complain about the difficulty of obtaining loans to expand their
business.
The lockmakers and the tailors, like the Baghailis and their new
transport operations, have found that village employment outside tradi-
tional agricultural wage labor has greatly changed their lives. Each has
reported greater independence from the landowners and greater secur-
ity. They are less susceptible to boycotts from the landed and to other
forms of pressure. Consequently, they are in a position of greater
strength when bargaining with the landed for wages or for other favors.
"It is the best thing that has happened to us," said the leader of the
Jatav lockmakers. "It [the business] isn't enough, but it makes us
tougher when dealing with the Thakurs. We didn't used to get any-
thing from them, but now we are a force to be reckoned with."
Improvement in the political position of the lower jatis, as exempli-
fied in their ability to organize and to protect themselves, is essential to
improving their economic well-being. Their economic well-being, in
turn, reinforces their political position. Access to resources outside the
village plays an important role in this process.
A number of Kisanpur families hive relatives working outside the
village or have personally returned from working in local towns or cit-
ies. It is common for wealthier families to have close relatives who live
or work outside the village. Among the most common form of employ-
ment is government service in one of its multifarious forms. Among the
wealthy, the most coveted position is to work for the Indian Adminis-
trative Service or the Provincial Civil Service. These jobs produce con-
siderable prestige and income and usually depend on superior education
that is available only outside the village. Others who cannot aspire to
such positions often find jobs as lower-level government servants. Re-
cently there is an increasing interest in employment in private industry.
For the poorer inhabitants, particularly the scheduled castes, it is
harder to find gainful employment outside the village. Underemploy-
ment and unemployment in North India are high and finding and se-
curing jobs are very difficult for the poorly educated. Some, however,
have had successes. A number of males from a Kisanpur Bhangi ex-
tended family secured relatively lucrative, if grueling, work as cycle
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rickshaw drivers in the nearby city of Krishnapur. The first brother to
seek such employment travelled to the city after hearing about these
jobs from a jati-mate from another village. He first secured a position
as a driver and then sent for one of his brothers. They, in turn, sent for
others as they saved up enough money to provide for the arriving rela-
tive and his settlement. In this way, opportunities for employment un-
folded for the extended family of the Bhangi. The rickshaw drivers re-
turn to the village most evenings. They stay in the village during
harvest season if the wages are higher than those they would earn driv-
ing a rickshaw.
Krishna Singh, as described earlier, had spent a number of years in
Delhi working at a brick kiln. 27 He heard of the job from a jati-mate
from a nearby village. He decided to pursue the employment opportu-
nity and his extended family agreed to care for his wife and two small
children. In addition, his ownership of land made his family less depen-
dent upon his wage labor for survival. The money he earned enabled
him to improve his land and to play a role in politics and in prosecuting
cases.
Another Jatav took advantage of scheduled caste reservations in the
Indian army. He heard about joining the Indian army in school. When
he turned eighteen he took the necessary test but the army rejected
him. Soon after, a jati-mate who had taken the test and had been ac-
cepted asked if he had specifically applied for a reserved seat. The
Jatav hadn't known of the special procedure for obtaining scheduled
caste reservations.278 The friend urged him to reapply, to obtain a
scheduled caste certificate, and to assert his rights. He was admitted.
His position in the army provided him with good pay, and he sends
most of it back to his family in the village. Since joining the army, he
has gone to school and learned English. "When I marry, my children
too will get an education and enter service," he told us.
One Kohar reported how he secured outside employment as a class
four jamadar (janitor, general laborer) at a government office in the
nearby market town. He first worked as a laborer for one of the
Rajputs in Dev Singh's faction. As a Kohar, he had also provided some
ritual services as a palanquin bearer during the wedding ceremony of
one of the Rajput's daughters. The Rajput heard of the job opening
from one of his relatives, an employee in the Provincial Civil Service,
277. Supra note 239.
278. The interview did not reveal if the Jatav had not known about the special
procedure for obtaining reservations or had only hoped for admission without such a
procedure. He displayed some embarrassment about his status as a scheduled caste
member.
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and told the Kohar that he could help him get the job. The Rajput
secured a small payment for acting as an intermediary, but primarily
helped the Kohar because "I was a loyal worker. I never agreed to
work for anyone else. Now my family will work for him."
ii. Sources of government assistance
The ability to secure additional financial resources through land,
nonagricultural employment in the village, and employment outside the
village depends in part on government assistance.
Broadly speaking, there are two different types of governmental de-
velopment assistance programs: those that provide services, such as ac-
cess to new seeds and fertilizers, and those that provide loan funds dis-
tributed through branches of nationalized banks, and to a lesser extent,
through rural cooperatives 79 Bank loans, the most important of these
subsidies, are made primarily to finance the purchase of specific assets,
such as irrigation pumps or farm animals. Normally, banks make loans
only if land is available as security. However, there are special provi-
sions for subsidies for the small or marginal landowner, as well as for
the landless laborer.280 Scheduled caste members and members of the
backward classes are eligible for even higher concessions.28 1 Subsidies
can be substantial, and include differential rates on interest on loans
and heavily subsidized agricultural inputs such as fertilizer, seeds, ani-
mals and trees. There are also special provisions to assist in the starting
of cottage industries.
In Uttar Pradesh, the state governfiient administration organizes the
rural development bureaucracy. The district collector heads the bu-
reaucracy and acts with the locally elected zila parishads, the local
members of parliament, and members of the state legislative assembly.
Krishnapur District is divided into eight development blocks, each
headed by a block development officer, or B.D.O., who supervises the
279. See S. MAHESHWARI, RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA (1985) (providing an
introduction to rural development). The most ambitious of the government's rural de-
velopment programs is the Integrated Rural Development Programme. This program is
designed to raise the incomes of the poorest village families above the official poverty
level through a program of grants and assistance. Parties that provided detailed infor-
mation on the Integrated Rural Development Programme in Uttar Pradesh include
P.K. Sharma, Block Development Officer, Aligarh, Feb. 16, 1983, A. Aggarwal, Loan
Officer, State Bank of India, Aligarh Branch, Mar. 2, 1983, V. Singh, Director, Agri-
cultural Extension Services, Aligarh Branch, Feb. 16, 1983.
280. See Reserve Bank of India, Report of the Working Group on the Role of
Banks in Implementation of the New 20-Point Programme 3 (1984).
281. See R.C.S.C.S.T., supra note 263, at 66 (providing a list of programs for
scheduled caste members).
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work of the village level workers, or V.L.W. (now also known as gram
sevas, or village servants). The B.D.O. and the presidents of the vil-
lages in the block constitute the block Panchayat Samiti, which over-
sees all development activity. Both the B.D.O. and the V.L.W. are sup-
posed to cooperate with village panchayats to determine the families
which are most deserving of assistance. The development bureaucracy
works with representatives of the nationalized banks, local cooperatives,
and agricultural extension services in providing development assistance
to villagers.
The V.L.W. is a linchpin in rural development. The V.L.W. is sup-
posed to live in or near a particular village or group of villages, to
counsel villagers as to what resources are available and directly assist
villagers in securing loans and other assistance. In those instances
where concessions are available, the V.L.W. is required to certify that
the particular individual is eligible. Under the Integrated Rural Devel-
opment Programme, the V.L.W. assists in selecting those families cho-
sen for special services and concessions and ensures that each family
receives the assistance promised. The B.D.O.'s supervision of the
V.L.W. is somewhat tenuous because there are usually forty to sixty
villages in each block.
Wealthy landowners reputably control rural lending cooperatives and
corruption is allegedly widespread. Benefits supposedly reserved for the
poor often go to their wealthy patrons.282 Politicians often use bank
funds as their personal resources, taking out loans and never repaying
them.283 A study in one city found that 20%-30% of rural develop-
ment benefits go to those not entitled to receive them.2  In addition, up
to one-half of all such rural loans are expected to go bad. 285 According
to the B.D.O. for the Kisanpur block, it is far easier for wealthier bor-
rowers to escape repossession or to receive new loans because poorer
282. See D.N. Dhanagare, Agrarian Reforms and Rural Development In India, 7
RES. Soc. MOVEMENTS, CONFLICTS & CHANGE 177, 192-93 (1984) (describing the
wealthy's control over cooperative institutions); see also Premi, Uttar Pradesh: Web of
Corruption, INDIA TODAY, July 15, 1986, at 59-60 (explaining that ficticious weaving
societies have defrauded funds from rural lending cooperatives).
283. See J.W. BJORKMAN, POLITICS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ALIENATION IN INDIA'S
RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS 98 (1979).
284. Maheshwari, Rural Development and Bureaucracy in India, 30 INDIAN J.
PUB. ADMIN. 1102, 1108 (1984). But see R. Singh, More Serious Rural Thrust on 20
Point Programme, INDIA TODAY, Sept. 15, 1986, at 19 (disputing the report by Union
Minister for Program Implementation A.B.A., Ghani Khan Chowdhry that only 5% of
funds were misappropriated).
285. See RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, REGIONAL RURAL BANKS REPORT OF THE RE-
VIEW COMMITTEE, REGIONAL RURAL BANKS (1978) (discussing banks' activities to im-
prove rural economy).
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borrowers "haven't the clout. They will be harassed, or at least they
think that they will." This corruption and failure to provide services to
the needy is the result of the interaction of each person involved in the
development process, particularly the V.L.W., the local panchayat, and
the bank loan officers.
In Kisanpur, the poorer villagers identified the V.L.W. and his inter-
action with the village president, as the most substantial problem.2 8 In
1984, the V.L.W. received less than Rs. 700 per month, barely placing
him above the poverty line and occasionally making him poorer than
the people he helps. The Kisanpur V.L.W., a Rajput, reputedly made
between four and ten times that much in bribes. He lived in
Gandhipur, 87 a city approximately twelve kilometers from Kisanpur,
and visited the village only once or twice per year.28 On these occa-
sions he stayed with the president or with one or two of the other
wealthiest Rajput families. The V.L.W., whenever in Kisanpur, made
it clear that he expected to be well treated and well fed. One Rajput
commented, "He thinks he is a raia (king)."
The village president, and to a lesser extent the other large Rajput
families of Kisanpur, had close relationships with the V.L.W. The
V.L.W., with the president's assistance, selected those families entitled
to receive the principal benefits of the Integrated Rural Development
Programme. Although most Rajputs did not qualify for concessional
loans or other benefits, the V.L.W. was often able to arrange such
rates. In a number of cases, the V.L.W. certified that Rajput landown-
ers was entitled to such concessions.28 This can be done in a number of
ways. First, a family might obtain a tlraudulent scheduled caste certifi-
cate. This is the less favored route because upper caste members do not
want to claim, even for the purpose of cheating the government, that
they are scheduled castes. "If word got out that we were certified as
scheduled castes, we could be made to look very bad to the other fac-
tion. How could we marry off our daughters?"'290
286. Panchayats have been described as "gatekeepers" preventing flows of benefits
to poorer villagers. M. Bhattacharya, Administrative and Organizational Issues in Ru-
ral Development (discussion paper), Proceedings of the 22nd Annual Conference of
Members of the Indian Institute of Public Administration, JIPA, New Delhi (1979),
quoted in Hooja, Machinery for Delivering Benefits to the Rural Poor: A View From
an Indian State, 28 INDIAN J. PUB. ADMIN. 53, 63 (1982).
287. A fictional name.
288. The V.L.W. at a nearby village used to visit approximately once per month to
attend a banquet that the largest landowner in the village held in the V.L.W.'s honor.
289. See M. SHARMA, supra note 46, at 58 (finding that the V.L.W., the land
registrar, and seed store inspector, regularly took bribes). The seed store inspector also
sold seed on the black market. Id.
290. Our initial research began not in Kisanpur, but in another village in a differ-
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In the second instance, the V.L.W. would certify that a family had a
smaller landholding than was actually the case. Because benefits not so
substantial for this category, this method is also less popular. The third,
and more common way, would be to have a bona fide scheduled caste
family be the "straw" for the loan or benefit. A scheduled caste certifi-
cate or loan application would be filed in the name of the scheduled
caste family by the upper caste member, who would then receive the
loan or benefit. Sometimes the scheduled caste family is a party to the
deception, but in most instances the family is unaware. In one instance
a Dhobi scheduled caste family suddenly began receiving demands
from the local branch of the State Bank of India for payments for a
loan to purchase an irrigation pump. The Dhobi went to see his patron,
an affiliate in the Dev Singh faction, to complain, and thereafter the
demand for payments stopped. The Dhobi understood what had hap-
pened, but was unconcerned long as the demands for payment ceased.
In theory the V.L.W. is required only to certify that concessional
rates or other benefits are available. In the case of bank loans, however,
the bank manager or loan officer rarely approves any loan without the
presence either of the V.L.W. or of some other middleman. The mid-
dleman is normally someone from the village who has prior friendly
relations with the bank manager. In these cases, either the V.L.W. or
the other middleman invariably takes some kind of gratuity and splits
it with the loan officer. Because the V.L.W. was rarely in the village,
and because he lived so far away, most villagers opted for a local mid-
dleman. There are a few successful middlemen in Kisanpur, both re-
lated to the leaders of the two major factions. For loans of between Rs.
3,000 and 5,000, a middleman charges a fee of approximately Rs. 200
to 300. In addition, in order to receive a loan the borrower must open a
"buy down" account at the bank of at least Rs. 300 to ensure the first
payments of interest and principal. Opening these accounts often re-
quires an additional loan because borrowers do not receive cash in con-
nection with the original loan, only the second purchase. Again, a mid-
dleman is often involved and charges substantial interest.
A V.L.W.'s certification is still necessary to receive concessional
loans or scheduled caste loans. In those instances where the borrower
ent development block. After a few weeks, we conducted a lengthy interview with the
Chief Divisional Magistrate, or C.D.M., who related a number of specific stories re-
garding the illegal procurement of concessions. One of the stories revealed that the
president and largest landowner in the village had apparently secured a number of
fraudulent loans for members of his faction. The president's son heard the contents of
the C.D.M.'s story and related them to his father. We were unceremoniously escorted
out of the village the next morning.
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actually qualifies for concessional rates, the V.L.W. charges a fee of
Rs. 150 simply to travel to the bank and another Rs. 250 to 300 to
make the arrangements for the loan. In general, marginal or landless
laborers and scheduled castes do not even approach the V.L.W. be-
cause of the excessive fees. In addition, the V.L.W. often will not even
talk to scheduled caste members and a village middleman is required at
an added expense. There is a general fear that no one could service the
loan, resulting in the pump or animal would be repossessed, and that
scheduled caste members would be harassed by the police.
Although there were considerable complaints about the corruption
inherent in the system of receiving government assistance, only in two
instances did we find anyone who had taken action. The first case in-
volved a Mahabrahmin who claimed not to be aware of the bribery
system. The Mahabrahmin, not a member of any faction, first went to
a branch of a local bank and asked for a loan. He had a small amount
of land, and felt that, combined with his funerary work he could afford
a loan to purchase a water buffalo. The bank officer told the
Mahabrahmin to go back to the village and see one of the middlemen.
The middleman arranged the loan and withdrew Rs. 200 from the
Mahabrahmin's bank account. When the Mahabrahmin found out, he
complained to the village president, Jaswant Singh, who "contacted the
bank manager, but nothing came of it." When asked why he did not
pursue the claim, he replied "What could I do? This is the way."
The second case involved a Nai, who had a small business stitching
clothes. He had a savings account in a localcooperative bank. At one
point, he went to the bank to make a' deposit. He discovered the with-
drawal of a substantial amount of money from his account. After con-
sulting with the bank manager, he discovered that his name had been
used to take out a loan at concessionary rates. The bank manager, how-
ever, refused to assist him in solving the dilemma. The Nai went to see
the new village president, Dev Singh, for help. Although the Nai was
not an active member of Dev Singh's faction, the villiage president still
offered to help.29' Dev Singh went to the cooperative bank and forced
an investigation, apparently threatening to go to the police if the bank
did not cooperate. It turned out that an upper caste member from a
nearby village had taken out the loan. As a result of the investigation,
the Nai's account was settled. In addition, the bank instituted a new
system requiring passbooks to contain a notarized photograph of the
holder.
In general, however, people did not complain about the system of
291. We are not, however, completely convinced that the Nai offered to help.
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bribery, even though it prevented them from taking full advantage of
benefits and concessions. Some individuals felt that they could not take
out loans because they could not start a buydown account. Many
others, however, said that they would take advantage of financial assis-
tance if they could do so without paying bribes. When we asked why
they had not complained to the bank managers, block development of-
ficers, magistrates, or others, we were told that they would not listen to
them, or that this was simply "the way it is." We asked the members
of the scheduled caste committee that had prosecuted the suit against
the panchayat for failing to distribute the land why it did not pursue
cases of loan fraud or minimum wage violation. They replied that it
was not worth the trouble. "That is land. This is a loan." In fact, it
appeared that no one conceived of the problem as a legal one.
This reaction surprised us, given the fairly high level of legal literacy
among the scheduled castes. After some discussions with the scheduled
caste committee prosecuting the land case, we realized that it had not
occurred to them to engage a lawyer in an essentially administrative
action. After further discussion, the scheduled caste committee seemed
willing to accept the possibility of court action as a way of forcing an
administrative change. We pointed out that using the courts in such
instances is analogous to the court action to recover lost wages in the
brick kiln. "If we had free lawyers, we would try it. Anything that
works," concluded Krishna Singh.
In these cases, legal representation and the threat of court can help
the lower jatis to secure numerous government guaranteed benefits. Af-
firmative action benefits, as well as grants and low interest loans (with-
out the payment of bribes), can constitute essential elements in the for-
mation of economic security. For the lower jatis, a small benefit is
extremely valuable. A small loan can begin a lockmaking business or
secure tools for other cottage industries. For those with small amounts
of land, subsidies can improve crop yields or help with the purchase of
animals. An effective use of reservations policies can help secure em-
ployment outside the village. It is even remotely possible that had legal
action been taken in Case 7, regarding the minimum wage laws, might
have worked as a bargaining chip in securing some increase in pay.
Although the upper jatis may not support these steps toward eco-
nomic independence, it will not necessarily prompt them to harass
lower jatis. Such steps may work as part of traditional and modem
social and political relationships to secure greater independence for the
have-nots. Clearly the ability to secure more of the benefits of economic
development, particularly those provided by the government, is of vital
importance in and of itself. But in should be remembered that eco-
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nomic independence is necessary to political and social independence,
and vice versa. Advancing one necessarily advances the others. The ex-
ample of Kisanpur suggests the ability to make advances in each area.
However, it is in the economic area in which courts are currently used
least that their use may help secure important benefits.
What is first needed is an example of a lawyer successfully using the
court to enforce benefits, drawing on analogy between existing land
cases and other cases where benefits are withheld from their intended
beneficiaries. It is clear that there now exists in Kisanpur some interest
in trying that route.
III. LAW AND CHANGE
A. THE STATUS Quo, SANSKRITIZATION, AND WESTERNIZATION
We began this inquiry with the following proposition in mind-that
one cannot understand the importance of increasing access to legal sys-
tems for the have-nots, let alone devise programs to facilitate that ac-
cess, without a detailed look at the structure of dominance in a particu-
lar society. Preceding sections describe the nature of hierarchy and
domination in a not atypical Indian village. Although villages in other
parts of India or other parts of the world differ from Kisanpur in im-
portant respects, the major questions remain the same: what are the
patterns of domination and in what way are those patterns changing?
In Kisanpur, the status quo in religion, society, and economic rela-
tionships principally works against the have-nots. Hierarchy is present
and ingrained in each, and each reinforces the other. There are, how-
ever, certain chinks in the armor. Hindu religious views, while gener-
ally accepted as hierarchical, are open to broad and occasionally pre-
vailing, reformist views. Belief in equality is not limited to religious
apostates. A person perceived as a good, or even a great Hindu can also
preach equality and base it on scriptural authority. Traditionally the
state, from the Hindu king to modern governments, has had an impor-
tant role in enforcing religious interpretations. Thus, there is some reli-
gious precedent for the modern state to encourage increasing equality
among varnas and jatis.
That being said, it is clear that very strong anti-egalitarian beliefs,
grounded in religion and tradition, do exist, held not only by those most
able to benefit from them, but by the lower jatis as well. While the
view from above is relatively easy to understand, the view from below is
not so obvious. There are several basic components. First, the structure
of belief is very old and tradition gives it religious significance. At least
with regard to religion, people tend to believe what they are told when
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very young. Second, subscribing to such beliefs is practical because the
overwhelming majority of others also believe in the same system. Life
is more orderly and less dangerous if one follows the rules. Third, Jati,
as a system of cohesive groups, provides a sense of belonging, an order
to one's life, and a support structure larger than one's family. It pro-
vides an explanation for one's relatively miserable position and passes
the blame for one's current failure either onto an ancestor or onto one's
previous incarnation.29 2 Also, jati provides an accepted mechanism for
improving one's life through the spiritual-via rebirth, and through the
practical-via sanskritization. Because no jati considers itself at the
bottom of the hierarchy, there is always someone beneath you to look
down on.
The two principal ideological agents of change in the underpinnings
of village hierarchy are sanskritization and liberal modernization. Per-
haps unfortunately, other models for change, such as complete religious
conversion and revolutionary egalitarianism, are empirically not pos-
sibilities.2 93 The State's standards of equality, often dovetailing with
religious reform, have played the leading ideological role in moderniza-
tion. The most obvious effect is among the lower or "untouchable" jati
members who now often refer to themselves as "scheduled castes" (the
constitutional term) before referring to themselves as Rajput Jatavs,
the sanskritizing name. The use of the latter term implicitly accepts the
Hindu view that everyone must conform to a jati, and that the only
way to improve one's status is to operate within the system. The
"scheduled caste" label indicates an acceptance of one's status as a
member of a minority, larger than one's own jati and including those
traditionally inferior to oneself. The bond in this larger minority is the
common experience of discrimination. The lower jatis in Kisanpur are
edging tentatively toward a common ground among themselves and
further reinforcing their self-perception as "scheduled castes." The
lower jatis have excersied their influence through their participation as
voting blocks in the political process. Previously, lower jatis had to ap-
proach their jati superiors for assistance; now upper jais must also
come to them for help. The persisting strength of jati exclusivity re-
mains a significant constraint against lower jati unity and is a factor
which upper jais may also manipulate to their own advantage. In a
292. See C. GEERTZ, supra note 155, at 87-125 (addressing the cultural signifi-
cance of religion); J. HABERMAS, LEGITMATION CRISIS 118 (1975) (examining the func-
tion of religion in establishing collective and individual identity and in creating social
order).
293. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for the
lack of religious conversion as a major phenomenon among lower jails).
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growing number of instances, however, common action has resulted in
greater gains. Exercising rights in a collective fashion may create a new
or additional community based on a sort of legally defined
"varna"-i.e., scheduled castes-rather than a religiously defined jati.
The comfort provided in knowing that one's position in life is divinely
ordained shows signs of being increasingly overpowered by a belief that
one's treatment by the upper jatis is simply unfair. At least with regard
to avoiding self-blame for one's lowly position, this conclusion may be
as comforting as a belief in the designs of fate, although it certainly
suggests action against the upper jatis rather than a resigned adher-
ence to tradition.
The workings of Hindu religious reform and the pronouncement of
egalitarian legal rights have had an effect on at least some members of
the upper jatis. Many have an internal sense that untouchability is bad.
In at least some isolated instances, upper jati members have accepted
the antihierarchical interpretations of the Arya Samajists and other
Vedic orthodoxies. More importantly, political competition has required
increased attention to the condition and aspirations of the lower jatis,
including the need to treat them with some measure of increased social
respect. Affirmative action programs, while falling far short of their
enunciated goals, suggest that the number of scheduled caste members
in positions of authority will continue to grow. This increase will re-
quire the further social acceptance of scheduled caste jatis. If the next
V.L.W. or bank officer is a Jatav, member of the successful upper jati
faction may invite that official to their homes for dinner. This cognitive
dissonance leads to change.
We cannot predict with certainty if the forces of change in the vil-
lage will result in an ensuing breakdown in jati solidarity or a resulting
psychological loss from such a breakdown. Jati solidarity can have very
substantial practical benefits. Jati solidarity among the Jatavs (with
regard to lockmaking) and Baghailis (with regard to their burgeoning
transportation business) played a major role in the ability of these jatis
to improve their economic position. And sanskritization, though ac-
cepting the hierarchy of traditional Hinduism, does strengthen jati
solidarity.
Powerful psychological issues are also raised. The need to belong as a
jati insider, or as a member of a close group, is particularly powerful in
India, though it is longing common throughout humankind. 29 4 Because
294. See R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 137-38 (1976) (describing the so-
cietal interaction of insiders); R. UNGER, PASSION (1984) (discussing human interrela-
tionships); B. BERGER, P. BERGER & H. KELLNER, THE HOMELESS MIND 82 (1973)
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a jati insider is part of the divine order, there is even greater comfort in
its permanence and its importance. We do not know if other social
structures can replace the feelings of community that jati provides. Ac-
ceptance of an antihierarchical ideology is more likely if people are
able to gain the practical benefits of solidarity as well as the psycholog-
ical benefits of belonging to some group. This group can consist of the
hypothetical fifth varna, or the village as a unit, the family, or some
other corporate group, such as a social action group. None of these
groups, however, has the religious, social historical significance or
power of jati. Perhaps jati will evolve into something like an extended
family, or a group based upon religion but not hierarchy. Perhaps polit-
ical allegiances will become increasingly important. Perhaps the tradi-
tional view of jati will remain with an increase in inter-jati coopera-
tion. From the actions of the scheduled caste committee, at least
among the lower jatis, the last two alternatives are the most likely. Nor
do we believe that, on balance, such a development is necessarily perni-
cious. Jati solidarity remains, but inter-jati solidarity is, to a certain
extent, replacing or supplementing it. An evolution in religious justifi-
cation may follow. Some of the feelings of self-worth garnered from
effectively carrying out jati rules can be replaced with other ideological
standards, both modern (garnered from ideals of equality, nationhood,
etc.) and Vedic.295
Changes in the relevance and justification of jati distinctions are also
crucial to changes in economic relations. Customarily, the jajmani sys-
tem provided a highly limited degree of paternalistic sharing of wealth.
Opportunities to improve one'9 position were essentially nonexistent.
The jajmani system restricted the lower jatis' share because of their
low place in the religious and social hierarchy based on their lack of
merit. In the modern market-based rural economy, the share received
from an upper jati patron involves a more interactive process. This pro-
cess is partially based upon political allegiances given the patron that
are readily transferable.
(submitting that religious secularization and modernization have resulted in individual
disenfranchisement from society).
295. See R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SocIETY, supra note 294, at 150-53 (distin-
guishing between feelings of honor within rank or caste, and rising above one's rank
and applying the concept of honor to all people); Berger, On the Obsolescence of the
Concept of Honor, 11 EUR. J. OF Soc. 339, 343 (1970) (correlating concepts of honor
to institutional roles). It is clear that changes in the perception of jati have also oc-
curred among the haves. Although the haves may require less of jati affiliation than the
have-nots, their economic position is not so precarious, and they are less in need of a
reason to explain their failures. They may also prove themselves less in following the
dictates of traditional jati rules and more through competitive success in the modem
world.
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Even if unsubstantial in terms of qualitative redistribution, the redis-
tributive aspects of land reform, governmental assistance programs,
and similar efforts are symbolically substantial. The more wealth and
power are seen as susceptible to State manipulation, the less immutable
the relative positions of wealth and power appear.2 96 The pressure on
the State to effect those changes, through the use of voting blocks on a
state or national scale, is only likely to increase. Because traditional
society and religion reinforce traditional economic inferiority, an attack
on one serves as an attack upon the other.
B. THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND THE HAVE-NOTS IN RURAL INDIA
In the first part of this essay, we outlined the central issues raised in
the debate about legal aid and the value of facilitating access to a west-
ern liberal legal system for the poor in non-Western societies. More
particularly, we've noted the arguments typically heard as this debate
is carried on in India-some for, some against, and some just skepti-
cally neutral about the prospects for legal aid in that country, espe-
cially in its rural areas. The case of Kisanpur allows us to hazard some
local responses to these arguments.
Initially, we can discard the assertion that legal aid is unrealistic be-
cause poor villagers are unknowledgeable about and mystified by law
and courts. This proposition is often raised less as an argument against
developing legal aid programs than as an observation about the immen-
sity of the task. It carries with it a paternalistic pessimism that, in its
most extreme form, is debilitating. At its most optimistic, it suggests
that legal aid must primarily focus on the education of the rural poor
about their legal rights. Again, this assumes that the poor are ignorant
and in need of outside instruction.
The converse of this proposition is Justice Bhagwati's complaint that
the proponents of legal aid in India often have little idea of the needs
and aspirations of the rural poor. Kisanpur led us to the unexpected
conclusion that this is not as severe a handicap as it may first appear;
however deficient the understanding outsiders might have, the rural
poor themselves have a pretty clear understanding of their needs and
aspirations. The have-nots of Kisanpur understand the benefits of ap-
296. See Joshi, Whose Law, Whose Order: "'Untouchables," Social Violence and
the State in India, 22 ASIAN SURV. 676, 678 (1982) (arguing that the egalitarian so-
cial policies of the state have a force of their own, independent of the reluctance and
weak personal commitment of state actors to these policies). But see Gabel, The Phe-
nomonology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 Tax.
L. REV. 1576-78 (1984) (arguing that the reliance on state derived rights is equivalent
to reliance on state goals).
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pealing to the legal system in certain specific situations and recognize
the limitations of those benefits. They know what soft spots in the hier-
archy will work to their advantage, what pressure points will set off
unpleasant reactions, and what solutions will cause new problems.
Above all, they have shown that when given the opportunity and the
resources, and after weighing the possible benefits against the wide
range of risks, they may pursue solutions to their problems in court.
Clearly, not all scheduled caste jatis in Kisanpur match the relative
sophistication of the Jatavs in these matters. Nevertheless, one of the
more striking aspects of life in Kisanpur is the extent to which the
have-nots' are aware of their legal rights and privileges. Such legal
knowledge is due in great part to the increasing presence of lower jatis
in legal and bureaucratic professions (a presence brought about in part
by reservation policies) and the continuing nature of jati solidarity and
jati communication. While this was particularly true of the Jatavs, the
information provided by Jatav lawyers outside the village has been
communicated among all lower jatis and often acted upon in concert.
Indeed, the notion that the Indian legal system is alien, inscrutable,
and mysterious to the rural poor must be discarded or at least region-
ally confined. To the extent that it is a puzzle to the Indian peasant, it
partakes of the universal characteristics of legal systems throughout the
world. A tendency to be intimidated by a complex system is not evi-
dence of an inability to function within the confines of imported institu-
tions. It may be simply be a universal tendency to be intimidated by
complexity. In our experience, the ways and means of going to court
are a part of the folk-knowledge of Kisanpur. Without exception, every
one of our respondents knew someone involved in the system who could
provide the type of information and informal assessment of a particular
case necessary to get started.
Of course, the Kisanpur community's knowledge of legal rights and
process, while extensive, was not complete. For example, when
problems arose concerning government-provided entitlements, such as
subsidized loans and grants, there was little appreciation that legal ac-
tion might help to secure these benefits. However, these did seem to be
a quick realization that the legal process could secure such entitlements
from the government, just as it could secure rights from other villagers.
Educational efforts, concerning both substantive rights and procedural
techniques, are a crucial part of legal aid efforts. Our experience in
Kisanpur, however, suggests that it is important to discard the popular
notion that such education begins with a blank slate.297
297. There are various suggested.strategies for sharing legal information for the
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An argument clearly related to the question of legal literacy, but
deriving more directly from the debate over law and development, is
that an emphasis on villagers' greater use of Western-style courts is
culturally irrelevant. Many of the critiques of law and development
suggest that western style legal liberalism is inappropriate for develop-
ing countries. In India, whether appropriate or not, at least the trap-
pings of the system-constitutional government, elected parliaments,
village self-government, and a system of common law courts 298 -are
now very well entrenched. The importance to landowners of obtaining
legal title to their land, the extent that the lower jatis identify them-
selves as scheduled castes or backward classes, the vigor of election
battles, and the use of courts demonstrate the degree of acceptance of
these systems. Once considered Western, these systems are now clearly
indigenous. The question is no longer whether they are appropriate, but
to what end they are working.
This is not to say that more "indigenous" systems have completely
withered. Caste panchayats still play a role in village life, particularly
with regard to intra-jati conflicts among the middle and lower jatis not
involving land. And despite the failure of nyaya panchayats, or infor-
mal courts,2 9 some organized, non-legal alternatives to dispute resolu-
tion are successful.300 There are obvious limits to the assistance the
have-nots can expect to find when battling the haves in local noncoer-
cive dispute settlement institutions. Have-nots benefit only if they use
impartially supervised systems of mediation backed up with the possi-
bility of going to court. In government courts, different jatis at least
formally have equal personal status. In the village, tradition militates
benefit of litigation strategies for the have-nots. With the assistance of Professor Ga-
lanter, the Ford Foundation in New Delhi is working to set up a clearinghouse on legal
information of assistance to lawyers for the poor.
298. In this context, we refer to courts as including all government adjudicative
forums.
299. See Meschievitz & Galanter, In Search of Nyaya Panchayats: The Politics of
a Moribund Institution, 2 POL. INFORMAL JUST. 47 (1982) (delineating weaknesses in
the nyaya panchayat system).
300. See Baxi, From Takrar to Karar: The Lok Adalat at Rangour-A Preliminary
Study, 10 J. CONST. & PARL. STUD. 2, 95 (1976) (recommending increased empirical
research in the field of alternative legal systems); see also The Legal Services Author-
ity Act, 1987 (Act No. 39 of 1987), Chapter VI (authorizing state or district authori-
ties to establish Lok Adalats (literally, people's courts) for the purpose of arriving at
compromises or settlements of cases that would otherwise fall under the jurisdiction of
a civil, criminal or revenue court). Notwithstanding their names, Lok Adalats are to
consist of State and/or district judicial officers "and such other members possessing
such qualifications and experience as may be prescribed by the State Government." Id.
Their jurisdiction extends only to cases where the litigants have made a joint applica-
tion to the relevant court that they intend to "compromise or settle" their suit. Id.
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against lower jatis receiving even ostensible equal status in an upper
jati panchayat or mediators, and it is nearly impossible to imagine an
upper-jati member submitting to a lower-jati panchayat or mediator.
As in courts around the world, a lower-jati disputant is potentially dis-
advantaged in an Indian court because of the disparity in socioeco-
nomic status between parties (the landless laborer vs. the landowner).
Wealthy clients can bribe judges and government officials and can se-
cure the best legal talent. Such disadvantages, however, are inevitably
magnified in an informal dispute settlement situation.
Indeed, the whole point of much modern legislation in India, includ-
ing those "new rights" most often discussed by our have-not informants
in Kisanpur, involved in (village common lands, scheduled caste colo-
nies, loan concessions, and scheduled caste reservations) has to conflict
with preexisting local views of justice. Given the inherent clash between
a legal framework that promotes egalitarian values and a culture that
diminishes such values, the importance of forums as immune as possi-
ble from the influence of local elites is clear. While the court system is
not completely independent, either procedurally or substantively, it is
relatively more so. It is also difficult to imagine that under any alterna-
tive dispute settlement system, the haves would voluntarily comply with
decisions against their interests or agree to compromises absent some
kind of coercion. 30' Most village coercions, social or religious, are di-
rected against members of the same jati or against members of rela-
tively lower jatis.
Unfortunately, the coercive power of outside courts themselves are
greatly attenuated in the village setting. It is on this fact that some of
the more fundamental critiques of legal aid are based. Put bluntly,
these arguments can be reduced to the question of why one should
bother. Greater use of courts simply won't make a difference because
winners can't get their decrees enforced.
Assuming for the moment that a have-not litigant can win judgments
in court because of violations of statutory or constitutional rights by
local elites or officials, what solace is there in victory? The- distance
between court and village is a great one, both physically and psycholog-
ically. A winner in court often returns to a setting where the coercive
power of village elites is greater than the strength of a court writ and
where the police are unwilling or unable to help. Thus, many social
activists conclude that pursuing a legal strategy is at best a waste of
time and at worst a cooption by a corrupt and slow behemoth lulling
301. See Dhavan, supra note 15, at 25. (referring to people's courts as "redistrib-
uting poverty among the poor").
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the poor to sleep with false promises. Our study of Kisanpur suggests
that the attempt to vindicate certain rights in court will not necessarily
turn those rights into reality.
Although the legal system is often a weak and imperfect ally, the
field of alternatives is narrow. With jati affiliations still so important, it
is unlikely, if not impossible, that in the near future a strong alliance
can develop between the landless scheduled castes and the poorer mid-
dle or upper castes. Temporary alliances of a relatively minor sort are
likely in factional politics, for example, but not for action of a revolu-
tionary kind. The poverty of the lower jatis and their numerical inferi-
ority, makes them vulnerable. In Bihar, where scheduled castes have
attempted to take radical action against the landed, they have always
suffered the most. By turning to the legal system, we do not feel that
they are giving up other alternatives; in fact, they have very few other
alternatives.
And while there is a strong basis for pessimism about the direct ef-
fect legal action might have on village patterns of domination, the
Kisanpur example suggests that this pessimism is exaggerated. Practi-
cally, the legal system has in fact worked to advance a number of
causes of the lower jatis. The courts do have certain coercive powers,
such as requiring land registration, ordering payments of certain loans
or benefits by the state, and a limited control over the police.
But perhaps more importantly, as Kisanpur demonstrated, the value
of legal action to the have-nots cannot be measured strictly in terms of
winning in court or getting a victory enforced. Scholars have long ob-
served that court settlements are seldom considered a full resolution of
the underlying dispute by village litigants, even when the dispute is be-
tween members of the same jati. Instead, appeal to the legal system is
often viewed as an elaborate method of increasing one's bargaining po-
sition in the local arena. Macauley has touched on this question in the
western context:
We are all subject to many private governments where the influence of the legal
system is problematic. Long term continuing relationships have their own norms
and sanctions, often far more powerful than anything the legal system has to
offer. [However], sometimes individuals and groups seek to affect the balance of
power within these private governments by appeal to courts, administrative agen-
cies and legislatures." 2
The precise effect courts have on social relations in Kisanpur is un-
known, but the fact remains that courts are an established part of vil-
lage life, and are perceived as very important to the people who use
302. McCauley, supra note 22, at 152.
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them as a means to affect the balance of local power. The courts do
have a positive effect in this regard. Greater access to courts for the
have-nots is a tool with which to play the game of village politics more
effectively. And the haves often find that manipulating the system ille-
gally carries certain costs. If one is clearly wrong and expects to lose a
case, bribing judges or the police becomes an expensive proposition.
As long as the upper jatis continue to control socially, economically,
and often numerically, there is a limit to their tolerance for change. In
this context, perhaps one of the more important allies of the lower jatis
is the legitimacy, albeit strained, of the legal system in the minds of the
upper jatis. Presently, a version of the liberal state (albeit a weak or
soft version and one that coexists with traditional patterns of domi-
nance) is active in the village. Courts and certain ideas of rights, par-
ticularly the right to property, expressed in land records, deeds, and
litigation over land ownership, are an accepted part of village life, be-
cause they do not deviate too far from traditional Hindu views of hier-
archy. Given the alternatives, it makes sense to harness what currently
exists and attempt to benefit from it. The alternative, to "delegitimate"
the liberal legal system, is unlikely to have any positive practical effect
upon the lot of the have-nots. 3
03
Admittedly, however, the vigorous pursuit of legal rights in Kisanpur
remains a risky and dangerous proposition-. Sowell's argument that le-
gal benefits provided for the have-nots can often result in a revolt by
the haves has proven itself true in India time and again.'" The caste
riots in a number of states, most prominently Gujarat, have been in
large part reactions by upper jatis against what they see as overly pref-
erential treatment, enacted by the state and enforced through the legal
system, for lower jatis.05 But these warnings should not be so severe as
to curtail all forms of resistance to the haves' domination of the have-
nots. The courts, along with other forces of social change, may advance
the cause of the have-nots and counter the haves' resistance. It is only
necessary that caution precede action.
Other problems with the legal system, such as huge court backlogs,
303. See Crenshaw, supra note 7, at 1357 (noting that because racism, not legal
thought, creates a coerced existence for blacks, attempts to analyze liberal theory that
purports that whites consensually dominate blacks, will not render a valid conclusion in
understanding racial domination); Schneider, Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspec-
tives from the Women's Movements, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589, 593-98, 612-22 (1986)
(discussing the relationship between legal rights and personal consciousness).
304. See T. SOWELL, supra note 7, at 90 (claiming that increased benefits to mi-
norities heightens animosity of racial hatred).
305. Bobb & Kapoor, Gujarat: State of Siege, INDIA TODAY, May 15, 1985, 24-39
(attributing the violent 1985 uprising in Gujarat to an internal class struggle).
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the inefficiencies of the current Civil Procedure Code, the weaknesses
of the legal profession, and the expense of filing and fighting cases, are
not fatal to effective use of the courts. The have-nots are eager to use
the legal system, even though they are aware of these failings. In some
instances, these problems are not as important as they appear to Wes-
terners. Courts are often simply one tool in the battle against the haves;
even if the courts appear to act inefficiently or "pathologically," they
may still be useful weapons in that battle. In some instances, these
problems may be initigated, as discussed below.
1. The Current State of Public Interest Litigation
Over the past decade and a half, Indian appellate courts have broken
substantial new ground in the area of public interest litigation. Most of
this litigation has emerged from the appellate judiciary's jurisdiction to
issue writs and orders to enforce fundamental constitutional rights. Lit-
igation also arises from the high courts' jurisdiction to issue writs
against the state to prevent the violation of any guaranteed legal
right.3"6 Former Chief Justice Bhagwati, one of the principal patrons of
the public interest litigation movement, described it as a "judicial
revolution.
o3 0 7
Due to innovative approaches by the courts, the appellate judiciary
has heard the claims of numerous classes of have-nots. Such landmark
cases include People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India
[The Asiad Workers Case]308 and Sanjit Roy v. State of Rajasthan,00
both involving the payment of the minimum wage to poor workers;
Sheela Barse v. Maharashtra [Sheela Barse 1],310 regarding the condi-
tion of female prisoners; Miss Veena Sethi v. State of Bihar,3" regard-
ing the condition of undertrial prisoners; Bandu Mukti Morcha v.
Union of India312 and Neeraj Chaudhry v. State of Madhya
Pradesh,313 both regarding bonded labor; Lakshmi Kant Pandey v.
Union of India,314 regarding methods of adopting children; Sheela
Barse v. Union of India [Sheela Barse 11],311 regarding custodial re-
306. INDIA CONST. arts. 32, 226.
307. See Bhagwati, supra note 27, at 561.
308. 1982 A.I.R. (S.C.) 1473.
309. 1983 A.I.R. (S.C.) 328.
310. 1983 A.I.R. (S.C.) 49.
311. 1983 A.I.R. (S.C.) 339.
312. 1984 A.I.R. (S.C.) 802.
313. 1984 A.I.R. (S.C.) 1099.
314. 1984 A.I.R. (S.C.) 469.
315. 1988 A.I.R. (S.C.) 2211.
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straints on children; and Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corpora-
tion,316 involving pavement dwellers. This is quite a list of have-nots.
In none of these cases was there a named plaintiff or a class action.
Under the Indian Code of Civil Procedure, there is no provision for
class actions similar to Rule 23 in the United States Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure allows
representative suits "where there are numerous persons having the
same interest in one suit," but the application of this provision is usu-
ally confined to pre-existing groups, typically religious sects.317 Nor is
there anything approximating the United States Manual for Complex
Litigation. Instead, these cases were brought by parties whom the laws
of the United States would define as having no standing. In fact, most
of these cases began, not as regular court petitions, but as letters ad-
dressed to judges on the court, often from public interest groups, legal
aid groups, or even from social workers or journalists.'16 The pleadings,
and in most cases the facts contained in the supporting affidavits, are
fairly "amorphous." 3 19 In a number of cases, a letter making the
broadest allegations of the violation of the rights of a particular group
has prompted the court to order a special judicial commission to inves-
tigate the facts.320 The elimination of standing requirements and the
acceptance of abbreviated forms of petitions with only limited fact alle-
gations is a revolutionary development. For the sake of convenience, we
refer to cases admitted under such relaxed rules as public interest peti-
tions or cases.
There are a number of obvious advantages in allowing public interest
cases under such modified rules of procedure. First, such a petition in-
volves relatively little preparation and puts the onus on the court to
prepare the case. This could substantially reduce the cost of litigation
for the have-nots, one of their principal complaints regarding the legal
316. 1986 A.I.R. (S.C.) 180.
317. See Gidney v. Anglo Indian Association, 1930 A.I.R. (Rang.) 177, 181 (hold-
ing in a defamation case on behalf of members of an association that the "same inter-
est" required by Order 1, Rule 8 did not exist or else every plaintiff woild have to
receive separate damages); Radhaswami Satsang Sabha v. Puttani (deceased by
L.R.'s), 1984 A.I.R. (All.) 198 (indicating a possible expansion of the rule). Recently,
in a case involving a dispute between two factions of a Hindu sect, a case litigated for
forty-two years, the U.P. High Court remanded the case to the District Court allowing
plaintiffs application to proceed under Order 1, Rule 8. Id.
318. Asiad Workers Case (letter from public interest association); Sheela Barse v.
Maharashtra (letter from a journalist); Bandu Mukti Morcha (letter from public inter-
est organization, framed in legal form); Lakshmi Kant Pandey (letter from a lawyer
involved in adoption issues).
319. Sheela Barse v. Union of India [Sheela Barse 1Il, 1988 A.I.R. (S.C.) 2211,
2215.
320. Bandu Mukti Morcha, at 808-12.
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redress of violations of rights. Second, such petitions essentially avoid
the crowded district and other lower courts and reduce the possibility
of delay through appeal. In addition, the higher judiciary enjoys con-
siderably more prestige than does the lower. Presumably, the higher
judiciary is more honest and not as concerned with caste or class as the
lower judiciary.
While this form of public interest litigation has advantages, its disad-
vantages are also plentiful. First, there must be a showing that the per-
son or group brining the action is acting in good faith even though the
petition requires no actual aggrieved plaintiff.321 Although these two
requirements may not serve as substantial barriers, other requirements
do.322 Under Arts. 32 and 226, with the exception of the prohibition
against practicing discrimination in public places, untouchability, and
bonded labor,3 23 standing exists only if there is a violation of a right
that runs against the state. The Supreme Court may proceed under
Art. 32 only if a fundamental right is violated. Fundamental rights are
limited in scope, and do not, with the exception of the right to receive
the minimum wage,324 involve any basic economic rights.32' As dis-
cussed below, the high courts are often reluctant to accept a public
interest case unless a fundamental right is violated.
Second, a substantial violation must occur, at least in order to re-
ceive the attention of at least the Supreme Court. Given the massive
backlog of cases already extant throughout the Indian judicial system,
the appellate judiciary and the Supreme Court must be concerned that
not all of these cases come before them under their original jurisdic-
tion. In M.C. Metha v. Union of India, involving a major leak of poi-
sonous gas resulting in numerous injuries and a demand for damages, a
five judge constitutional bench of the Supreme Court tried to define
those public interest cases the Court to exercise its original jurisdiction.
The Court required large scale or harsh violations:
[T]he infringement of the fundamental right must be gross and patent. . .and
321. Gupta v. Union of India (original text), 1982 A.I.R. (S.C.) 149, 189 (stating
that only letters from bona-fide individuals acting without personal self-interest are
acceptable in lieu of technical adherence to writ of petition procedures).
322. Id. at 189.
323. INDIA CONST. ARTS. 15, 17 & 23.
324. See INDIA CONST. Part III. The Supreme Court has held that prohibitions
against bonded labor and the taking of life without due process combine to make the
receipt of a minimum wage a fundamental right. People's Union for Democratic
Rights, at 1488-89.
325. This is not the case under Article 226 of the constitution, vests authority in
the high courts to issue writs to enforce any legal right against the state. Whether a
case is admissible to a high court as a "public interest" case, with relaxed standing
requirements, is not entirely settled.
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either such infringement should be on a large scale affecting the fundamental
rights of a large number of persons, or it should appear unjust or unduly harsh or
oppressive on account of their poverty or disability.... Ordinarily, ... a petition
under [Art.] 32 should not be used as a substitute for enforcement of the right
to claim compensation for infringement of a fundamental right through ordi-
nary process of a civil court (emphasis added).311
It is unclear if a high court may accord public interest status to cases
not involving violations of fundamental rights or large scale or particu-
larly harsh violations of other rights. Clearly, under Article 226, a high
court has jurisdiction to issue writs to enforce any legal rights, not just
fundamental rights, against the state. In Justice Khalid's concurring
opinion in Shri Sachidanand Pandey v. State of West Bengal,327 how-
ever, he noted that:
It is only when Courts are apprised of a gross violation of fundamental rights by
a group or a class action or when basic human rights are invaded or when there
are complaints of such acts as shock the judicial conscience that the Courts,
especially this Court, should leave aside procedural shackles and hear such peti-
tions and extend its jurisdiction under all available provisions for remedying the
hardships and miseries of the needy, the underdog and the neglected (emphasis
added).32 8
This would certainly allow high courts to restrict public interest
cases either to violations of fundamental rights or to particularly egre-
gious violations of other legal rights. The Kerala High Court, in
Mampilly v. State of Kenala, suggested that whenever there is a public
injury, any member of the public may approach the court for a writ
under Art. 226. However, this decision depended upon a broad inter-
pretation of Supreme Court precedent 329 and preceded both the M.C.
Metha or Shri Sachidanand Pandey cases. In addition, though the
Kerala High Court did not explicitly restrict public interest petitions to
far-reaching violations, the case did involving a substantial and broad
threat to public health. The Rajasthan High Court held, in a public
interest case, that citizens are entitled to utilize the Court to insure
that the State performs its legal duties.330 Similar to the Kerala case,
this case involved a substantial public health threat. The Rajasthan
High Court also noted that the case involves Article 21, a fundamental
right, although it did not base its acceptance of the petition on this
326. M.C. Metha, at 1091.
327. 1988 A.I.R. (S.C.) 1109.
328. Id. at 1136 (Khalid, J., concurring).
329. 1985 A.I.R. (Ker.) 24, 28 (involving the sale of liquor in dangerous
containers).
330. Koolwal v. State of Rajasthan, 1988 A.I.R. (Raj.) 2, 4 (involving a substantial
public health hazard due to poor sanitation in the capital city of Jaipur).
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fact. 331
The Andhra Pradesh High Court admitted a public interest writ pe-
tition involving "large scale violations or abuses of power" by the state
government but no alleged violation of fundamental rights.332 The
Delhi High Court, however, rejected a public interest writ petition con-
cerning the prosecution of rioters after Mrs. Gandhi's assassination, be-
cause the petition did not allege a violation of fundamental rights. 3
By contrast, the Allahabad High Court, one of two seats of the High
Court of Uttar Pradesh, has stated in dicta based on older Supreme
Court decisions, that the Court would entertain a public interest writ
petition even though neither fundamental rights nor conscious-shocking
facts are involved.
3 34
As these cases indicate, the rules and standards regarding the nature
of the right violated and the extent of the violation for the admission of
public interest claims are in a state of uncertainty and change. There is
a tendency, especially in the Supreme Court, to restrict such cases to
substantial violations of fundamental rights. This restriction is partially
based on the need for docket control and reducing case backlog. Al-
though the High Court has issued dicta that public interest writs are
admissible under broad criteria, reported cases involve rather substan-
tial and broad-ranging problems, such as high-level public corruption
or threats to public health.
Another major drawback in using public interest writ petitions is the
frequent inability of an appellate court to hear evidence, to adjudicate
individual claims, and to order specific relief. Articles 32 and 226 au-
thorize the appellate judiciary to issue writs to enforce rights factually
alleged in affidavits. Writ petitions are admitted to decide questions of
law, and are not normally admitted if there is a substantial question of
fact.33 ' The reason for this is obvious. The high courts and the Supreme
Court are appellate tribunals and not trial courts, with the limited ex-
ception of original criminal jurisdiction in three high courts. In public
interest cases, the courts have often appointed commissions to investi-
gate alleged rights violations, but the power of these commissions is
limited. In some instances, the violations are so egregious that it is vir-
331. Id.
332. Satyanarayana v. Rao, 1988 A.I.R. (A.P.) 144, 154.
333. People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Ministry of Home Affairs, 1985
A.I.R. (Del.) 268, 279.
334. Umsh Chand v. Samiti, 1984 A.I.R. (All.) 46, 50.
335. See Naidu v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 1977 (1) S.C.C. 561, 565 (dis-
missing petition on account of dispute over question of fact); see also Rules of the
Allahabad High Court, adopted under art. 226, ch. XXII, para. 1(2).
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tually impossible to deny them.336 These cases are essentially collabora-
tive rather than adversarial. Parties may always contest a commission
report alleging violations of rights. 33 1 In such instances, substantial
questions of fact remain, making it difficult for an appellate court to
fashion appropriate relief. In Bandhu Mukti Morcha, the Court based
its conclusion that working conditions were appalling and that forced
labor is legally equal to bonded labor on a commission's investigation
and report.338 The court ordered various local authorities to prevent the
occurrence of bonded labor and to rehabilitate victims.3 3 9 The Court
refused simply to accept the reports of the commissioners or the affida-
vits of the employees regarding the liability of the employers. The
Court explained that these issues required litigation at the magistrate
level.3 40 In other cases, the courts issued general instructions to state
authorities to end certain practices but left case by case factual issues
to state agencies or lower tribunals. In Sheela Barse I, a case initiated
by a social worker's letter to a Supreme Court judge, the Court could
not determine the reliability of the allegations but suggested that the
state of Maharashtra institute new procedures for female prisoners.-"
These procedures included providing legal aid, instituting surprise judi-
cial visits, and ensuring that magistrates investigate allegations of
torture.
3 41
The problem of adjudicating factual issues often prevents the courts
from awarding individual money damages. In The Asiad Construction
Workers Case, the Court ruled that the class of employees involved had
the legal right to receive the minimum wage. The Court, however, had
to appoint ombudsmen to monitor the situation to ensure that the
workers subsequently received the amounts due them. The Court did
not impose any retrospective relief.34 3 The Court in the M.C. Metha
336. See, e.g., Barse v. Maharashtra, 1983 A.I.R. (S.C.) 378, 381-82 (involving a
petition alleging custodial violence towards prisoners and prescribing protective mea-
sures); Koolwal v. State of Rajasthan, 1988 A.I.R. (Raj.) at 4 (involving a substantial
health hazard due to poor sanitation in Jaipur).
337. See Cunningham, Public Interest Litigation in the Supreme Court: A Study
in the Light of American Experience, 29 J. INDIAN L. INsT. 494, 504-05 (1987) (stat-
ing that collaborative litigation assumes that parties will voluntarily reach agreement
and take necessary action). One court has referred to "persuading" a municipal gov-
ernment to make changes in light of a writ petition regarding municipal sanitation.
Janki v. Sardarnagar Municipality, 1986 A.I.R. (Guj.) 49, 50.
338. Moreha v. Union of India, 1984 A.I.R. (S.C.) 802, 808.
339. Id. at 820-21.
340. Id.
341. Barse v. Maharashtra, 1983 A.I.R. (S.C.) 380.
342. Id. at 381-82.
343. People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, 1982 A.I.R. (S.C.)
1473, 1491.
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case after lamenting the horrible effects of the gas on the victims, 44
concluded that the Delhi Legal Aid and Advice Board should file com-
pensation actions on behalf of each injured party in an appropriate
lower court.3 45 The Court did note that in a very few other cases mone-
tary damages had been ordered, but that these were only where the
violation "shock[ed] the conscience of the Court." 346 One of the cases
cited by the Court where monetary damages were ordered was Sah v.
State of Bihar,47 where a man was held in jail for fourteen years after
he had been acquitted. The State of Bihar had no plausible reason for
keeping the prisoner in jail and was ordered by the Court to pay money
to the prisoner to enable him to pursue a case for damages against the
state.3 8 The Bihar High Court noted that while no evidence had been
presented with regard to the amount of damages that would eventually
be due, the Court was certain that something would be owed.349 The
Court described the interim award as palliative.35 0 Even in this highly
unusual case, the Court struggled with the problem of making a factual
adjudication.
Other high court cases demonstrate the problems in pursuing ques-
tions of fact via the writ petition. In Mahesh v. Ahmedabad Municipal
Corporation, a physician brought a suit against the city of Ahmedabad
to abate the nuisance caused by hutment dwellers and hawkers. 351 The
Gujarat High Court clearly did not approve of the use of a public inter-
est writ petition against what the court perceived as the interests of
poor people.3 52 The Court explained that this type of case is not appro-
priate under Section 226 due to disputes questions of fact.353
The Madhya Pradesh High Court had a similar reaction in Prayagi
v. State of Madhya Pradesh,35 involving a petition for a writ of man-
344. Id. at 1491-92.
345. Id. at 1100.
346. Id. at 1091.
347. 1983 (1) S.C.C. 1086.
348. Id. at 1089. In addition, the Bihar High Court requested to monitor prison
statistics in the future. Id. at 1088.
349. Id. at 1089.
350. Id.
351. 1988 A.I.R. (Guj.) 154.
352. See id. (stating that "[i]n substance, the petition provides an illustration as to
how the concept of 'Public interest litigation' can be twisted, distorted and then mis-
used so as to deprive the numerous citizens of their right to exist"). The Court further
declared that "no purpose would be served by calling upon the Municipal Corporation
to take action which would definitely [do] harm to [the] lot of the poor." Id. at 156.
353. Id. at 155.
354. 1987 A.I.R. (M.P.) 25. In another writ petition involving public corruption,
the Andhra Pradesh High Court requested an investigation of public corruption, but
ruled that it could not order the central government to appoint a commission to investi-
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damus directing the State of Madhya Pradesh to, among other things,
remove a cabinet minister for alleged corruption. The High Court dis-
missed the writ petition because the allegations required factual investi-
gation and the proper forum for inquiry into complaints against Minis-
ters and public servants is the Lok Ayukt, a statutory board for
investigating public corruption cases.3
The problem of the courts making only general orders and requests
in appellate writ petition cases is demonstrated in Sheela Barse II.316
In that case, a social worker had previously brought a writ petition
seeking an improvement in the treatment of children under custodial
restraint. The social worker now sought to withdraw the writ petition,
because the court had become "dysfunctional,"'s 7 and none of its gen-
eral orders had been followed. 358 The Court refused to dismiss the peti-
tion and instituted various orders and requests concerning the welfare
of the children in custody, including orders releasing two named chil-
dren. 359 The Court also attempted to justify the fact that its orders
were of a general nature. "Again, the relief to be granted looks to the
future and is, generally, corrective rather than compensatory, which
sometimes it also is. The pattern of relief need not necessarily be de-
rived logically from the rights asserted or found. .. "3s0
The conclusion to be drawn is not that writ petitions involving un-
resolved questions of fact are of no use. The appointment of commis-
sioners to make investigations that are reported to the court may result
in compromise orders (or what is termed in the United States as con-
sent decrees) and in the articulation of important legal rights. In addi-
tion, such cases may prompt courts to apply pressure either to adminis-
trative units of government or to triers of fact to enforce those rights
that courts articulate through the regular adjudicative process. If those
rights are not enforced, further orders can apply more pressure until,
presumably, an official is placed in contempt. The extent of the appel-
late court's actions depends on the nature of the right violated, the ex-
tent of the violation, the numbers of people involved, and on the degree
to which factual issues are in contention.
The types of legal problems we discovered in Kisanpur are, in gen-
eral, less amenable to writ petitions in the appellate judiciary. First, in
gate the charges. R. Satyanarayana v. Rao, 1988 A.I.R. (A.P.) 144, 176-79.
355. Prayagi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1987 A.I.R. (M.P.) 25, 27.
356. Sheela Barse v. Union of India, 1988 A.I.R. (S.C.) 2213.
357. Satyanarayana v. Rao, 1988 A.I.R. (A.P.) 2213.
358. Id. at 2214.
359. Id. at 2216-19.
360. Id. at 2215.
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instances involving the usurpation of village lands, the complaints are
considered as against the individuals who have illegally occupied the
land, and not against an instrumentality of the state (i.e. the village
panchayat). Arguably a villager could draft a mandamus against the
panchayat to force it to evict the offenders. There is some question as
to whether an appellate court would exercise jurisdiction in cases where
relatively few individuals are involved, or a fundamental right is not at
issue, as is currently the case in Kisanpur. Except in those instances
where people are killed or the wages are so low that they threaten the
very lives of the workers (such as in the Asiad Construction Workers
Case),3"' cases in Kisanpur may not involve an unconscionable violation
of rights.
In other instances involving the panchayat's designation of land for
individual or scheduled caste colonies or in the event a mandamus is
requested to evict common-land occupiers, complex questions of fact
necessarily arise. It is unlikely that an appellate court would make a
factual finding in such cases merely on an affidavit. The appellate court
would probably refer the matter to the collector's court. The same
would be true in most cases involving individual corruption.
Two areas most amenable to writ petition cases are those involving
the failure to pay minimum wages and those where no public assistance
as guaranteed in law, is ever distributed. Even in these cases, however,
factual issues may arise that result in either a dismissal of the petition
or a referral to a lower tribunal or administrative agency. Given the
potential expense of hiring a lawyer in Lucknow, and the likelihood
that the High Court would not entertain these petitions for one or more
of the reasons listed above, it is probably more practical to bring these
cases before lower-level triers of fact or administrative personnel in the
first instance.
The recent experiments with public interest litigation in the appellate
judiciary, however, can still play an important role in resolving some of
the types of cases found in Kisanpur. First, there is a clear articulation
in the appellate courts that the interests of the have-nots are to be vig-
orously addressed and their cause served. Although public interest
cases are discussed and followed in the context of writ petition practice
before the appellate judiciary, there is no reason that lower courts can-
not implement public interest rules. At the outset, this would reduce
the amount of legal preparation and the need to follow strict rules of
361. See Roy v. State of Rajasthan, 1983 A.I.R. (S.C.) 328 (invalidating provision
in 1948 Minimum Wages Act allowing for the payment of less than minimum wage to
famine relief workers).
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pleading. A letter may bring a public interest case before the collectors
court or a district court. Commissioners could be appointed by the trial
court to make preliminary investigations, which could greatly assist the
preparations of cases. We are not currently aware of any instances
where lower courts have adopted the public interest rubric in such
cases. In addition, the courts could impose the requirements that there
be a breach of fundamental rights, and that a violation must be sub-
stantial or involve large numbers of people. We encourage experimen-
tation with this technique because it could greatly assist the prepara-
tion of cases in lower tribunals.
Second, there is the benefit of the implicit or explicit possibility to a
high court in the event the lower tribunal did not provide sufficient
assistance to the plaintiffs. It is easier to approach the high court with
a public interest writ petition after noting that an attempt to find re-
dress in a lower tribunal has failed. In any case, an adverse decision in
a lower tribunal is appealable to the high courts. Even if an appeal does
not take on the technical benefits of public interest case, including re-
laxed rules of standing, of pleading forms, and of evidence, it would at
least benefit from the new amenability of the appellate judiciary. to
help the have-nots, to expand their rights, and to oversee implementa-
tion of those rights.
While most of the individual grievances we heard in Kisanpur may
appear limited and fact-specific and therefore appropriate for lower
level courts, this is not always the case. For example, a case involving
the payment of minimum wages could proceed before a high court as a
public interest case. In addition, there is no doubt that have-nots from
other villages have experienced injuries better suited for a writ petition,
such as bonded labor. Even in the more routine cases, such as the fail-
ure to provide scheduled caste colonies or loans and other economic
benefits, the patterns of abuse most likely are replicated outside of
Kisanpur. A substantial, systemic failure of instrumentalities of the
state to provide these benefits and services constitutes the type of high
court writ petition requiring the appointment of commissioners and the
institution of a broad investigation of such practices under the high
court's supervision. Any resulting order by the court might be only gen-
eral, and individual cases might have to be litigated before the appro-
priate lower-level triers of fact. However, the investigative powers of
the court's commissioners and the court's scrutiny of any subsequent
action taken on the part of administrative or judicial organs are poten-
tially of great benefit. This process may reduce costs for the poor liti-
gants and implement decisions with greater reliability than a case not
yet before the higher judiciary.
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The ability to gather information about the systemic violations of
rights over a wide area, resulting in the effective aggregation of such
claims in a public interest case before a high court, is crucial. The
problems we have discussed earlier about limited discovery, and the
length of time required in putting facts before the court, could be re-
duced if judicial commissions performed the lion's share of the work.
As we have discussed above, lower jatis are in constant communication
from one village to another; this resource could be used for the task. In
addition, lower jati lawyers are also in communication with each other.
A test case might be needed to discover if a high court is amenable to a
writ petition in any of the problem areas discovered in Kisanpur. Assis-
tance in understanding how to file such petitions, what allegations to
allege, and how the litigation could best proceed would be invaluable.
However, even if the expense or lack of familiarity with public interest
cases deters local lawyers from proceeding to the high court in Luck-
now, the mere existence of the high court public interest forum benefits
the have-nots when taking cases to lower-level forums.
2. The Current State of Legal Aid
There is substantial skepticism about expending effort or money on
providing legal services instead of on programs that concentrate on
building multifaceted organizations for the poor. Increasingly, advo-
cates of legal aid favor funding grass roots social action organizations.
In this theory, legal strategies are just one part of social action organi-
zations of the rural poor. If this argument is accepted, the success of
legal aid generally depends upon the development of such organiza-
tions, especially on those that Professor Baxi calls 'participatory organi-
zations of the rural poor,' or those that grow out of the oppressed them-
selves and are relatively freer from being co-opted, absorbed, or
derailed.
3 62
Certainly there is much in our examination of Kisanpur that lends
support to the preferability of this multifaceted approach. Individual
litigants are vulnerable to intimidation by village elites. There is a clear
need for some sort of political clout in order to enforce court articu-
lated legal rights and to ensure that the haves do not apply pressure
upon the have-nots in some other area of village life not before the
court. This is true whether that clout takes the form of temporary alli-
ances with upper jati patrons or of using lower jati organizations that
take advantage of upper jati factionalism.
362. Dhavan, supra note 15, at 284.
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It is important to encourage these types of organizations. A number
of such rural organizations exist already. Various groups have existed
for years under the supervision of religious or political organizations,
and have met with varying degrees of success. One example is the So-
cial Work Research Centre, based in Tilonia, Rajasthan, that is highly
effective at organizing the have-nots socially and economically. The So-
cial Work Research Centre has also had some success in pursuing legal
strategies; in fact, this group filed one important public interest case
regarding bonded labor.3 3
Another successful group is the AWARE, a scheduled caste uplift
society in Andhra Pradesh, that has made great progress in organizing
lower jati communities, particularly with regard to social goals. The
AWARE has also had some success in using the courts to recover
land.3" '
Unfortunately, the majority of the most well-organized, active, and
successful of these groups are confined to tribal areas. While tribals, or
scheduled tribes, are among the most impoverished groups in India,
they have certain advantages over other groups of have-nots in terms of
organization building. Tribal peoples have remained largely on the pe-
riphery of the Hindu social structure and have maintained a group
identity outside of and independent of caste hierarchy. Tribal groups
are not subdivided into jatis. Secondly, tribal groups are concentrated
geographically and all of their members frequently share common
problems. Most of their legal problems are against outsiders, such as,
logging companies and others who usurp land and forest products from
all members of the tribal group. As a result, it easier for tribal groups
to organize effectively as a group.
While there has been some success in organizing the have-nots, it
seems unlikely that such social action groups can be fashioned among
more than a tiny percentage of members of non-tribal rural have-nots
any time soon. Many people and organizations have tried accomplish-
ing this organizational goal for some time, and there is little reason to
expect a sudden large scale success.
On the other hand, legal action itself, can serve as a catalyst for
organization. Consider, for example, the scheduled caste committee in
Kisanpur. Krishna Singh's legal victories when he worked as a brick
kiln worker in Delhi encouraged him to organize the committee for the
363. Roy v. State of Rajesthan, 1983 A.I.R. (S.C.) 328.
364. K. Bhat, Harijan Uplift Programme of the AWARE in Khanna District of
Andhra Pradesh: A Study Report (December 1982) (available from the Ford Founda-
tion, New Delhi).
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purpose of fighting a law case. The legal rights due to each scheduled
caste member overcame differences between the lower jatis. Victories
only strengthened that common cause. It seems to us that supporting
pre-existing, home-grown forms of legal activism among at least this
group of have-nots actually serves to assist further collective action in
the future. To wait until "participatory organizations of the rural poor"
have formed unnecessarily delays an activism ready to develop.
The organization of legal aid in India is, in many ways, in its infancy
and is concentrated usually in larger cities and towns. Many cities and
towns already have different types of legal aid or public interest litiga-
tion oriented groups. The groups are mainly private, often single-issue
oriented, while others are organized under the auspices of the bar, the
courts, or of the government. Such organizations have brought many of
the public interest cases cited above. The new Legal Services Authority
Act, designed to "provide free and competent legal services to the
weaker sections of society," although not widely implemented is likely
to increase the number of at least partially working legal aid
committees.
Krishnapur, the city where the district court nearest Kisanpur is lo-
cated, had a legal aid committee headed by the district judge and in-
cluded a number of prominent members of the bar. In addition, a law
school located in Krishnapur had a working and active clinical program
focusing on legal aid. The district judge had control over certain gov-
ernment funds available to pay for legal assistance for the poor, al-
though the amount was meager and the per appearance reimbursement
rate insufficient. The judge also was able to use his powers of "moral
suasion" to encourage private lawyers to take on some cases, although
the ability to find private lawyers with enough time or resources was
obviously limited. Criminal cases used most of these funds. We wit-
nessed a "legal aid camp" organized by the district judge, members of
the bar, and the law faculty of the local university. The camp included
the district judge and a number of magistrates, as well as twenty or so
volunteer lawyers. Over five hundred people attended the camp and it
lasted a single day. Almost all of the cases involved the disposal of
minor criminal matters.
While it is important to encourage public interest litigation-oriented
groups and legal aid committees, they are not a complete solution to
the problem of inadequate legal assistance for the have-nots. Such
groups and committees are principally organized in cities and the
larger towns and away from villages. Legal aid committees include the
more senior and upper jati members of the bar. The funds available for
fighting cases are scarce. We found in Kisanpur that it is relatively
[VOL. 5:655
LEGAL AID IN INDIA
easy for the poor to find legal representation among members of their
own jati, usually through jati connections. Though the lawyers had lit-
tle connection with the larger Krishnapur district court practice, they
lived nearer to Kisanpur, in the market town containing the collector's
court, where most cases are filed and heard. The benefits to the
Kisanpur litigants of hiring a lawyer of their own choosing, from their
own jati, and who lived closer to them and to the court where most
cases are heard is clear. The poor litigants are far more comfortable
with the attorney and more likely to control their own case. It would be
less likely that a lower jati member from Kisanpur would be comforta-
ble with approaching the legal aid committee in Krishnapur, even if
someone would listen to him or her, and even if a lawyer could be
found to help him (most city lawyers are not fond of spending time in
villages) or that money could be found to pay the lawyer. As such, it
would be preferable if a system could be created where it was these
lawyers who could provide legal aid to the have-nots.
3. A Proposal for Rural Legal Aid
The two principal obstacles to effective use of the legal system by the
Kisanpur have-nots are: (1) the lack of money to pay lawyer's fees, and
(2) in cases regarding government benefits, the lack of familiarity with
effective legal strategies. A third obstacle is the lack of appreciation as
to how the lower judiciary could be mobilized under appellate public
interest rules, as well as how the appellate judiciary might be used.
This includes the related ability to martial information regarding large
scale violations of rights.
A legal aid program should concentrate on solving the financing
problem without requiring potential litigants to proceed through any
distant legal aid committees. This should be done by using those work-
ing parts of the system as they currently exist; this would mean that
one was not starting from scratch, and fewer toes would be stepped on.
If a nearby legal aid committee is already constituted, this commit-
tee is the beginning. Otherwise, a committee could be drawn up from
any existing social service or rural action groups, the nearest judiciary,
and members of the bar. The intended principal goal of the committee
would be to distribute funds to lawyers representing the have-nots
under the supervision of the various courts and tribunals. It is impor-
tant to prevent the distribution of funds to non-needy plaintiffs and
their lawyers; restrictions on jati and perhaps on income level could be
employed. The distribution of funds would begin immediately after a
case is filed in an appropriate forum. Disbursement of funds may rely
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on a formula that the committee and the appropriate judicial officer
approve. Funds would not be disbursed in the event of continuing liti-
gation because this would discourage settlement of cases. Filing some
type of case in a forum, however, would act as an effective gatekeeper
to the payment of funds.
Lawyers would have the duty to complete applications for funds, to
ensure that the have-nots could select their lawyer without having to
approach a legal aid committee or a judicial officer. News on how to
receive payments for representing the poor would travel fast among
members of the bar. Attorneys could make the necessary applications
from the committee and from the judicial officer involved. Plaintiffs
would have to consent to continuing disbursements, however, to ensure
that they retained control over the course of the litigation.
The additional funds to pay these lawyers may come from a number
of sources, such as government appropriations, a small additional fee
for court filings, grants from volunteer agencies, and donations from
the local bar. In addition, courts could elect to award costs more fre-
quently, although the length of most cases may make such a potential
funding mechanism relatively less relevant. If the funding base is di-
verse, it would remove the process from the untoward influence of polit-
ics and the vagaries of appropriations. In addition, the more diverse the
source of funds, the greater the number of people interested in keeping
the system free from corruption.
As we learned in Kisanpur, the poor are likely to band together to
raise some funds. Any additional financing may, at least in some cases,
need only be a supplement. The local organized bar, a powerful politi-
cal force throughout India, would support a system that allows the
funding to go directly to the lawyers and not the bureaucracy. In any
case, a pilot program instituted in a few areas could experiment with
different methods of raising and distributing funds.
In addition to using the existing system to provide legal services
through new sources of funding, relatively easy improvements in legal
literacy of the have-nots and their lawyers is possible. Legal literacy is
already surprisingly prevalent and has inspired an active interest in
learning more. The Indian Law Institute, with the assistance of the
Ford Foundation, has already begun a national clearinghouse for infor-
mation regarding public interest law.
At the local level, handbooks and leaflets could disseminate informa-
tion on what types of cases are amenable to legal action and possible
types of action. Indians could obtain this information at public meet-
ings or legal aid camps. Also, the courts could distribute these hand-
books to attorneys once they accept legal aid funds. The information
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contained in such a handbook could spread through word of mouth,
primarily through jati ties.
We would encourage the filing of test cases regarding the implemen-
tation of public interest case appellate rules in lower tribunals. This
involves filing cases using simplified procedures, alleging only broad
facts in affidavits, and requesting the appointment of commissioners to
investigate the facts. Test cases would facilitate the collection of this
relevant information and may form a new tool in assisting lawyers in
cases involving the have-nots. We would also encourage the filing of
new public interest test cases in the high courts. Test cases would nor-
mally involve allegations of broad, systematic denials of rights, primar-
ily in the areas of economic rights.
Part of the handbook would include discussions on how to create and
file such cases. In addition, we would encourage legal aid committees,
bar associations, and existing law school clinical programs, to offer as-
sistance to legal aid lawyers in preparing cases and strategies, particu-
larly when such test cases are involved. Such assistance should expand
if a case is appealed.
The most important method of disseminating information about legal
strategies is through their successful pursuit. Nothing spreads like a
success story. The active promoting of such uses of the courts will, by
itself, result in others following similar strategies. We believe that any
pilot programs implemented to effect these strategies is more than in-
formation-gathering devices. Pilot programs would encourage the have-
nots to effectively use the courts.
These suggestions would need to be implemented differently depend-
ing on varying local conditions. A number of pilot programs could de-
velop information as to details. However, starting with poor villagers
and ensuring that they are in control, avoiding new bureaucracies, and
concentrating on the development of existing legal pathways, such pilot
programs have a realistic opportunity of success. They would also avoid
many of the problems that critics of legal aid programs, both in India
and in the United States often describe.
Based upon our examination of Kisanpur, we conclude that much
may be accomplished simply by facilitating access to the existing legal
system in a fairly modest fashion. We believe that villagers may effec-
tively improve their social and economic status within the existing vil-
lage framework without creating too much danger to themselves. We
believe that the legal system may play an important part in this process
because it is not foreign and does not necessarily run counter to ex-
isting village institutions. We believe that poor villagers will, on their
own initiative, often attempt to use legal institutions to advance the
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process, and that a legal aid system would, in many ways, only be as-
sisting that preexisiting process. We also believe that, because of recent
innovations in public interest litigation, the courts are relatively amena-
ble to assisting the poor in pursuing such legal strategies. And, finally,
we believe that pilot legal aid programs can be organized which will be
effective, and which could avoid many of the potential difficulties
pointed to by critics.
Our suggestion for a relatively modest approach depends less on ex-
traordinary leadership, mass organization, bureaucracy or extensive
volunteership, and more on what is already in place. Some of what we
have suggested is already happening. But a series of pilot programs and
studies in detail to confirm or deny the types of observations and con-
clusions made in this essay, may pave the way for a serious reevalua-
tion of legal aid on a grander scale.
